

the command staff was more aware of the political life of the country, but this must be explained by the general upsurge in public life. In economic matters, the command staff was well versed. We quoted above the words

of the same Ludendorff that he was not interested in any parties, and then, when he felt attracted to this, for some reason he ended up in right-wing circles. The rest of Moltke's assistants - Stein, Waldersee, Nikolai, etc. - went the same way. In a word, the "demigods" of the nephew, released into the political arena, with no less zeal than those of their uncle (Moltke Sr.), embarked on a political struggle, finding themselves under a black banner. Ironically, they were even less successful than their ancestors. If the latter reached chancellorships, then the heroes of our time were swept away by the revolution, actually saying goodbye not only to the chancellorship, but also to their military career. True, in such natures as Ludendorff, the rays of hope of returning to the chancellor's office have not yet faded, but life is unlikely to give way to this bison of gloomy reaction. As for the military qualities of both Ludendorff and Stein, who was Quartermaster General

of the headquarters at the beginning of the war, and then in the middle of the war Minister of War, such qualities cannot be denied for them. These were not geniuses, but educated staff workers with a strong character who knew how to prepare for war with a firm hand, and then the war itself.

No matter how tempting the figure of Ludendorff is, in order to dwell on it in more detail, we cannot do this, and we are forced to say goodbye to him, as to Moltke's assistant, in order to meet again with his judgments, cat; independent worker in the German General Staff. With the departure of Stein and

Ludendorff from the latter before the World War, they were replaced by Waldersee and Tappen. We will have to meet with these faces more than once throughout our work, and therefore we will dwell a little on their appearance.

The well-known Hoffmann, former chief of staff of the Eastern Front, characterizes Waldersee as a highly educated, excellent officer of the general staff, but who did not have a strong character and, moreover, was ill. Having received, with the outbreak of the World War, the appointment

Chief of Staff of the 8th Army in East Prussia, Waldersee quickly ended his career, being replaced by Ludendorff in this post after the Battle of Gumbinnen. Tappen, head

of the operations department, who remained in this position until the autumn of 1916 and was replaced by Wetzel only with the arrival of Ludendorff, is a person well illuminated by modern German literature. His closest collaborator Bauer, in his work "The World War in the Field and at Home," gives him, in general, a fairly correct characterization, which is also confirmed by other contemporaries.

Bauer introduces Tappen to us as a man of extraordinary willpower, good nerves and the ability to make quick decisions. Extremely diligent, strict with himself, Tappen could be an excellent boss, if only his knowledge, mental abilities and spiritual qualities were up to par. Mostly friendly to his subordinates, Tappen, however, was impossible with those who did not please him in any way. Everything new, coming out of the 314th circle of the service of the general staff he had learned - his shrine, he did not recognize. In military technology, he saw only an auxiliary means and a

rather secondary one, which view, however, corresponded to the concepts of most officers of the German General Staff. Tappen's viciousness evoked unwanted and sometimes unfair criticism on his part. He brought coldness everywhere with him and acted as a brake.

Other contemporaries confirm Bauer's judgments and all declare with one voice that Tappen could not have been the right hand of such a chief of staff as Moltke. Indeed, with the gentle nature of the latter, Tappen was an undeniably negative figure, not to mention the fact that Moltke could not find an ideological assistant in him. But other qualities characteristic of Tappen, namely, the strength of his will, good nerves and extraordinary diligence, apparently forced Falkengine to keep Tappen as head of the operations department until his own departure in the fall of 1916. Falkenhayn did not need either right or left hands, but he did not deny the importance of the work of the employees standing near him. In his book "The High Command" he says: "Responsibility for

the actions of the high command fell exclusively on the chief of the general staff. He could bear this exceptional burden, of course, only because he was surrounded as employees by a group of distinguished people who must also be considered as belonging to the high command. As can be seen, this Chief of the German General Staff had his own opinions on every issue that arose in the administration, and therefore Tappen could be useful to him as well. As for the "attorneys" in their plans for operations, Falkenhayn chose Freytag von Loringofen, the quartermaster general, and the minister of war, Mr. Wild von Hohenborn, as such.

But under Moltke Tappen, then the notorious Hench, whose identity is also known without us, as well as the head of the general department, who was in charge of appointments on the general staff, constituted the "intimate" circle of the chief of staff. Speaking about the presence of such, Bauer is very sharp about the head of the general department, who had previously been an adjutant and envoy to Moltke and, using his unlimited confidence, was far from partial in all appointments, distinguished at the same time by a rather insignificant knowledge of people. Bauer

recalls with bitterness the existence of this tacit but all-powerful military council under the chief of the German General Staff. We will not dwell on a detailed

description of the German General Staff, no matter how interesting in itself, but only note the commonality inherent in all general staffs before the World War - this is the greatness and isolation of the operational department. If Schlieffen demanded from his subordinates "more to be than to seem", then the operational department of his heir, as well as, we repeat again, other headquarters (Austrian, Russian, French), learned this principle from the other end: "more to seem than to be". The operational branch was the "holy of holies" of the headquarters, and its employees were priests of the highest rank, inaccessible to mere mortals. Closed in on themselves, pretending to be people immersed in work of particular importance, striving to have as little contact as possible with others at the headquarters, not to mention the formation, the employees of the operational department usually even dined

at a separate table and closer to high-profile persons. True, such feigned importance aroused a critical attitude from comrades even at headquarters, and, according to the personal recollection of the author of this work, at the headquarters of the Russian commander-in-chief of the northwestern front, the operators were given the rather unflattering nickname of

“senators”. To put an end to the German General Staff, we must again return to our old acquaintance Ludendorff and listen to his judgments about our staff members. “With my monstrous

work overload and my heavy responsibility,” says the former “senator” of the times of Moltke (the younger), “I could only tolerate independent, direct people around me, from whom I demanded that they frankly express their opinions to me that they , sometimes very thoroughly, and did. With deep faith in their own strength, my employees stood steadfastly and firmly by my side. They were selfless and at the same time independent assistants, imbued with the highest consciousness of duty. The right to decide, of course, belonged to me, tick as the responsibility that I bore did not allow fluctuations. The war demanded swift action. But there was no self-will in my decisions, and when I evaded the offers of my employees, I never insulted them. In these cases, and also when there was an exchange of opinions, I tried, without falling into obscurity, to recognize views that did not coincide with mine. I am pleased with the fame and good reputation of my employees. I have always held the view, and still hold it, that war is so grandiose and gives such wide scope for brilliant creativity that one person cannot fulfill all the demands it makes. My first collaborator in the East was the then Lieutenant Colonel, now Major General Hoffmann, an intelligent officer full of the best aspirations. Characterizing his headquarters in the future by individual characters, Ludendorff says: “In the main apartment, I took Lieutenant

Colonel Wetzel to develop operations ... He was a wonderful soldier's nature, with a loyal and strong character. Enterprising and cheerful, precise in his work, he was an excellent and sweet assistant to me.

Giving further characteristics to individuals, Ludendorff notes in them, as positive qualities, a huge

efficiency, iron diligence, foresight, talent, calm and clear thought, organizational skills, etc. With the advent of Ludendorff, other customs started up at the

German headquarters: lively conversation. I willingly took part in it, but sometimes they talked about official business. Of course, we strictly observed that operational measures were not discussed at the common table (a very good and useful custom; B.Sh.). Visitors who arrived at the headquarters were often invited instead of us to the table or only to the office. "From visiting officers of all types of arms and from all divisions of the front, we learned about what was being done in the army, sometimes better than through large official reports." "I attached the greatest

importance to close ties with the front and received many messages that I always knew how to use, why these military visits were especially desirable and valuable to me."

Thus, as if everything was going well at the German headquarters, but we must deliver some disappointment to the "fictitious" chief of the general staff. "His first collaborator in the East," Hoffmann, testifies to us that, in addition to his immediate assistants, even in operational matters, Ludendorff liked to listen to opinions and unofficial advisers from the operational department, with whom he had a former friendship. The former crown prince writes in his memoirs: "In my opinion, Ludendorff did not always know how to choose his closest employees and also did not pay due attention to pointing out their mistakes and shortcomings. Too often, too, he ignored reports that dissented or refuted their reports. The reason for this was again his noble understanding of the duty of loyalty to his assistants, who, to the best of their ability, but always, however, standing at the height of their position, undoubtedly strove to fulfill their tasks in the best possible way. This explains why he endured the posts of many people who did not correspond to their abilities longer than it would be desirable in the interests of the cause.

With this, we lower the curtain over the German General Staff, skimming through it from Moltke (senior) to Ludendorff. They dwelled on it, however, in detail because this headquarters set the tone for the rest of the headquarters of the European armies and served as a model for them.

It would seem that it was possible to limit ourselves to this and again return to our old acquaintances from the banks of the Danube, but we will still allow ourselves to look into one of the headquarters of the opposite side. We already in the introduction abandoned the study of the Russian General Staff, and therefore here, without raising the curtain on his life, we turn

to the French General Staff. The French General Staff, having plunged into dust and non-existence of its enemy - the German General Staff, is now following in its footsteps, being a trendsetter for the armies of its vassals.

It was noted above that the revolution dismissed the general staff as a caste, and only with the reaction, with the restoration of the Bourbons, in 1818, Napoleon's Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cyr again puts forward the idea - to have well-trained specially trained staff workers in the army. Having ruled out protectionism in the selection of the latter, Saint-Cyr laid the foundation for the general staff corps, staffed from the applied school of the general staff. Instead of worldly protectionism, the protectionism of science and knowledge was put on the stage. Isolation from the army, the guild nature of the newly created institution, the lack of good training and work in the general staff itself did not create authority for him either among the troops or among senior commanders. The defeats of 1870 dealt the final blow to the prestige of this institution. Headquarters, Destroying the

of the III Republic, following the model of the German General Government created at the Ministry of War something like a Greater German General Staff with a Chief of Staff at the head.

The instability of the latter in office, the fear of returning to a caste institution, the Napoleonic principles of the authority of senior military commanders - introduced the same instability in the French general staff - or rather in the "general staff service", since the general staff, as a special corps, was not restored. The "General Staff Service" was filled with officers who received a higher military education - "brevet".

We are deprived of the opportunity to dwell on the French General Staff, as we will call it for clarity. Our acquaintance with him will begin at the beginning of the 20th century.

Placed in the position of technical workers, like their ancestors in the era of Napoleon, the French general staff actively plunged into the study of the technique of staff service, overtaking their enemies, the Germans, in this. Humbled in the ideological and administrative part, this general staff was accumulating strength in order to join the struggle for the expansion of its rights. First of all, it was

necessary to overthrow their gods among the general staff and give way to young forces and trends. As is known, after the defeats of 1870, French military thought was brought up on defensive tendencies for a future war with a neighbor on the Rhine. Seeing in the defense an opportunity to stop the onslaught of the Germans, the tops of the army and the general staff led in this direction both the development of a war plan and the preparation of the army. But already at

the beginning of the 20th century, signs of criticism of the accepted views on the nature of the future war on the Rhine appeared in French military thought, and the young forces of the general staff came out with a sermon of the offensive.

The discussion that had begun in literature was soon transferred to the life of the General Staff. The well-known Grandmaison, a member of the General Staff, declared war on General Michel, Vice-President of the Military Council, accusing him of predilection for "defence". The "Young Turkish" movement of the general staff in Paris ended with the resignation of Michel and the promotion to the post of chief of staff of Joffre with his party of "demigods" with "patents" of higher military education.

The "Young Turks" won, and henceforth the General Staff began to deepen its rights not only in the army, but extended them to

the life of the

country. We have dwelt on this brief history of the French General Staff in order to make the following presentation more intelligible. In his fascinating work

The Headquarters, Jean de Nierrfe gives us a brilliant characterization of the French General Staff and the relations that have developed in it.

Pointing out that "brevet" (in our concept - an officer of the general staff; L. Sh.), i.e. those with a "patent" of higher military education were distinguished by their striking isolation from other army commanders, Jean de Pierrefe notes that almost all of them were reactionaries with an instinctive desire to stay away from progress and a deep distrust of advanced opinions.

The Brevet retained a strict devotion to morals, extreme honesty, a weakness for savings, tradition, an absence of curiosity about everything that came out of the scope of his career, a complete ignorance of extraneous ideas and, above all, mental narrowness. The French officer of the general staff

despised everything that was not part of his environment, whether it was society or even that army, the flesh of whose flesh he was. Such was the general type of "brain

of the army" on the other side of the Rhine.

Having outlined it, we hasten to return to the question of interest to us.

First of all, we must get to know Joffre a little closer. Pierrefe draws him as a wayward and intractable person) who arbitrarily guarded his authority. In his headquarters, he was an autocratic master, and there were very few people who did not cower him.

Punctual in the distribution of the day, Joffre could not bear the delay on the part of his subordinates. Having succumbed to first impressions, he did not change them later. Preferring to see modest people around him, but not timid and shy, Joffre could not stand employees who spoke a lot, especially in a raised tone and with courage, as well as speakers who tried to convince him of anything. In the latter case, the painful authority immediately interrupted speaker.

The "Young Turks", putting forward Joffre's candidacy for the chief of the general staff, did not calculate a little, thinking to see in him an obedient dummy in a place of honor. However, even with such a boss, a wide field was still opened for them to identify the qualities indicated above. Pierrfe

says that despite the fact that general staff officers generally occupied a privileged place in the army, "especially privileged" ones still stood out among them, constituting the third division of the headquarters (operational). It was considered a

special chic to serve in this department, which during the first three years of the war had all the signs of a closed monastic circle. Self-confident and reveling in their own dignity, seized by the same feeling of dislike for other people's faces and opinions, with the same way of thinking, the priests of this department inexorably guarded their authority and the authority of their commander-in-chief, trying to isolate him from extraneous influences.

Severe and even cruel in judging the actions of the senior officers of the army, the "brevet" of the operational department, with their conclusions and personal inspections of the units, contributed a lot to the frequent change of the senior officers of the army, which marked the first periods of the war. Pierrfe points out that, despite the best feelings that overwhelmed the officers of the 3rd division when they visited the units, they still brought a lot of harm, because: 1) they were blind admirers of the official doctrine, 2) they turned out to be little familiar with reality, and 3) usually visited only the headquarters, but not the troops. The same Pierrfe gives

us a vivid image of the attitude of an employee of the operational department not only to the army, but even to the government of France. Speaking about the fact that with the victory at Marie Joffre turned out to be almost the ruler of the whole country, the author describes the first trip of Colonel Penelon, who was under the President of the Republic, to Joffre's headquarters in order to establish contact and receive orientation about the events taking place at the front. Arriving at headquarters, Penelon turned to the operations department. where he had personal connections but was coldly received. When Penelon dedicated the operators to the purpose of his visit and began to prove the need for o

government, it was subjected to a brutal attack by the priests, who rejected all power in France, except for the power of Joffre and ... perhaps the most operational branch.

"But, however, what do you want to do with the government?" Penelon asked bitterly.

"With the government... let it clean up the colonies!" came the rather definite and firm reply of the monks of Joffre's headquarters. Thus began "parliamentary control" in France!

Pierrefe also introduces to us the head of the operations department, Colonel Hamselin, who took up this position after the Marne, a prominent part in the plan of which is attributed to him, as being at the disposal of Joffre. Now, as is known, Gamelin commands troops in Syria against the Druze.

Distinguished by a youthful appearance, although he was already over 45 years old, dapper in clothes, good health, Gamelin was easy to handle and never abused the trust that he enjoyed with Joffre. Silent, with a soft voice, skillfully owning his language, Gamelin knew how to passionately defend his opinions and convince those who listened to them. One of the first to graduate from

higher military school, Gamelin had a reputation as a good strategist, and if we take into account his manner of reporting to Joffre, which corresponded to the character of the latter, the great influence that Gamelin enjoyed with the commander in chief, who loved his chief of the operational department, becomes quite understandable. Gamelin was one of the members of Joffre's

intimate circle, which usually met at the dinner table at his mandarin. In darker colors, Pierrfe sketches the image of the head of the first department,

who was in charge of the personnel of the army, Lieutenant Colonel Bem. Small, black, with a hard face, with a cold gaze of rapidly blinking eyes

in a pince-nez, with an insinuating and uneven gait, Belle sowed horror as he passed through the headquarters corridors, showing himself as a prosecutor returning from the execution of a criminal. Belle had an enormous memory, knowing almost the entire composition of the French army. With mock gaiety, in short minutes, he rests his 12-hour

works, Belle put together. cruelty in the treatment of representatives of the army who approached him on official business. He was guilty of the expulsion from office of one hundred and forty-seven generals, whom Joffre himself did not save, for Rehl was inexorable in his reports and attestations. Neither the chiefs of staff nor his assistants dared to object to Bel.

Known to Joffrey before the war, Belle enjoyed his unlimited confidence, belonging to the intimate circle of the Marshal of France. If we saw

a certain hospitality at Hindenburg's headquarters, then his opponents received a cold reception from his opponents in the person of their representatives. No one, of course, thought of not only asking them about the situation at the front, but even inviting them to the dining room, and the senior military commanders who came, in order not to die of hunger, had to turn to ordinary restaurants. No

matter how interesting the further deepening into the life of the French General Staff, we are forced to refuse this, asking for forgiveness and for allowing ourselves to dwell more or less in detail on Joffre's "main apartment". We were prompted to do this, on the one hand, by the desire not to confine ourselves to interpreting the issue within a purely German framework, since the German and Austrian general staffs were still to some extent related, and on the other, by the desire to lift the veil over the "brilliant" French general staff, which occupied now on the world stage the first place among the "brains of the army" of various countries. Usually the winners always serve

as a model and look at them, study them at best, and often blindly copy them. Some of the armies today are doing this, taking the French general staff as a model. In addition, the latter, setting up military hegemony among the vassal states of Europe at the behest of the "free republic", himself seeks to transfer the way of life and work of the general staff from French soil to another, without thinking about how susceptible this other soil will be for the successful growth of such institutions. . In view of this, we believe that we will not be reproached for evading the description of our heroes from the banks of the Danube, especially since

their figures will be more understandable after acquaintance with those on the banks of the Spree and the Seine.

The parallel drawn between the personnel of the three modern headquarters (Austrian, German and French), we believe, frees us from assessing Konrad's assistants, because the reader of this chapter will himself make a certain judgment about the characters of the Austro-Hungarian general staff.

Chapter IX

"From him all the qualities"

Collective management of the war as a whole. – The modern "commander" in the management of the war. – Necessity and importance of the war control apparatus. - A. Svechin on the General Staff. - The main duties of the commander of our days. - "Authority" chief of the general staff and "intimate" circles with him. - "Copyright" in the General Staff. - Development of initiative in the staff of the General Staff. - "Toulon" in the work of the General Staff. - Requirements for staff members. - The attitude of the chief of the general staff to subordinates. - Education by the chief of the general staff of his subordinates. - The political outlook of the staff of the General Staff. - Development of volitional properties among the staff of the General Staff. - their performance. - The "silence" and "modesty" of the General Staff. - Sociability. - The tact of the staff of the General Staff. – The nature of oral presentations. - General staff and system. - "More to be,

than to appear."

The reader of our work visited a number of halls with portraits of employees of the general staff of various armies and even of different eras. Before him passed the "ancient heroes" - "demigods", we stopped his attention on the painting of the "new" school, close to us in time. Courageous, energetic, stubborn faces looked from the walls, with a fold of mind on their foreheads and an imprint of character in their faces.

We will not explain to the reader the individual characteristics of each of the persons who left their appearance in the portrait gallery, but will focus on more general conclusions about the personnel

the general staff, its significance, training, education and way of life life.

It seems that, without any special explanation, one can notice common features among the personnel of the headquarters we have outlined, cultivated in different states, far from similar to one another. Such a phenomenon becomes quite understandable if we recall that the general staff of the army of various European states was staffed and belonged entirely to the same bourgeois class, which has common features, wherever it lives - on the Danube, Spree or Seine. If the armies of these states nevertheless included representatives of the working class and the peasantry, then the general staff isolated itself from this. The "brain" of the capitalist army could only be bourgeois and nothing else. Therefore, no matter what headquarters we looked into, everywhere we found the same bright representatives of the bourgeoisie, jealously guarding the interests of the latter. Thus, on the one

hand, copying the most conservative of the headquarters - the German one, and on the other, most importantly, class interests left the above imprint on the general staff of one or another of the states listed above. In the preceding chapters, it was noted that the leadership of

the war as a whole in our days has decisively and irrevocably passed from the hands of the commander to the collective. The commander in his ranks is one of the statesmen responsible for the military side of the war. and in other areas of jurisdiction, he only makes his own demands, but by no means leads the whole country as a whole. We pointed out the false understanding of this principle by the German General Staff in the time of Moltke and in the World War, and therefore, we believe, no special proof of the provisions put forward by life itself is required.

There remains the "military side" of the war, which should be controlled by one personality of the commander, like Napoleon. However, if we remember, then, according to Schlieffen's concept, Napoleon could do this only by "stealing the sacred fire from the sky." Nowadays, such fairy tales are no longer believed, and therefore we allow ourselves to fully adhere to the views of Conrad, J that even in the military field, the management of the war is possible only with a well-organized, correctly, clearly and smoothly functioning military control apparatus, part of which is the General Staff . Now

the last actual chief of the German general staff, Ludendorff, testifies that one commander is not able to single-handedly conduct a war, and, consequently, prepare for it.

In his "Strategy", A. Svechin says: "The advantages of the German system (military administration; B. Sh.) consisted in the fact that, while maintaining the appearance of feudal parochialism, they allowed the assignment of responsible work to talented specialists, regardless of their age, not with official position. The army was entrusted to a young general or even a colonel, who was officially listed only as kik "chief" (chief of staff), and who had with him a decent representative of the idea of feudal seniority. "Of course," A. Svechin comes to quite healthy

conclusions, "the conclusions of this system fall away in an army that has finally freed itself from feudal prejudices and is happy to take command of young leaders, ***beyond any line of seniority***" (*our italics*: B.Sh.).

"From here, however, it does not yet follow that the general staff is a relic of feudalism ... the commander in modern war conditions must rely on a whole team of selected assistants, fit for any responsible work, deserving full confidence."

"Such a team is already required to streamline the gigantic work of preparing for war. Coordination, harmonization of training ... can only be done by the General Staff, a collection of people who forged and tested their military views under the same conditions, under the same leadership, selected in the most careful way, bound themselves by mutual responsibility, and through friendly actions reaching a turning point in military development ". "The modern forms of the operation into which the battle

has developed do not allow one person to lead it; dozens and hundreds of trusted agents are needed, each of whom would not be a bureaucrat, but a conscious representative of the highest military command, so that modern operational forms can be applied. No amount of telegraph wires will provide communication in the absence of

of the General Staff: telegrams will be invested with one understanding by the writers and the other by the readers.

"The presence of a well-functioning general staff, among others, can be advantages and allows managed by concise orders," A. Svechin said further. "Just as two Hughes apparatuses, standing at two ends of a wire, must be preliminarily set up by a mechanic in order to quickly and intelligently print the transmitted dispatch, in the same way the general staff of both conspiring instances must be preliminarily set up by a master experienced in strategy and operational art."

"The General Staff," concludes A. Svechin, "should speak the same language and put the same thoughts into certain expressions." We considered

it necessary to elucidate the views of our literature on the General Staff, contemporary to us, in order to then proceed to a discussion of the impression made from visiting the Museum of the General Staff. Without hesitation,

we join the thoughts of the former Chief of the Austrian General Staff, which boil down to the fact that the commander today has to be satisfied only with the ideological side and the general direction of the entire work of the military command and control apparatus, and find satisfaction in his good work. In other words, the modern commander is subject to further dismemberment, and the need for good collective work, i.e. the importance of individual governing bodies is increasing, even in the ideological part of the leadership, and not only in their technical work. The commander of our day will not be able to work with such a headquarters as Napoleon had, even with Berthier. The thoughts we have just repeated of the former Chief of the Austrian General Staff were

expressed after the World War. We do not know how inclined he was to be guided by them at headquarters before the war. Judging by his high appreciation of the role of the chief of staff and the continuous battles that he wages for it, one could conclude that Konrad sought to put into practice the views of Moltke (senior) with his "one" opinion and "one" only face. However,

the presence of an "intimate circle" of staff workers under Conrad suggests otherwise.

The existence of such circles of specially selected persons was characteristic of all three headquarters before and at the beginning of the World War; in the future, such a circle was around Falkengene, and Ludendorff did not disdain side advice from his subordinates, as Hoffmann told us about this. At the same time, we saw how outwardly each of the commanders guarded his authority as the "single" arbiter of military operations ... In view of the

foregoing, it is necessary to dwell a little more closely on the "authority" of the modern commander and the need for a "close circle" of advisers around him.

There are no words that the prestige of the commanders of our day should be understood as a tradition of unity of command of military leaders. As has just been pointed out, the process of dismembering the commander in the military field is natural today, and therefore it is not necessary to speak of his "authority", in the previous sense of that. Here it is only necessary to establish whether the commander in wartime, and the chief of the general staff in peacetime, is able to retain authority in the general leadership of the military apparatus of command or whether he needs an auxiliary body in this area of command. We say "auxiliary", because only those intimate circles that existed under the chiefs of staff could be such. The general leadership of the war, even within its military

framework, is now so difficult that laying it on one person is a great burden, feasible only for outstanding people who, perhaps, just fit to steal the "sacred fire" before that. And since the commanders before the World War still did not consider it possible to do this, it is therefore understandable that they were looking for support in close people, trying to find in them, at best, verification of the correctness of their judgments, and at worst - an unspoken military advice, about which bitterly recalled the German Bauer. Such intimate circles, selected moreover on the basis of property, kinship or former service, however, were not reliable criteria for the correctness of the plans and steps taken by the commander or chief of staff. They should be regarded as painful growths, as a concession to "tradition", as a phenomenon inherent in the bourgeois class, and to them

Engels' judgment can be justly attributed that it is better not to have a headquarters at all than to have instead a close circle of relatives, friends, acquaintances and former colleagues, as an auxiliary body under the commander.

No matter how difficult the preparation for modern warfare and its conduct in the theater of operations, we still do not think of a commander or chief of the general staff limited in his ideological, creative part by any preservation of "chiefs" who "achieve turning points in military development through friendly performances", as A. Svechin says. We do not want to enter into polemics or object to the author of the excellent work "Strategy", but let us only remind our reader of the "Young Turks" of the French General Staff, "by friendly actions achieved a turning point in doctrine" and reaped the first setbacks at the beginning of the war of 1914. If you turn a few pages back and read about the French General Staff before the World War, then we will not find a difference with the thoughts expressed by A. Svechin. military construction" and "bound themselves to mutual responsibility" cannot always establish correct and correct forecasts of military development and the war itself. In such a general staff we see the former "demigods" and "intimate circles", but with a larger number of members.

“An army that has finally freed itself from feudal prejudices and gladly accepts the command of young leaders, beyond any line of seniority,” such a general staff is not needed at all, and in another case, the chief of staff will very likely also be from the “young leaders”, for whom they will turn out to be redundant persons who "bound themselves by mutual responsibility" and windbreaks. A modern commander needs a workable control apparatus and nothing more. Rejecting, thus, the need for intimate circles. advisers to the commander or the chief of the general staff, we come to another issue, namely: "authorship" in the work. Since the importance of the activities of independent military command and control bodies has risen, the question of authorship in the work becomes topical. We saw how "Uncle" Moltke admitted

only "one" opinion, which he formed after a preliminary discussion with his subordinates, and only he "alone" reported this opinion, bearing all responsibility for it. Before our very eyes, Moltke's nephew recognized Ludendorff's "authorship" in the project to strengthen the army, for which all troubles fell not on the chief of the general staff, but on the "author". Conrad tells us that in this case, following the views of Moltke Sr., he took full responsibility for himself, but the "author" remained in the background. In other words, should each of the employees of the general staff have his own "Toulon" or leave all the laurels and sorrows for him to his boss. "Copyright" in the service of the General Staff has long been

a topic of discussion and practical resolution. We can say that it arose with the recognition of the duumvirate as a management system, i.e. at the beginning of the 19th century. We are talking about the relationship of the General Staff with their combatant commanders. Without going into the motives for resolving this issue in the German army, which was controversial for a long time, we will limit ourselves to indicating that "copyright" was left to the commanding staff. Apparently, Caprivi did not claim "authorship" in Bredov's attack, partly, apparently, because the "demigod" was not particularly flattered by the disclosure of the methods by which he implanted this authorship. But one cannot remain silent about the fact that the "authorship" was hidden only outwardly, while inside the General Staff these authors were known and entered into the appropriate lists. In other general staffs, following the Prussian model or by virtue of the firm acceptance of the principle of one-man command, copyright has found the same permission. Although it must be said that after the World War, the representatives of the General Staff from the banks of the Spree seem to hold a different view, and next to the names of military commanders they always mention their chiefs of staff, which can be partly explained by the desire to perpetuate the memory of the workers of the General Staff, now crossed out by the hand of the Entente from the living list.

In the former Russian army, the "copyright" of the general staff was recognized and even rewarded, but only if the chief testified that success was achieved thanks to the plan developed by his chief of staff.

Such was the law, but custom in all armies brought into use, along with the command line, the so-called general staff line. The "demigods" had their own "divine" subordination, and often played them not only in front of their immediate combatant commanders, but also contributed to their removal from their posts. The "line of the general staff" was sacredly guarded by the druids from top to bottom. It is hardly necessary, of course, to prove the whole harm of such a "line of conduct" - clearly even without us, especially for "an army that has completely freed itself from feudal prejudices and gladly accepts the command of young leaders." However, to our deep regret, the same is recommended for her. We have heard the opinion of A. Svechin that the

modern general staff are "trusted agents", "conscious representatives of the high command", that this "meeting of people" should be "preliminarily set up by a master experienced in strategy and operational art", that "the general staff should speak in

one language."

Finally, A. Svechin emphasizes: "The role of the General Staff in overcoming local, bell interests is especially important." Pointing out that these bell-like interests are characteristic of the highest commanders, because "the highest commanding staff can be disciplined incomparably tighter than the Red Army soldiers," A. Svechin comes to a certain conclusion: "The General Staff are agents of one whole, not connected with the local interests of this unit, with given traditions, but connected with the idea of victory on the armed front as a whole. His duty is to put forward these common goals and fight against bell deviations.

Well, why not the "divine line of conduct", that old, unwritten line of the General Staff, which we just talked about? Well, what if the top command staff came out of the bowels of the General Staff? Apparently, he, in addition to the command line, should be "a trusted agent of the whole," for he is "preliminarily set up by an experienced master in strategy and operational art." With all due respect to the author of the Strategy, we resolutely refuse to join his views and rather join Napoleon in his assessment of the General Staff. It is not far from the "divine line of conduct" of the general staff and to the "general staff

swagger", and we dare to assure that a strong combat commander will not tolerate such "patronage" over himself, resolutely putting a limit on the power of a "trusted agent", or simply removing him from himself.

The General Staff cannot be an interpreter or explainer of orders from a higher authority for its chief, a "tuned Hughes apparatus", since, first of all, a common understanding of military phenomena must be established among the high command, orders must be written in such a way that they clearly express their thoughts only for the general staff, but also for the combat commander. It must not be forgotten that the leader, and not his "chief", is still responsible for success or failure, and that combat commander is bad, who, like Moltke, will look for the culprits in his subordinates, and not in himself.

Having rejected the interference of "conscious representatives of the high command" in the terms of reference of combatant commanders, we will focus on "copyright" among the general staff itself, in view of the existence of precedents for its "actual" recognition. It was noted above that the former Chief of the Austrian General Staff always took into account the opinions and reports of his employees, accepted the expedient ones, demanded initiative work, even changed his basic assumptions, but this, however, did not lead him to legitimize the "copyright" of his employees and throwing the blame on them in case of failure, as Moltke (the younger) did. There are no words, it is flattering for everyone to have their own Toulon, but one must not forget that its glory should belong to the one who is responsible. Let us turn to Ludendorff's Toulon. It would seem that, first of all, the chief of the general staff is responsible for the timely strengthening of the army, and appropriate projects should come from him, since more than any of his subordinates, he could know the political and economic situation of the present and the prospects for its development in the future. . If the chief of the operational department was the first to raise the issue and developed a project, this means that the chief of staff did not assess the situation in time, but only followed his subordinate. But if this were the case, then the sanction of the project for submitting it to the highest authorities should have come from the top boss, and, thus, all responsibility was placed on the shoulders of the chief of staff. Who knows -

would not Germany have met a better fate on the battlefields if not Ludendorff, but Moltke himself, had been removed from the general staff in a timely manner, for in the post of chief of the operational department, Ludendorff, perhaps, would have turned out to be more useful than in the independent position of the first quartermaster general. Moltke, as you know, failed a second time, but not before the Reichstag, but ... before the French. An evil irony of fate - the "author" of this failure was again not Moltke, but the deplorable memory of Hench, but only this time the chief of the general staff did not get away with this "authorship" as easily as the episode with Ludendorff. If we deny "authorship" to the general staff in general, and among its subordinates in particular, then we are quite far from suppressing their initiative in their work or bending down their vanity. Both the first and the second should be respected, appreciated and developed in their subordinates, highlighting their work on merit when necessary, but not shifting all responsibility for it solely on them. Conrad's opinion of this is to our liking. But Toulon!? How about Toulon!? Everyone wears it in his satchel! The indication is fair, but inapplicable in staff work, because here it is necessary "to be more than to seem." The glory of the excellent work of the "silent" employee in this field will also imperceptibly, but surely pass into the thickness of the army. The fate of Metzger is a guarantee for the doubter. Konrad, the whole army, his own country and even the allies of the Germans knew and appreciated this man, calling him "the right hand" of Konrad, but Metzger himself did not show "copyright" until the end of his days, which is clearly seen from his work in Volume V Schwarte " World War", written after that. His "Tulon" did not leave him! It would be erroneous to conclude

that in the era of Napoleon there were no high requirements for staff workers. They at that time mainly focused on the technique of this service.

Since the Moltke era, staff members have been required to take part in the ideological side of the preparation for and conduct of war, and every year this demand is more and more increased to such an extent that without a well-established, ideologically working apparatus of military administration, it is now impossible to either prepare for war or hold it.

Therefore, it is clear that people who are well educated, with energy and initiative, hard-working, independent in their judgments and actions, but at the same time tactful and modest in the community, should be called to lead the individual bodies of this administration. We have seen the demands

made by Konrad and other chiefs of staff in this regard, and we will not repeat them here. We will speak about the qualities of the staff members of the general staff a little later, but now we will only note again that special attention should be paid to their selection, which, of course, is one of the most important concerns of the chief of staff. We would only warn against one thing - this is from drawing up a headquarters on the basis of relatives and friends, because in this case it is better not to have any headquarters at all. Let us

now dwell on the relationship between the chief of staff and his subordinates. The examples above show that the chief of staff should follow only the general management of the work of his subordinate bodies, without interfering in its details. The foregoing does not mean at all that the chief of staff does not need to know the details of the work - no, they should sometimes be looked through, but not taken on their implementation himself, leaving this area to his subordinates. Schlieffen's pettiness in recalling earlier reports, in disagreement with later reports, will be exchanged precisely with this, and we do not consider "petty" as a chicanery on the part of the chief of staff, but as a certain control. Then we must not forget that a detailed study of a particular issue may entail a change even in its ideological part. Thus, while giving a general direction to the work of his subordinate

bodies, the chief of staff cannot regard the directive instructions given to him as unshakable and not subject to change. We have seen that Moltke (senior) and Konrad usually subjected them to a preliminary analysis. The Chief of the Austrian General Staff and even the tough Ludendorff recognized that only the final decision remained with them, but their preliminary instructions could always be changed. Let us just repeat once again that modern management requires detailed consideration of the decision being made, and since this is beyond the power of one chief of staff, then without preliminary detailed

the elaboration of a draft decision by subordinate bodies cannot be vouched for its expediency. Konrad points out that after such a study, he had to change the grounds for the earlier decision. Needless to say, initiative in the

work of subordinate bodies should not only be welcomed by the chief of staff, but even required by them. In this case, it is necessary to show skill and tact in order, on the one hand, to introduce initiative work into regular use, and on the other hand, not to cut off their desire for fruitful activity by a sharp rejection of the unsuccessful proposals of subordinates. The former Chief of the Austrian General Staff rightly considered it necessary to note this in his memoirs, emphasizing at the same time that he never introduced nervousness into the work of his subordinates. Schlieffen's "sarcasm" may have revealed his mind, but, on the other hand, it could have a harmful effect on the work of subordinates, why would we not introduce them into everyday life. Speaking about relationships with his subordinates, Konrad points out that he

never communicated with subordinates over the head of their immediate superiors. It seems that nothing can be objected to such an order of work, it only needs to be welcomed, but there will undoubtedly be exceptions when the subordinate chief himself will report in the presence of his closest assistant directly leading this or that branch of work. With precise and detailed work, which should be the service of the General Staff today, the above exception can turn into a rule. We repeat again that "Toulons" in the service of the General Staff do not find a place for themselves. The well-known selection of members of the general staff, even if carried out in the most thorough manner, is not yet a guarantee of the excellent work of

the headquarters. The latter will require: 1) the ideological connection of all employees in the same understanding of the various phenomena of military activity; 2) the improvement of the workers themselves in military affairs, which is rapidly advancing; 3) educating them in the sense of developing character; 4) improvement in the technique of staff service; 5) strengthening their physical qualities, since the staff service requires excellent health and endurance.

From what has been said above, it is clear that all the chiefs of staff whom we represented paid special attention to this. The solution of individual tactical problems, war games, field trips with the exchange of opinions of the chief of staff with his subordinates, and historical work served as a means to this. To the above cycle of studies with members of the General Staff, we must now definitely add political training and the corresponding political education of the staff. For physical strengthening, employees were involved in sports circles, special horse races, excursions, etc. were organized for them. Let us now allow ourselves not to go into details of the training of the staff of the general staff, since we will do this in the chapter on the training of the general staff as a whole. Above, we emphasized that in purely official relations, tact, tolerance for other people's opinions

and views, no jerking in work and ... less "sarcasm" should be observed from above. We are not attracted by Joffre's manner in dealing with subordinates. There are no words, the chief of staff should never lose his authority, but, as indicated earlier, such authority is created not by strictness and impregnability, but by spiritual and moral qualities. "Mandarin" has outlived its time even in China! On the contrary, the more simplicity and cordiality will be shown on both sides, when complete harmony is established between the boss and subordinates, the greater the chance that the work will go without friction. Even with all his inclinations towards "sarcasm", Schlieffen, according to the testimony of those around him, was a cordial person with his subordinates, expressing, however, this is sometimes quite original. Konrad tries to attribute these properties to himself, although contemporaries say that he brought a tense atmosphere with him everywhere. Ludendorff also finds it necessary to emphasize his and Hindenburg's sociability with the headquarters. Even a closed chief of staff, like Falkenhayn, and he, it is true, in a close circle, was simple with his subordinates. In a word, oddly enough, only in "free" France did the mandarin continue to live and flourish, not to mention the Russian general staff, where the balls on the head of "tangerines" were always valued much higher than the contents in their skull. "More to be than to seem" is obligatory both for subordinates and for the boss.

Now we turn directly to subordinates. Somewhat above, we partially indicated what qualities the employees of the general staff should possess.

We are far from writing ten commandments for staff workers and listing point by point all the virtues that they should have, since in general we are opponents of "points" in our conclusions. The characteristics of the staff workers outlined above show with sufficient clarity that not dry morality hammered into points should be embedded in the mental and moral properties of the staff of the headquarters.

Therefore, we will focus only on certain issues that constitute one or another interest for our day.

It was noted above that the composition of the responsible staff of the headquarters should not be alien to politics, i.e. 1) to have appropriate political training and to be constantly aware of the political life not only of one's own country, but also of neighboring states, and 2) not to create one's own policy, purely military, because such a policy does not exist in nature separately. The foregoing presentation shows that the members of the General Staff did not receive political training and education at all, and their political views were developed by life and rotation in a certain bourgeois environment. It is impossible, of course, to recognize, let's say, Slamechka's political erudition, if he had only a sharp pen and could successfully put on paper the thoughts in this area of his patron, the chief of the general staff. All contemporaries (Germans, French, etc.) now unanimously testify to the political illiteracy of their general staffs, and therefore we have introduced a new one into the number of duties of their superiors, namely, concern for the political training and education of their employees.

As for the "authorship" of the General Staff in politics, we will touch on this in more detail below, but now we consider it necessary to note that we do not think of such authorship, since politics is the business and duty of other state bodies, and not the General Staff. The latter must take into account political life, draw conclusions from it, make those or other wishes that are necessary for the defense of the country, but which by no means prevail over other branches of the development of the life of the state. Never

we should forget the teachings of Clausewitz that "in any case, the art of war is not a decree to politics."

After the first world shake-up, the truth is now being repeated, expressed a hundred years ago by a philosopher of war.

In chapter V, Napoleon's judgment is given that the commander needs a balance of mind and character, and the little corporal clearly explained this by resorting to geometry. Since now, according to Ludendorff's just remark, every soldier becomes a commander, the same balance of mind and character should be characteristic of representatives of the general staff. In this, the Austrian General Staff shied away from the development of mental abilities over character, for which they received reproaches from their German allies. True, among the latter, individual characters of the general staff, in the Hench family, also did not have the character characteristic of a leader at critical moments. In general, it should be noted that the very mode of work of the General Staff, with a constant strain of the mind and with less practice in the application of its moral properties, tends to upset this balance precisely in the direction of diminishing moral forces. In these views, we specifically pointed out the need to develop in the subordinates of the chief of staff responsibility and initiative in work, as well as independence in the latter. From my side. and the characters of the general staff must always remember that, in addition to knowledge, willpower is also required from them, and therefore they are obliged to make a forest of efforts to develop volitional qualities in themselves.

We consider it necessary to note here the efficiency that should be inherent in the staff of the General Staff. Modern military affairs require careful study of all issues and their thorough study. If even one issue requires long and painstaking work on it, then what can we say if we take their sum, which is the function of one or another governing body. There is no doubt that it will require tremendous effort from those who are called for this. A difficult feat is the path of a staff worker, and everyone who embarks on it must be aware of this. It should not be forgotten that daily self-improvement in military affairs is necessarily added to purely service activities, i.e. certain

absorption of literature and participation in it with a pen. Great mental activity is required from the staff of the general staff, and therefore the desire to strengthen their bodies is understandable, which was considered necessary by each of the chiefs of staff.

In the foregoing presentation, we have given Schlieffen's judgment of that "taciturnity" and modesty, which should be the lot of members of the general staff. It must be said that these qualities were hard to inculcate even in the German General Staff, not to mention other staffs, for which the legacy of the German General Staff was by no means obligatory. In fact, in all armies, the general staff, officially or unofficially (French), has degenerated into a special caste, even in the military environment, not to mention the life of the whole country. Several representatives of the "black clergy" passed before our eyes, hiding under their monastic cassock all their arrogance towards others, their "divine" rightness in certain views and actions, all the cruelty in pronouncing various sentences, sometimes far from corresponding to reality. We think that there is no need to give additional illustrations to what has been said above. In particular, in relation to the Austrian headquarters, its isolation from the army was noted. In 1913, such a caste structure of the General Staff, its skills and habits caused criticism in the press, both civilian and purely military, advising the "black clergy" to look into the book of "good tone" more often.

We are far from recommending "good manners" in its usual sense, but we consider it necessary to note that it is imperative for the general staff to establish normal relations both with the civilian environment and with the troops, and, finally, within the thickness of the general staff itself. Before us passed the "brevet" of the operational section of the French headquarters, we showed the types of the same section of the German headquarters, outlined their representatives in the Austrian. Everywhere we found only one "senators", for whom the authority of not only the commander in chief, but even ... the government was often questioned. That such a phenomenon was an ugliness in the general staff, that it must be eradicated, that it is peculiar only to a rotten bourgeois system, there is no need to say much about this. We think that leafing through these

pages earlier than us will turn away from such characters and they will not be his heroes. Silence and

modesty do not yet signify the humiliation of the individual. We do not deny ambition in a military leader, but we do not elevate it to the first place among the incentives that encourage work: above is debt.

There is no doubt that people called upon to keep the secrets of preparing and conducting operations should be distinguished by "silence", moreover, they are obliged to be "silent", and we especially recommend this quality to every employee of the General Staff. However, "silence" should not lead to alienation from the environment, to isolation from it, to depriving oneself of the most valuable source for the accumulation of experience. Separation from life is connected with the distortion of concepts and morals, with that ugly "senatorship" and "mandarinism" that we spoke about above, with those just contempt and hatred that were deserved by the general staffs of various armies in Europe. It was pointed out above how useful the tact of the chief of staff with his subordinates is for the cause. We believe that, shown by the latter, it will also only contribute to success. You might think

that we are recommending some "Chinese ceremonies" in circulation. Far from it. We say that subordinates should reveal independence in their views, make certain proposals, defend them, but still this should not be of the nature of perseverance, stubbornness and the imposition of their opinions and judgments. It must not be forgotten that in the end it is the chief of staff who decides what kind of "brain" we think is, well versed in military affairs and having his own definite views on things. We agree with Joffre, who showed contempt for speakers who suffered from verbiage and lawyer inclinations, because with all our skepticism towards the hero of the Marne, we cannot take away his military thinking and, perhaps, not bad. Joint work establishes mutual understanding, and therefore no special long-winded reports on this or that issue are required. We do not welcome the dictatorship of Bel in his reports to Joffre, and we are also not inclined to accept the manner of Gamelin insinuatingly passing his opinions to the marshal of France. Calm, short and clear, complete

self-worth, the presentation of the essence of the matter is recognized by us as the most appropriate way of reporting. The arguments "for" and "against" should be outlined, one's own judgment should be expressed, and the rest is up to the chief of staff. We understand Metzger's manner in his treatment of Konrad, which the latter now testifies to, as the "correct", but at the same time far from "subservient" character of the former head of the operational department. However, such balanced natures are rare, and in the name of the dignity of thought, we are even inclined to forgive some roughness in the character of subordinates. Each person should have a certain approach and appropriate treatment.

We consider it necessary to dwell on the attitude of the General Staff to the ranks. We have just explained the question of the "copyright" of the General Staff as we understand it. The paintings from our gallery, depicting the general staff and the formation, indicate that all the headquarters could not establish proper relations with that instrument of war - the army, which won victories for its command directly with sweat and blood or atoned for its mistakes. An arrogant, in most cases harsh, judgment about the combat work of units and their commanders, forcing units to work with a "whip", poor knowledge of the real face of the war and even unwillingness to plunge into the situation of the front, inhospitality - all this distinguished the tops of the general staff, creating that isolation from the troops, which has been talked about more than once. We would begin to utter old truths if we developed our judgments about the need for closer contact with the "silent front", more attentive

and tactful attitude towards him, his needs and life. Here we consider it only our duty to pay attention to this once again and advise never to forget about the "consumer" of tactics and strategy.

We repeat again that it was not our intention to give the ten commandments to the workers of the general staff, and our work does not claim to be the tablets of Moses. We have set ourselves the task in this chapter only to develop a picture of the life of the General Staff, the relationships that have developed in it, and to give the types of this high institution. Everyone who reads this chapter will first of all make his own judgment and form a definite opinion about those

qualities that should be characteristic of the employees of the central administration of the general staff, that "brain of the army", in which, in not so long ago times, the whole life of an instrument of war was concentrated, as in a focus, and which claimed to attract guiding threads to itself and from certain state organs .

"More to be than to seem" - the testament left by Schlieffen to the German General Staff must be inscribed at the entrance to each General Staff, and not only inscribed, but also introduced into its personnel. But it is one thing to draw a slogan, and another thing to implement it. The general staffs that we viewed in the portrait gallery, being the flesh of the flesh of bourgeois society, were far from this. The "demigods" of our day did not want to leave Olympus until they were thrown from it by new forces that move humanity forward. So it will be with every general staff who wants to "seem more than be"!

Chapter X

Konrad and the inner life of Austria-Hungary

Clausewitz on politics and war. - Lenin on domestic politics and war. - Sources of Conrad's historical education. - Conrad's theory of the state. - Conrad's attitude to domestic politics is "principled" non-intervention in it. - Konrad on the connection between the domestic and foreign policy of Austria-Hungary. - The politics of feelings and ideas. – Domestic policy of the monarchy in the concept of Krauss. - Konrad on the strength of the state and the strength of the army. - Conditions for creating a strong and efficient army: the size of the army, its spirit, organization. - Areas of domestic politics where the General Staff interfered: the economy, the management of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the press and the fight against enemy intelligence and propaganda. - Strengthening the army and measures in this by Conrad. - Conrad's conversation with the Minister of War on February 8, 1908 - "things are still there." - The national policy of the monarchy and its influence on the strengthening of the army. — Letter from Conrad, March 30, 1911, on measures to improve the government. - The spirit of the people and the spirit of the army. - "Native language" and a single "service" language. Conrad and the Religious Question. - The General Staff and the class struggle in the monarchy. - Conrad's desire to improve the internal life of the monarchy by war - the advice of the chief of the German General Staff. – General staff and press. - Konrad on the issue of governing Bosnia and Herzegovina. - Deployment of troops and domestic policy. - Lines of domestic politics in Conrad's "memoir" c

So far, we have introduced the reader of our work to the organization of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, to its life, and introduced individual characters. Perhaps everything has been done in excessive detail, but it was considered necessary for the clarity of understanding the activities of the "brain" of the army from the banks of the Danube.

In the following, our attention will be mainly focused on the work of the General Staff, that vast arena in which the headquarters of the Habsburg army actively acted.

Previously, the functions of the General Staff were outlined, the most important of which is preparation for war. We introduced the reader of our work to Konrad's views on the duties of the General Staff and noted that the former Chief of the General Staff considered all military activity in peacetime to be nothing more than preparation for war, based on those guiding lines that are indicated by politics.

"Politics permeates the whole matter of war," says Clausewitz, declaring specifically that "war is not only a political action, but it is simply a real instrument of politics ... It is therefore not governed by its own laws, but is part of another whole, and this is the last and there is politics." True, Conrad did not fully assimilate the ideas of Clausewitz, which we will discuss

below, but, in any case, without politics, the chief of the general staff could not imagine the correct direction of his military activity.

Let us refrain for the time being from expressing our understanding of politics as such, i.e. on what it is based and what constitutes the "primary" in social relations. Let us first listen to Conrad's thoughts on this matter and take a closer look at his activities in the field of

politicians.

Usually still and still most people, whose pen dipped into the field of strategy, begin to consider the influence of politics on war in the field of foreign relations, that is, in other words, from foreign policy, and then they already talk about domestic

politics.

We do not want to consider ourselves innovators, but we prefer to start our narrative from the field of domestic politics, since, according to V.I. Lenin, "Our two-year civil war only confirmed the observation made by history, fully given long ago, that the nature of the war and its success depend most of all on from the internal order of the country that enters the war, that the war is a reflection of the internal policy pursued by this country

(our italics; B. Sh.). All this inevitably affects the war" (Collected Works, Volume XVI, p. 382). Below we will give

a justification for this, and now we turn to Konrad. The preceding chapters partly present the political views of the former chief of the general staff on the relationship between domestic policy and the country's defense. We apologize for repeating ourselves here, but we consider it necessary for a full study of the issue raised.

Konrad did not have any special political training. His political credo was developed by life itself. Perceiving the views of parents, teachers and educators, as well as reading the history of the Habsburg monarchy and a personal assessment of the current situation, the chief of the general staff established a certain point of view on certain political issues.

Several years spent in childhood in the Czech Republic, where he studied at schools and where he had to deal with boys of Czech nationality, and then further military service in the circle of officers of various nationalities of the empire led Konrad to the conviction that for the unity of the state (Konrad's main principle) there is no particular danger in its heterogeneous composition, but only some weakness lurks. Dividing states into

two categories: states with national unity, in which all citizens are soldered by one national idea, and states with a composition of various nationalities, which are kept within the state association only by a community of vital interests, Konrad attributed Austria-Hungary to the second category. In the structure of such states, in his opinion, there was a certain danger of the internal struggle of individual nationalities, and in them social contradictions, the class struggle, were to develop most of all. Such a mixed state is more exposed to danger from outside than a strong and united state association in terms of its national composition. Transferring over the long years of his service from one corner of the monarchy to another, Konrad clearly saw that not everything

was going well in Austria-Hungary, and already in the role of division chief on

the Italian border was forced to enter deeply into the internal political relations that developed in this area of the empire.

Called in 1906 to the post of chief of the general staff, Konrad considers it his duty and duty to plunge deeper into the political life of Austria-Hungary. His military teachers, the Germans from the banks of the Spree, said that the chief of the general staff should, above all, maintain contact with foreign policy. Konrad is unable to break with this way of thinking, declaring in his letter to the head of the military office Franz Joseph dated March 30, 1911, that he "does not interfere in principle in matters of domestic politics."

However, life itself leads the chief of the general staff from the very first years of his activity to something else. Even without going into the details of Konrad's work in the field of domestic policy, in the letter we mentioned above, the former chief of the general staff, considering it his duty to orient Franz Joseph in the oppositional mood of the parliament to military reforms, sees the outcome either in the reconstruction of the cabinet, or in the application of Art. . 14 of the constitution, which gave the right to Franz Joseph alone to conduct

law.

Thus, the words about "principled" non-intervention in internal politics were completely out of touch with the case.

In his memoirs, Konrad holds a very definite view that in order to understand the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary, it is necessary to consider the internal policy of this state. Seeing in the tasks of the latter the achievement of the complete unity of the various nationalities of Austria-Hungary, Konrad says that the guiding lines for foreign policy also came from here. We consider it necessary to pay attention to the fact that, as was indicated in the first chapter of our work, such a close interweaving of the lines of

domestic and foreign policy in Austria-Hungary stood out very clearly, and Konrad is absolutely right in his conclusions. Krauss, who has been mentioned by us more than once, sees in the internal policy of Austria-Hungary one of the main reasons for the fall of this state.

We will not repeat ourselves and again describe the internal relationships that existed in the Habsburg monarchy, and the reasons that caused them. We have done this in the first chapter of our work, but here

let us just consider the position of the General Staff in matters of internal politicians.

First of all, we must note that all internal politics, in the understanding of both Konrad and the general staff in general, had a basis in the form of feelings, ideas, hatred, etc. moral manifestations, but by no means economic strength. We will not hush up that some economic tensions between different nationalities, for example, the Hungarian agrarian policy, attracted the attention of Konrad, but, in his opinion, of course, they were again based on the hatred that the Hungarians had for other nationalities of the Danube Empire. Only after the fall of Austria-Hungary, Krauss agrees that the difference in the economic development of the peoples of the state created the internal chaos that was on the banks of the Danube. However, in the concept of this modernized general, nationalities with a higher culture were supposed to absorb the lagging peoples of the empire and thereby destroy the basis of contradictions. We will return to the judgments of this author of *The Reasons for Our Defeats*, but now we can already record his unsuccessful attempts to move out of the circle of other statesmen of the former Habsburg monarchy.

Above were the words of Conrad about his principled non-interference in domestic politics and, on the contrary, his intrusion into it in reality was noted. Now let's try to explain it. Outlining the personality of Conrad, we cited his judgment that success or failure in a war lies in the very people who wage it. No commander's genius, no well-trained and armed army is able to compensate for the weakness of the spirit in the people and the lack of will to win in them. With a strong spirit, the people inspire the army, which will confidently go to victory. The weakness of the state is determined not by the absence of a strong army, but precisely by its internal, and therefore external, weakness. Strong Rome had strong victorious legions, and with the fall of Rome the military glory of its regions withered.

We recalled these thoughts of the chief of the general staff as the starting point for his judgments about the internal life of the state. At first glance, they seem healthy even for our days, and if you throw off 20 years when they were proclaimed by Conrad, then they should

almost a revelation. Victory depends on the state as a whole, and not on the commander, not on the army, which is only a cast from the state itself. It would be impossible to object to this, but in reality, Konrad invariably considered the strong and combat-ready legions of Austria-Hungary to be the root cause of victories, and not the strength and power of its peoples. However, the connection of the people with the army and the most important role of the former in the success of the war served as grounds for the chief of the general staff, on which he considered it "his duty" to propose certain measures

in domestic politics. Below we will meet more than once with Conrad's judgments that only that foreign policy can count on success, which has behind it an army strong in number and quality. The creation of this army should be the first duty of every state and any of its leaders, and especially, of course, the chief of the general staff. Being the first to

answer for the existence of a strong and combat-ready army, Conrad considered it his direct duty to establish certain conditions for the internal life of the state, which would contribute to the creation of a proper instrument of war.

1. First of all, in order to have the army necessary for the war, it was required: The development of all numbers in accordance with: a) those combat missions that can be assigned to it, and b) with the population that this army exposes. 2. Then, the army must

be high in moral character, i.e. the spirit of the army must stand at its proper height, which depends on the spirit of the people themselves.

3. Further, the organization of the army is entirely in accordance with the internal policy of the state. "The organization and combat value of the armed forces, as well as the operational and other preparations for war, in hardly any other state, as in the monarchy (Austria Hungary), are in strict accordance with foreign and domestic policy," Konrad writes in his memoir dated 31 December 1911.

Conrad also referred economic issues to domestic policy, believing that, depending on their resolution, both the size of the army and the combat readiness of the state in general increased. If we stick to the path of researching Conrad himself, we are obliged here to consider his views on the economy of the Austro-Hungarian

monarchy. However, in view of the importance of this issue for our time, we allow ourselves to deal with it separately. The next issue of domestic policy, very important for the Austrian General Staff, was the issue of governing Bosnia and Herzegovina, where military and civil power were combined in one person, subordinated along two lines: in the military - Konrad, in the civil - the general imperial finance minister. Finally, the general staff raised sharply the questions of restricting the freedom of the press in order to preserve military secrets and for security measures against enemy intelligence and propaganda.

These are the most important paths along which the influence of the General Staff on the internal policy of the Danube Empire proceeded. In the future, we turn to more or less detailed consideration of the steps of the General Staff in these matters.

Both the strengthening of the army and its spirit proceeded from the correct resolution of that national policy, which constituted the cornerstone of the entire domestic policy of Austria-Hungary.

From the preceding chapters it is known that in the development of its armed forces Austria-Hungary lagged behind not only the first-class states of Europe, but also its small neighbors.

Focusing primarily on the proper development and training of the armed forces of the state, and then the conclusion of appropriate military alliances with neighbors, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, from the moment he assumed this position, immediately raised the question of strengthening the army.

Conrad determined the strength of the army: 1) by its proper size and 2) by the corresponding material supply. The competence

of the General Staff, in fact, included the question of the size of the army only in general, while its detailed study and implementation through the relevant legislative institutions was the direct responsibility of the Minister of War and two Ministers of People's Defense (Austrian and Hungarian).

We cited the low staffing that was in the units. Since 1907, Konrad has taken care, first of all, of its strengthening. Then, as he orients himself in the situation,

the chief of the general staff raises the question of strengthening the contingent in general,

necessary both to increase the units of the army and the formation of those technical troops, primarily heavy artillery, the need for which was caused by the conditions of modern warfare.

Conrad's views on the deployment of a million-strong army in wartime, which we have quoted in Chapter IV, outline the path along which he was to follow in his practical work. Without stopping the detailed attention of the reader of our work, we will point out that the chief of the general staff put forward a project to introduce a two-year term of service in order to let the conscripts of the state pass through the ranks of the army as much as possible and in case of war to have the necessary supply of people who received military training.

We intend to devote a special chapter to the work of the General Staff in the field of organizational, so for the time being we will confine ourselves to what has been said.

The conditions under which one had to follow the path of building an army are best defined by Conrad's conversation with Minister of War Schoenich on February 8, 1908. The chief of the general staff pointed out that during the 25 years since the last war, both the temporary ministers of war and the chief of the general staff, who had held this position continuously for 25 years (Beck), were not able to weaken the harmful influence of domestic politics and the now deeply stuck in the sand. Therefore, it is now the first duty of the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff to show full exertion in order to pull out the cart and put it on solid ground.

In his reports to Franz Josef, Konrad tirelessly insisted on the need to strengthen the contingent, proposing certain measures, and, finally, at the beginning of 1911, he came up with a big program to strengthen the army, linking his performance either with the adoption of the project, or with his dismissal from the post of chief of staff .

All Conrad's measures in this matter ran into: 1) budgetary conditions and 2) the national policy that had developed in the state. Considering himself

responsible for preparing the army for war, Conrad persistently made demands, but their defense fell not on his lot, but placed a heavy burden on the ministers who were obliged to act as intercessors and defendants before government officials.

institutions of the monarchy. The ministers, including the military, of course, did not particularly want to spoil their careers for the sake of Konrad's excellent plans, and in response to the latter's hot arguments in 1911 in defense of the need to strengthen the army, the all-imperial Minister of War Schonaich calmly persuaded him that, they say, Konrad had fulfilled his duty, raising this issue, and the rest is up to Franz Josef and the representative institutions. Franz Joseph frankly told his chief of staff that it was not

being done the way he wanted - the emperor of a patchwork monarchy. The representative institutions of both halves of the latter stubbornly did not agree to the implementation of the projects proposed to them.

The reasons for the hostility of parliaments to questions of defense lay in the national enmity that determined the entire policy of Austria-Hungary. Having achieved

independence under the constitution of 1867, Hungary received its own national army, as well as the formation of the Austrian Landwehr. But along with these national units, the all-imperial army continued to exist - a fragment of the Wallenstein camp. The development of this army, the faithful stronghold of the Habsburgs, was not at all in the interests of the Hungarians, and therefore any measures aimed at strengthening it met with a sharp rebuff from them. On the contrary, in 1908, unexpectedly for the ruling military circles, a military - "new program" was published in the Hungarian newspapers, aimed at the development of the Hungarian landwehr.

In addition, all projects to strengthen the army were associated with an increase in loans and, consequently, placed a heavy burden on the population. The Hungarian half of the state was completely unwilling to increase its share in the development of the general imperial army, referring

on the hardships of the war tax.

Seeing, however, that the government was interested in passing a law on strengthening the army, the Hungarian parliamentarians intended this time to receive compensation in political rights. The opposition of the Hungarian parliament was ready to make concessions to the government in its military programs, but connected them with privileges in political freedoms, with the new electoral law.

The same struggle over the war bills went on in the Austrian Parliament, where the Czechs fought the Germans.

Being in the cauldron of the internal struggle of parliaments, the responsible ministers tried to somehow preserve peace and tranquility, sacrificing the projects of the chief of the general

staff. As has been repeatedly noted, according to the constitution, the chief of the general staff was not responsible to the parliaments and was not invited to their meetings. His attempts to get access there met with a sharp rebuff from the ministers. Therefore, Conrad could only appeal to Franz Joseph, recommending to him the famous paragraph 14, or to Franz Ferdinand, who was hostile to the Hungarians and sought to support the project to strengthen the army. Encountering opposition and

rebuff to his plans everywhere, Konrad even turned to the chief of the German General Staff for help, asking him to influence through Wilhelm on the implementation of projects to strengthen the army. In powerless attempts

to carry out his great program, Conrad, in the previously mentioned letter to the head of the military office of Franz Josef on March 30, 1911, writes that he fundamentally does not interfere in domestic politics, but, however, in the current state of things, which he got acquainted with from conversations with very sensible politicians, considers it his direct duty to orientate in what is happening. The proposed military reforms, which are met with a sharp rebuff from the parliaments, it is more rational to resolve not by dissolving them, but either by changing the composition of the cabinet of ministers, or by carrying out paragraph 14. The dissolution of parliaments would have the following consequences: 1) the victory of the opposition radical parties, and the defeat of the loyal, bourgeois parties ready to make sacrifices; 2) new elections would be held in the parliaments in the majority by radical parties that will come forward with their military programs; 3) the military demands put forward by the government, especially the two-year service law, would suffer a new defeat; 4) the current favorable situation in Hungary would not have been used. This letter Konrad asks to report to Franz Joseph. The above document is typical of the General Staff, showing how

much it compromised its "principles", proposing measures of a purely state order.

Conrad did not have to taste the fruits of his proposals this time. The two-year service and contingent increase law was passed in 1912 when Conrad found himself removed from his position as chief of the general staff. The reform in the Hungarian parliament took place under strong pressure from Stefan Tisza and caused great obstruction from the opposition.

Returning at the end of 1912 again to the post of chief of the general staff, in 1913 Conrad raised the question of the formation of a reserve army in case of war, which also required an increase in the contingent, but the world war did not make it possible to implement this project.

Thus proceeded the struggle for an increase in the budgetary size of the army, the presence of which, of course, was characteristic not only of Austria-Hungary. Fights around this issue were going on in all states, taking on a more fierce character on the banks of the Danube.

Above, we cited the views of the chief of the general staff that success or failure in war lies in the people themselves, in the weakness of their spirit and will to win, which is determined by the weakness of the state not by the absence of a strong army, but precisely by its internal and external weakness.

In his memoir dated April 6, 1907, presented to Franz Joseph, Konrad develops the above statement. Speaking about the fact that internal troubles in Austria-Hungary have a pernicious influence on the development of the army, and listing them, the former chief of the general staff comes to the conclusion that not only apparent, nor the most real connection exists between the political life of the country and the life of the army. With the modern structure of the army as an "armed people", communication rests on the foundations of politics. The sound spirit of the army, with short terms of service, which tend to be further reduced, must have foundations outside the army. Although all this belongs to the field of domestic politics, however, it has a very important military significance. Based on this, Conrad, in his position, considers himself obliged to pay attention to domestic politics, since every delay in the decisive improvement of the internal life of the state threatens the army, and then, of course, affects foreign policy, creating difficulties for it.

According to Konrad, the importance of the spirit is great in general for any army, and especially in such a state as Austria-Hungary, which is a conglomerate of various nationalities.

Under the spirit of the army, the former chief of the general staff means: 1) the political mood of the army and 2) discipline in the army, and both of them are considered by him in relation to the mass of soldiers and especially the command staff of the army.

Konrad goes into detail in the analysis of all the peculiar conditions that were created for the army by the internal life of the country. Comparison of Austria with states in which a certain nationality predominates, such as Germany, or with countries such as North America, in which culture nevertheless developed on the same English basis, leads the former chief of the general staff to the conclusion that it is impossible with such the same yardstick to approach the Habsburg monarchy and its army, which includes various nationalities.

At the basis of his views on the internal politics of Austria and on the army, Conrad puts, first of all, the unity of the monarchy and the unity of the army. Only a single state, at least consisting of separate nationalities, can be considered vital.

The Chief of the General Staff expressed and cited his views on the domestic policy of the country in numerous verbal reports to Franz Joseph, Franz Ferdinand, in his memoirs annually submitted to Franz Joseph about the state of the army and the tasks that could be assigned to it and about those needs that needs to be eliminated. More than once, the events of domestic politics were noted by him in letters and verbal explanations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Of course, due to the size of our work, we cannot go into a detailed study and analysis of all these documents cited in Conrad's memoirs, and we will limit ourselves to outlining the general line of his views on certain branches of domestic policy.

So, according to his thoughts, Austria-Hungary should still be a single state organism, but taking into account the tribal composition of the population located on its territory. The year 1867 created a dualism, and if it is to be reckoned with, then we must not forget that other nationalities, in the course of their cultural development, can lay claim to the same rights as the Hungarians. Thus, it is necessary to reckon with the equality of individual nations. But it shouldn't come at the expense

the unity of the state and threaten the dynasty - this cement of the monarchy. Developing these views, the chief of the general staff is far from the wide autonomy of individual nationalities in the state, there should be a common firm power, the hand of which would be felt by every nation that is part of the Habsburg empire. In these forms, everything that is directed towards the destruction of power, everything that does not bring up an obedient citizen, must be suppressed by the most severe measures. Most of all, Conrad had to bother

with resolving the Hungarian question, in view of the persistent attacks of the Hungarians on the all-imperial army, which marked the unity of the armies in which Conrad believed so much. Along with the Hungarians, the Italians, the natural enemies of the Chief of the General Staff, were also taken under his

exceptional attention.

As it was pointed out, the healthy spirit of the army - its strong political mood, according to the chief of the general staff, should first of all be born outside the army, in which, however, the situation was rather unfavorable. Therefore, Conrad comes forward with a proposal to take a firm line in the national struggle.

In the reports to Franz Joseph, verbal and written, they are pointed out that the greatest danger threatens if individual nationalities take up arms in this struggle. In these types, the most decisive repressive measures are necessary: for example, on March 6, 1913, pointing to anti-government demonstrations in Dalmatia, he recommends the adoption of strict police measures, and in Croatia he advises replacing the civil governor with a military one, who, with the introduction of martial law, will establish a "legal" order. "Each nationality, Konrad explains, must know that in the monarchy there is in fact a 'right', and therefore every nationality must seek to resort to its protection."

We cite these examples only as an illustration of the views of the chief of the general staff on civil administration, and we consider it necessary to recall that he did not stop at all before using the notorious § 14, arousing even in Franz Joseph distrust in the correctness and timeliness of the application of this harsh law.

But the proposed measures were only measures of the current day, but the main attention should be directed to schools of various levels, including universities, in which the population of the monarchy would be educated in the spirit of its unity. From year to year, from the day he took office on the General Staff, Konrad emphasizes this in all his memoirs, and in his memoir of 1913 he adds that, in addition to schools, such work should be carried out in the press, in literature, and that, for this gap, be given large sums of money. The chief of the general staff resolutely rebels against all autonomous schools, especially higher ones, and takes a clearly hostile position on the question of opening an Italian university in Trieste, seeing in this desire of the inhabitants of the Italian regions of the monarchy only a desire to strengthen their irredenta.

Thus, as we see, the hand of the General Staff sought to reach far into the internal politics of the monarchy, and this was revered by its chief as a direct duty. Now let us turn to the army,

which the General Staff acted to defend, thus justifying its pressure on domestic politics. In his memoirs of 1907, 1908 and 1913, and in a letter to Foreign Minister Ehrenthal dated January 7, 1909, Konrad most clearly reveals his views on the unity of the army and the corresponding political mood. Throughout its centuries-old history, the Habsburg army has always, in fact, been

a complex organism, as we discussed in more or less detail in Chapter II of our work. However, unity was ensured by the consciousness of belonging to Wallenstein's army, by joining the common "Caesar" army. Conrad is well aware that in order to maintain the unity of the Habsburg army of his day, especially with the presence of the constitution of 1867, special methods must be adopted that differ from those that are characteristic of states homogeneous in nationalities and which were in the Wallenstein camp. Germany consists of small separate principalities, but homogeneously populated by Germans, with one common language, and only the Poles constitute a separate nationality in this single state organism. Thus, it is understandable that in such a state as Germany, the question of

the unity of the army, but even that population of Poznań is the eternal concern of the German General Staff.

The Austro-Hungarian army, which includes many nationalities, must be approached differently. As a principle, there must be a single spirit in the army, based on the consciousness of belonging to a single state organism, united by a dynasty. But since different nationalities are recognized as equal in the state, their equal rights must also be extended to the army. Within the latter, each nationality has equal rights, but each member of the army must be aware of the common interests of the army, no matter where he is located territorially and no matter what corps of troops he belongs to. Such a recognition of the equality of nationalities in the army leads, of course, to the very important question of the native language, from the successful resolution of which

a lot depends.

In the struggle for the unity of the army, Konrad is frightened not so much by anarchist and socialist propaganda as by the national enmity that burned in the country, which was especially aggravated by the Hungarians, who demanded the introduction of the Hungarian language as a command language for all parts of the Hungarian Honved and the Hungarian parts of the general imperial army. Konrad

responded to such aspirations of the Hungarians by stating that the Hungarian parties strive for only one thing - to leave the generals without an army. Resolutely rebelling against such attempts by the Hungarians, Konrad pointed out that the unity of the army required the unity of the command and supply organs for the army, the mixing of the officer corps, the appropriate deployment in all areas of the monarchy, etc. The feeling of unity of the army should especially affect the battlefields. It should not be forgotten that the Hungarian Honved also includes other nationalities (Croats, Serbs, Romanians), for whom the Hungarian language will be alien and hateful. Then, of course, there would be difficulties with the statutes published in different languages. Finally, concessions to the Hungarians will induce the nationalities that are part of the second half of the state - Austria, to also present their demands. In a word, the chief of the general staff turns out to be an ardent opponent of the "Hungarian nation" and its separate aspirations.

How was the chief of the general staff going to resolve these burning questions? The Constitution of 1867 took a step in the field of the formation of special national armies while leaving the general imperial army and, thus, as a rule it had to be recognized that each nationality, depending on its strength, should organize certain military units, but some of the latter were also mixed composition.

As for the "language", then, as a means to achieve the unity of the army, "German" should be left as the official language, the knowledge of which is necessary for all, and especially officers. Making concessions to national requirements, it was necessary to recognize in circulation in units the "native language" of the nationality that was superior in numbers in a given military unit, and by "native language" we mean yut, which was determined by the recruit himself when he was called up for service. In the company and the units corresponding to it, the "native language" should be adopted, knowledge of which, however, was mandatory for the command staff of the unit; above the company, as was just indicated, only German was the "official language".

Conrad believed that this approach to resolving the national question would preserve the unity of the army. Recognizing in fairness the national question as very, very important, he thought that its successful solution would: 1) make it possible to maintain the combat effectiveness of the entire army; 2) certain nationalities, seeing themselves as equal in rights in the army, will not be imbued with the desire to fall away from the monarchy; 3) their sympathies will be directed towards the preservation of the Danubian Empire, and not its enemies; 4) the idea of the

unity of the state and the army will be quite clear to them. In addition to the national struggle, the question of religious tolerance was acute in Austria. Although in terms of their religious composition the majority of the population was Catholic, to which Conrad himself belonged, however, other cults were also represented in significant numbers. While Franz Ferdinand, being an ardent Catholic, was ready to introduce the Inquisition, if such was only befitting in the 20th century, the chief of the general staff was distinguished by a certain degree of religious tolerance, which

merit. On this basis, one of the conflicts between Franz Ferdinand and Conrad even flared up. Then the

"bearer" of the idea of the Habsburg Monarchy had to face a new driving force - this is the developing class struggle.

In the social movement, Konrad saw a force that disintegrated the "united" Habsburg monarchy, and with it the "united" army, undermining the latter's spirit and even questioning the very existence of the armed force. In his opinion, anarchist and social democratic views reflected the idea of internationalism, the idea of renunciation of armed struggle in general, and thereby undermined the existing foundations of the Danubian Empire. In his reports, Konrad also reveals the path along which the agitation of the class struggle proceeded. According to him, the center of the whole movement was in Vienna, from where all the guidelines came from. For agitation, cells were planted in the army of 2-3 people per company from among the soldiers or even officers, who carried out active work. In addition, agitation was widely conducted among the younger youth. In his reports to Franz

Joseph, Franz Ferdinand, as well as in messages to the Minister of War, Konrad spoke out resolutely in favor of the liquidation of both agitation and the entire Social Democratic movement as a whole. Advising the use of energetic repressions against the demonstrators, pointing out to the Minister of War the need to apply the most severe articles for agitation in the army, the former chief of the general staff found a way to save the spirit of his "unified" army in this. Of course, we cannot demand from

the "bearer" of the idea of the Habsburg Monarchy a different approach to resolving this issue, but we are obliged to note the narrowness of his understanding of the future class relationship that was taking shape in Austria-Hungary, and the role that the Social Democratic Party actually played in this country. In Chapter 1 of our work, an assessment is given of the aspirations of the Social Democrats of the Danube Monarchy, who abandoned the ideas of the international revolution and became involved in the developing national struggle in the country.

Chief of the General Staff: 1) did not understand the class movement and did not try to find ways to properly resolve it in

Army and 2) did not understand at all that the Austrian Social Democracy, at the decisive moment of replacing the diplomatic pen with a sword, would vote confidence in this sword, which later turned out to be a "ceremonial skewer". Conrad's

views on the developing class movement do not reveal in him a true statesman, but only reveal the usual figure of a representative of the bourgeois class with monarchist tendencies, looking with hatred at the regroupings that were already taking place in the classes. But was it only the Austrian Chief of the General Staff who had such views? They were the same in the general staffs and on the banks of the Spree, the Seine, and even more so on the banks of the Nova, where they took on an ultra-black color.

Some new, incomprehensible, but powerful force, especially after the revolution of 1905 in Russia, rose before the bourgeois world, threatened it with a fight not to the stomach, but to death. Therefore, those persistent reports about the dangers of agitation of the class struggle, which were continuously made by the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, starting from the day he assumed this post, are quite understandable.

Pointing out more than once that the lines of the domestic and foreign policy of the Danubian Empire were closely intertwined, Conrad considered it his duty to emphasize both Italian irredenta, and Russian propaganda in Galicia, and Serbian agitation, which came from abroad, finding fertile ground for growth in the neighboring regions of Austria-Hungary. Demanding decisive measures in the fight against this foreign agitation, the chief of the general staff at the same time noted that the turmoil in the domestic policy of the monarchy only complicates foreign policy, giving courage to the enemies of Austria-Hungary, of which there were many. In these types, according to Conrad, radical treatment should first of all touch the internal state of the country. However, the chronic

internal illness of the Danubian Empire forced the chief of the general staff to change this view in the end, and on December 30, 1912, after his return to the post of chief of the general staff, Konrad) regarding the external situation that has developed for the monarchy, sees the only salvation in the war with Serbia, in the successful outcome of which he has no doubt.

A victorious war, in addition to improving the foreign policy of Austria, would lead to the fact that all foreign agitations would be put to rest, all the internal forces of the monarchy would be strengthened and soldered, the spirit of confidence would return to the army, the economic position of Austria-Hungary would also be strengthened, and, finally, , the power and authority of the dynasty both inside and outside would have risen. In a word, all the blessings were to follow with the defeat of Serbia, which is considered a prime necessity. It must be said that this thinking of the Chief of the General Staff was not original, but was inspired from

the banks of the Spree. In his private letter dated September 14, 1909, Moltke (the younger), discussing the political situation after the Bosnian crisis of 1908, wrote: "I am firmly convinced that if it were possible to limit the war only to the framework of the Austrian war against Serbia, then, with its successful conclusion, the monarchy (Austria-Hungary) would have strengthened internally, strengthened externally, and then it would not be easy for it to put up obstacles in the Balkans. Having believed in the internal healing of the state, Conrad in 1912, remembering the teachings of his Friend from the banks of the Spree, out of despair came to the conviction of their justice and embarked on an adventure, recommending that they embark on the path of war.

Conrad also included the press in the list of "pests" of the spirit of the army. Kindling the fire of national enmity in general, coming up with projects to expand the scope of national armies, undermining the authority of the commanding staff, exposing their shortcomings and mistakes, conducting party agitation, the press, in the opinion of the chief of the general staff, needed both curbing and proper direction from the civil authorities . Reporting this to Franz Joseph more than once, Konrad asked for the appropriate

press pressure.

In addition, the latter caused criticism in the wide disclosure of information constituting a military secret. Questions of new programs for the organization of the army by the chief of the general staff and the minister of war were sometimes recognized from the newspapers rather than reached in the usual way. Changes in troop dispositions related to operational intentions, war games conducted by senior military commanders, and maneuvers were widely reported in the press, causing fair criticism from the military

departments. Even the departure in 1911 of Konrad from the post of chief of the general staff to the post of army inspector was published in the newspapers earlier than it became known officially. Here we must dwell

on one more circumstance. The press was widely used not only by the "enemies" of the army, but also by the army itself. By order of Franz Ferdinand, tendentious articles filled with militarism and calling for the need for armament appeared from time to time. The general staff was also suspected of this. However, Conrad testifies to us that he was far from it, and the General Staff, as such, did not have its own newspaper. One can only agree with this conditionally, since attempts to influence the press on the part of the general staffs of other armies have been proven, and the Austro-Hungarian general staff was hardly an exception.

While fighting to establish a firm political mood in the army, Konrad came closest to this in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the commander of the troops was also the highest civilian. Closely entering into the internal politics of this region, which is especially fraught with all sorts of clashes on ethnic grounds, the commander of the troops, who was subordinate in the civil line to the general imperial finance minister, in the military line informed Conrad about everything. From the reports and personal reports of the Governor-General of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Chief of the General Staff saw how much the spirit of the troops stationed in these areas fell under the influence of life. They were beginning to decompose, and Conrad sounded the alarm about it. Then other interests in the defense of these provinces were relegated to the background by the civil authorities, which could not but disturb the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff. We have already noted above that the domestic policy barometer

shows the measures that must be taken in the deployment of troops. Purely military requirements determined the territorial principle of deployment, while the internal state of the monarchy spoke of something else. Konrad tells us that on November 20, 1910, when he reported to Franz Ferdinand, the latter was very concerned about the internal struggle in the state and put forward the principle of complete extraterritoriality in the deployment of troops. Pointing to

revolutionary events in Portugal and the fact that the army is the backbone of the dynasty, the heir proposed to move the regiments: put the Czechs in Hungary, the Hungarians in the German regions, etc. The chief of the general staff agreed with this, however, only as an exception and to a limited extent, because otherwise the mobilization and concentration of the army would be difficult. On the instructions of Franz Ferdinand that there would be no external war, Conrad considered it his duty to warn precisely of those dangers that threaten the country from the outside from all sides. Not by this means, in his opinion, it was necessary to improve the internal state of the state.

On the eve of the World War, in his memoir dated January 10, 1914 (memoir for 1913), the Chief of the General Staff, having outlined the difficult military situation of Austria-Hungary in the event of war, outlined the following lines for domestic policy:

“a) the creation of better living conditions for the southern Slavs, Romanians and Rusyns as part of the monarchy than those who exist in neighboring, kindred states, in order to b) by all strict measures to stop all irredentism and c) to lead a lively, working by all means (schools, churches, press, literature, training during military service) and richly funded propaganda in the interests of the monarchy.

“Only in the full coordination of all these aspirations lies the key to success,” said the chief of the general staff, thereby revealing his main view of the country's domestic policy. From this

alone, if we had not dwelled in such detail on the views and actions of Conrad in the field of domestic policy, we can judge that the phrase he threw about "principled non-intervention" was a beautiful phrase, a concession to tradition, and remained the same phrase, completely far from life, which pulled the chief of the general staff on the path of active action. We take the liberty of stating that Conrad was ready to intervene, even

without “principled” reservations, in the internal life of the country, if only his power was so widely distributed. Not being a responsible person to the representative institutions of the country, not being a member of the government, the chief of the general staff could only by his reports: 1) state one or another

a fact of domestic policy that has a harmful effect on the army, and 2) to propose certain measures to improve the country under the flag of the need for this in the interests of the army.

As we have noted more than once, such reports were made to Franz Joseph, the heir of Franz Ferdinand, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the corresponding submissions were made to the Minister of War, in whose hands the current life of the army was concentrated. In this regard, Conrad had to act second hand, which, apparently, was regarded by him as a "principled" non-interference in the internal life of the country. But the latter was still vigilantly watched by the eye of the chief of the general staff, fixing everything that threatened the "unity" of the state and the "unity" of the army.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs accused the General Staff of the fact that the so-called "military party" was replenished from it, pursuing its own policy. Konrad resolutely rejects this, but, according to everything that has been said above, there is no doubt that the General Staff was far from being a stranger to the internal politics of the country and sought to put pressure on it. The Hungarian parties paid the same coin of hatred to the general staff, which it paid off with the Hungarian separatists and the aspirations of other individual nationalities for self-determination. The press of the Danubian monarchy did not miss an opportunity to note all the ugly forms of the "brain" of the Habsburg monarchy, rightly seeing in it the stronghold of that Middle Ages, against which all the struggle on the banks of the

Danube was directed. So far we have been talking about the concern shown by the General Staff to create a certain political mood in the army. Along with this, he revealed the need to strengthen discipline in the army, based on the unquestioning execution of the orders of his superiors by the soldiers of the army. However, we must note that Konrad was far from the so-called "drill", "drill", so common in everyday life of the German army. Cramon, already known to us, even considered it necessary to point out this "shortcoming" of the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, and notes with satisfaction that later the former chief of the general staff changed his mind, recognizing "drilling" as a necessary attribute of the upbringing of a modern soldier, appreciating in this the merits of the German ways. Recognizing the need for strict discipline in the army, Conrad proceeded from other premises: the Habsburg army must maintain "unity", must be imbued with a conscious attitude towards that great task

cementing the state to which it is called, and what is important is not the "drill", but the exertion of all the forces of the army necessary to complete the task. If we recall Conrad's personal views on this matter, we should really note the absence of the dull drill that reigned on the banks of the Spree in the Habsburg army. The army of the Danubian monarchy had a strong discipline, which, however, surrendered under the weight of the blows of the world war. In fairness, it must be said that salvation was not in accepting the "drill", because in 1918 he also passed the "drill", but in the awareness of the army mass of the goals of the war, which were at first vague for it, and then simply hostile to it.

If, on the one hand, to create the "spirit" of the army, Konrad demanded the obligatory education of citizens before entering the army, then in the latter, further work on the spirit of the soldier mass and the introduction of the necessary discipline into it fell on the command staff.

It is clear that the work of the latter could be fruitful only when the spirit of the commanders themselves was at the proper level. In the chapter on the state of the Austro-Hungarian army, we gave the appearance of the Austrian officers, and therefore we will not repeat ourselves here. The internal struggle that took place in the monarchy, to the deep regret of the chief of the general staff, also penetrated into the thickness of the command staff, especially into the reserve officers of individual nationalities imbued with separatism. The "carriers" of the idea of the Habsburg monarchy, according to Konrad, were already in a state of decay, and firm and decisive measures were needed to stop this process.

In those same annual reports, as well as in current ones, Konrad tirelessly raises the question of the command staff. Wishing to preserve in him the former traditions of the officer of the Wallenstein camp, with his comradeship of the soldier's army, the chief of the general staff puts on the order of the day the question of revising the command staff, of his "cleansing", proposing to remove from his midst vicious elements who base their well-being on material prerequisites, on careerism, and pay special attention to the politically unreliable, infected with the spirit of social democratic doctrine. The authority of the command staff should be high

both in the army and in the state, therefore all sorts of press attacks, and there were many of them,

should be, according to Conrad, decidedly stopped.

It is also necessary to pay attention to the material well-being of the commanding staff. Here, the chief of the general staff gives preference to the combat command staff over the ranks of the administrative service, which are quite numerous in the army and the country. As a principle, the salary of an officer should not lag behind the maintenance of officials of other departments of the monarchy.

In a word, the chief of the general staff repeated elementary truths, but they came from life. And in our time, they are not yet regulated and resolved everywhere.

This concludes our acquaintance with the influence of the General Staff in the field of domestic policy of the country. Taking the army as a basis, Conrad considered it his duty to invade the internal life of the country in one way or another. Whether it was right or not, our further reasoning will show, as well as an attempt to find out to what extent the influence of the General Staff in this area should go, if we recognize it as necessary.

Chapter XI

"Search" in history

***Character of the army of the Great French Revolution. -
Communication between the army and the people. -
Separation of the army. - "Soldier" army of Bonaparte. -
Prussian Landwehr. - Staff Army. Ludendorff's reproach to
Clausewitz. - Clausewitz on the warrior and domestic
politics. - Thoughts of Moltke (senior) about the army and
its significance in the public life of the country, about the
police, the importance of education in the army.
- Engels on the war of 1870-1871 and the Prussian
military system. — Ludendorff on domestic politics. -
Ludendorff's thoughts from the "Memoirs" and the work
"Waging War and Politics". - Foerster's conclusions in
Schlieffen and the World War. - The determination of old B***

We will leave the Austro-Hungarian General Staff for the time being and do a little search in the area called history. True, not everyone recognizes this path as correct and true. Some thinkers prefer their own reasoning to him, but we are more inclined to draw knowledge from the mirror of life than from our own experiences. Previously, our search for history did not go beyond the

Napoleonic era. This time we will take a wider step - in the era of the great French Revolution, because, as A. Svechin rightly says in his "Strategy", - "already from the moment of the French Revolution, issues of domestic policy play an appropriate role in preparing for war." Of course, we are not going to dwell on this era of military art in detail, but we will only touch on it as much as we are interested in this issue. With the fall of the old regime, its "soldier" army gradually fell, and first volunteer units appeared on the scene,

national guard, and then the revolutionary armies of the Convention. The latter put an end to the isolation of the army from the people and sought to educate it in a republican-democratic spirit, developing broad political work in it by familiarizing the army with the most important decrees, sending out proclamations, newspapers, participating in public and military clubs, etc. The result of this was that that "democratic in its composition and organization and educated in the spirit of devotion to the cause of the revolution, the army itself became one of the most reliable pillars of the Jacobin government. The Convention emerged victorious from the civil war precisely because the army was for it," writes N. Lukin in "The Recent History of Western Europe", pointing out further that "political work in the army was entrusted to special commissars appointed by the Convention from among the deputies, three each.

army." Comparing the army of the Convention with the armies of the allies, N. Lukin points out: "The French army was recruited mainly from peasants who, thanks to the revolution, became full owners of their land, who increased their land ownership at the expense of national property; then - from the workers and small artisans and partly the bourgeoisie, no less interested in the peasants in preserving the gains of the revolution. The revolutionary spirit of the army and the readiness to make every sacrifice to save the republic were supported by the entire socio-economic policy of the Jacobins, carried out in the interests of urban and rural democracy. The French soldier lived and fought side by side with the officer he had chosen for a command position equally accessible to any literate and capable private."

"Finally," N. Lukin concludes, "only the revolutionary government, relying on the masses of the people, could mobilize the country's huge material resources for waging war and organize the rear for victory at the front." But gradually, with campaigns,

the army breaks away from the people, in France itself, towards the end of the existence of the Convention, an unstable balance of social forces was created, and the generals at the head of the army began to play a major political role. "In their hands was a power that became more and more independent of

civil government. This force was the army," writes the same N. Lukin. "Since the

fall of the Jacobin Republic," he continues, "the mood of the soldiers has changed dramatically. With the victory of the counter-revolution in the country, the connection between the army and democratic organizations was cut off, and revolutionary-democratic propaganda and agitation among the troops also ceased. While the commissars and generals of the Convention continued to fight against looting and all kinds of violence, Bonaparte, on the contrary, "in every possible way encouraged the coarsest instincts in the soldiers, educating the army in the spirit of a thirst for glory and easy prey" ... "At the same time, the soldiers got used to watching themselves as something separate from the nation, having its own special interests, and with contempt treated "hats". The soldiers began to associate their personal well-being not with the triumph and strengthening of freedom and equality in the republic, but with the personality and fate of this or that victorious general.

Such was the transition from the revolutionary army to the army of Bonaparte, to the army of the "soldier" type. "Napoleon by no means aspired to the ideal of an armed people," writes A. Svechin in his History of Military Art. "It was even desirable for him to isolate the army from the nation, to form a special state within the state out of the army," continues A. Svechin, "the peasant, forcibly torn off the land, hostile to military service, was completely reworked. The camp, the barracks became his homeland, the concept of the fatherland began to be personified by Bonaparte, patriotism degenerated into chauvinism, the desire for glory and distinction drowned out the idea of freedom.

The "soldier's" army needed "soldier's happiness", and Napoleon tried by all means to create it in an army cut off from the people. This gap deepened more and more every year, but the decline of "soldier's happiness" was approaching. The morale

of the army was breaking down. Failures began on the external fronts, and "in France itself," writes N. Lukin, "there was an exhaustion of people and material resources and an increase in dissatisfaction among the bourgeoisie, disillusioned with the emperor after the failure of the continental blockade, and the peasantry, embittered by endless recruits ... After a continuous 22- during the summer war, the population of exhausted and bloodless France longed for peace.

The upper classes, irritated by the complete stagnation in industry and commerce, the fall in state rent from 87 to 50 and 7%, and the high discount rate, now withdrew their support for the government. Material resources were also depleted: despite the doubling of taxes, in 1813 the receipts of the state treasury were only 50% of the usual.

It seems to us that, without any special explanation, it is clear that one "soldier's happiness" already in the time of Napoleon, with all the scope of his genius, could not serve as a guarantee of victory. The detachment of the army from the internal life of the country, the formation of the army as an independent organism in the state, did not bode well even a hundred years ago.

The very idea of a "soldier's" army demanded its isolation from the life of the country, and in this, of course, Napoleon took all measures. Severe in general in domestic politics and in his attitude towards the press, the little corporal himself strove, demanding the same from all the commanders, to create a cult of a soldier who would be lulled into bliss by the barracks and the glory of military exploits, but who would not have reached the sad news that rushed from home. The idea of a "soldiers'" army

was adopted by the opponents of the Corsican, although it should be immediately noted that on the ruins of this army of the emperor of the French, a new cadre army was born in the ranks of his opponents, the idea of an armed people loomed. We are talking about the Prussian Landwehr, which was called up for the war with Napoleon. For obvious reasons, we cannot go into the

history of the Landwehr in detail and refer to the work of A. Svechin "History of Military Art", Part III. It is important for us now to point out that the Prussian Landwehr, called to arms in a moment of dire need, still did not fully reflect the idea of an armed people. Having a class command staff, which was the "citadel of the bourgeoisie", the landwehr was a form of militia of the XIX century. However, even with such a secured structure for the ruling classes, the Landwehr - as a system of armed forces - was taken under suspicion for its political reliability. "The Prussian Minister of Police Wittgenstein," writes A. Svechin, "found that arming the people means organizing resistance to the authority of power, ruining finances, even striking at the Christian principles of the sacred union." This attitude towards

the landwehr was observed from almost all sides, and by further transformations it was placed in such a framework that it was by no means a "people".

The fight against revolutionary outbreaks in various parts of Europe in the middle of the 19th century contributed to the revival of the standing army, although its personnel system was considered a necessity. There are no words that all measures were taken to protect the army from the influence of the "people". Napoleonic traditions and the thunder of his victories were strong in the minds of European statesmen.

Thus the connection between the people and the army, which arose at the time of the Convention, disappeared from the scene in the time of Napoleon, but received support in the Prussian Landwehr. If the word "politics" still had a meaning for most of the military, then only in its external outlines, but the internal life of the country was a special area in which the military mind was of little interest. For him, the country should be calm, the power in it is strong and the state was obliged to give

everything for the army. None other than the "crazy Cadet" - Ludendorff, now throws a reproach in his work "Waging War and Politics" to the military poet of the Napoleonic era, Clausewitz, because he "in his book "On War" speaks of politics and the conduct of war. However, he has in mind only foreign policy. His thoughts are far from the interaction of waging war with the internal politics or economy of the country, although even in his old days, such questions arose and spoke about themselves.

We do not at all intend to put modern ideas about domestic politics and warfare into the mouth of Clausewitz, for he is the son of his age. But just as true is Ludendorff's observation that even during the Napoleonic era there was a connection between the internal life of the country and the war, it must also indicate that the philosopher of war did not pass over this factor. Namely, in his work

"On War" Clausewitz says: "It is assumed, of course, that in politics all internal interests are already coordinated and equalized (our italics; B. Sh.), because politics, in itself, is nothing but an attorney, obliged to represent and protect interests in the face of other states. It is not the place to take into account that it may take a false direction,

serve primarily the ambition, vanity and private interests of the rulers. "So," concludes Clausewitz, "we mean here that politics is the representative of all the inhabitants of the state and that, consequently, the military art of politics is in any case no decree."

Thus, if Clausewitz demands the "equation" of all the internal interests of the citizens of the state, considering this as a necessity for waging war, then, in fairness, we must say that the brains of modern German "demigods" did not understand or do not want to understand their philosopher of war. True, as is known, only now Ludendorff comprehends by diligent study of the secrets of politics, and with it the higher side of military art. Instead of reproaching Clausewitz for not taking into account the social conditions in the conduct of the war, we would advise the unlucky commander of the former German Empire to think about the words of the philosopher of war that "it is not the place to take into account that it (politics) can take a false direction, serve mainly ambition, vanity"... Will Ludendorff find in them a sentence on his activities - he was pronounced 90 years ago, and now we hear and read about him as a major blunder of the former first quartermaster general. Was Ludendorff ever in his policy "representative of all the inhabitants of the state", did it ever occur to him. We categorically deny this, and even Ludendorff himself, now realizing this, brushes aside participation in the internal life of the country, the leadership of which, in his opinion, lay with Wilhelm and the Chancellor, which we will discuss below.

We do not touch on the personal life of Clausewitz, which was distinguished by its activity in the internal politics of contemporary Germany and the reconstruction of the Prussian army on its foundations. It should not be forgotten that under Clausewitz the idea of an armed people had just been revived, and he himself was influenced by the experience of the Napoleonic wars.

From them, Moltke (senior), another idol of the Prussian general staff, drew the foundations for his teaching. "It has never been possible to create a new strategy," writes Schlichting in his work "Fundamentals of Modern Tactics and Strategy", "exclusively at the desk, therefore Moltke's theory also originates in the experience of the recent past (the war of liberation)", i.e. . from that

war, in the arena of which the Prussian Landwehr acted. We believe that it will be far from uninteresting to get acquainted with the views on domestic politics and the war of this illustrious chief of the Prussian general staff, who is also highly revered by the hero of our story, Conrad. The great "silent man" of the Prussian

General Staff in his "Military Teachings" instructed the latter: "Modern wars call entire nations to arms; there is hardly at least one family on which the war would not be a burden.

"In our time, therefore, it is not only the cabinets that decide the question of war and peace and direct the affairs of the people, but, on the contrary, in many countries the peoples themselves direct the cabinets. Thus, an element that cannot be accounted for has been introduced into the policy. At present, the stock exchange has also acquired influence, which can call on armed force to protect its interests.

The chief of the general staff is imbued with deeply pacifist ideas and proclaims: "a powerful state, along with the solution of social problems, internally asserts its power, authority and superiority outside its borders, not in order to oppress its neighbors, but to ensure peace with them and help preserve peace between neighbors". "But such a policy," according to Moltke, "can be

carried out with the support of a strong army, always ready for war. If you lacked this huge flywheel, then the state machine would stop, the diplomatic notes of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not have the proper weight.

"Our (German) army formed the foundation on which such a policy could be built ... Of course, it is sad that severe necessity forces the people to make more and more sacrifices to maintain the army." Proving further that all costs and sacrifices for the army

are strictly necessary, Moltke concludes that "to be ready for war is the best way to ensure peace. With weak forces and mercenary armies, this goal is not achieved; the fate of every nation rests on its own strength alone.

In this case, if "the army is the most important institution in the country, since it is only thanks to it that all the rest can exist

institutions, all freedom - political and civil, everything that is created by culture, finances and the state flourish and perish with the army, then such an army still gives "weight and support only as long as it is really in combat readiness and is able to enter into fight when the goal cannot be achieved otherwise. Stopping at the cadre army,

Moltke continues: "we must not allow the internal virtues of the army to be weakened, so as not to turn it into a militia."

While proving by examples the bankruptcy of the militia during the war of 1870 as a system of the armed forces, the chief of the German general staff also dwells on the experience of the French revolution, which we spoke about above. "After the revolution," writes Moltke, "of course, they immediately set about disbanding the hated army: the nation itself was supposed to defend freedom, and patriotism was supposed to replace discipline, and impulse and numbers were supposed to replace military education." Pointing to the groundlessness of such hopes, Moltke comes to the conclusion that "only after 30 years of bitter experience did the French come to the realization that it was not the army that should be included

in the militia, but volunteers in the army." Moving on to the war of 1870-71. Moltke also sees the superiority of the "trained and brave detachment of troops" (German over the French militia) and concludes: "an armed crowd does not yet constitute an army, and it is barbaric to bring it into battle, moreover, "arming the nation, we simultaneously arm and bad; every nation has both." "It is easy to give away guns, but it is not so easy to get them back," sums up the chief of the general staff. Frightening with the

Paris Commune, Moltke says: probably among us there will be elements like those who, after the war, seize or power in Paris ... God forbid that we ever give them weapons in their hands "" So, the valor with which our army is imbued should not be shaken. Not a single nation so far, in its entirety, has received such an upbringing as ours, thanks to universal military service. It is not an easy task to make a soldier out of a recruit, i.e. a man not only trained in marching and guard duty, but who, having a thorough knowledge of his complex weapons and being quite confident in them, should be able to act independently even

under the most difficult circumstances, to prepare a soldier who knows how to obey and command, for the last private becomes the head when he is posted or leads a patrol. All this is not as easy as it may seem for

desk."

"For us," Moltke continues, "the main concern is not with the technical education of the troops, but rather with the development and strengthening of moral qualities, with the military education of the young man. This cannot be achieved with drill, it must be absorbed into the flesh

and blood. "Indeed, justice requires it to be noted that military service does not represent daily, visible, productive work, but its goal is the security of the state, without which any productive work becomes impossible, and this it achieves. It is a school for the rising generations in terms of order, diligence, cleanliness, obedience and fidelity - qualities that are not wasted for later productive work.

"They say," writes Moltke, "that the schoolmaster has won our battles. Knowledge alone, however, does not yet bring a person to that height when he is ready to sacrifice his life for the sake of an idea, in the name of fulfilling his duty, honor and homeland; this goal is achieved

upbringing."

"It was not the scientist who won our battles, but the educator, i.e. a military class that gave the nation physical strength, spiritual vigor, love for the motherland and courage. So, we cannot do without the army either in domestic policy - in order to educate the nation, and even more so in external policy - to protect the homeland. (Italics are ours throughout; B. Sh.).

"The army," concludes Moltke, "cannot be a temporary institution, it cannot be improvised for weeks or months; it must be brought up over a number of years and generations, for the military organization must rest on stability and its possible duration.

"The strength of Germany," according to the chief of the general headquarters, - lies, in essence, in the homogeneity of the inhabitants.

We took the liberty of dwelling on Moltke's thoughts for so long, because:
1) they give us an idea of the views of the German General Staff on domestic politics and the army, and

2) these thoughts were considered a commandment for the chiefs of general staffs of other armies

in Europe. Abusing the attention of the reader of these pages, we will continue our reasoning about the views expressed by the Chief of the German General Staff.

So we have heard that the Chief of the Prussian General Staff is full of the idea of an armed people, as required by the modern character of war. He also considers the army to be a pillar for maintaining peace and the most necessary and most important institution in the state. Moreover, the army is a military class, the educator of the nation and the bearer of the victories won by Prussia in 1866 and 1870-71. All fairy tales about the schoolmaster who prepared these victories must be cast aside once and for all. The army must be combat-ready, but above all, obedient to the authorities and secured from the "worst" elements, which "God forbid" to give weapons into their hands. Finally, "we cannot do without the army... In domestic politics - in order to educate the nation" - this is what Moltke (senior) proclaims to us. We have just quoted Clausewitz's views on

domestic politics, and we must point out that they are far from the views of his compatriot in the uniform of the Prussian General Staff. As far as the philosopher of war recognized that the internal interests of citizens must be equalized and politics itself is nothing but the attorney of all citizens, so Moltke takes the opposite point of view, and sees in the army only the weapon of the "best" elements in the German nation, i.e. in other words, its bourgeois classes and well-meaning peasants. The internal correlation of the country's classes is invested in the structure of the army, and the army must act as the educator of the nation. In criticizing the armies of the Convention and the Paris Commune, Moltke clearly revealed his preference for the army, although with personnel bases, but still supposed to retain the features of Napoleon's "soldier" army. It was never our intention to discover the Americas, for they have long been regarded

as discovered. Therefore, we would be dishonest if we were to engage in our own criticism of Moltke's reasoning, when this has been done for us immeasurably more

efficient pen of Engels, moreover, a contemporary of the chief of the German General Staff.

Being "the greatest connoisseur of the policy to which military affairs are, in the last analysis, subordinated", and at the same time "understanding the profoundly independent nature of military affairs - with its internal technology, structure, methods, traditions and prejudices", Engels in his Articles about the war of 1870-71" criticized the judgments of the Prussian General Staff, which we have quoted above.

Engels defines the "just" policy of Germany as a product of "new German chauvinism", and not the desire of the Wilhelmian government to strengthen peace in Europe.

Pointing out the severe need for Prussia, after the defeat in 1806-1807, to accept short terms of service in the army for the accumulation of "large battalions", Engels says that after 1813 "the same principle of short-term active service and long-term reserve was developed more fully and moreover harmonized with the necessity of having an absolute monarchy. People were left in active military service from two to three years, not only in order to be trained in military affairs, but also in order to accustom them to unconditional

obedience."

"That is the weak point of the Prussian system. It must reconcile two distinct and ultimately incompatible goals. On the one hand, it claims that every physically healthy person should be a soldier, to have a real army, the sole purpose of which is to become a school in which citizens are trained in the use of weapons, a school that is the core around which they concentrate during an attack. from the outside. This system seems to be purely defensive, but, on the other hand, the same army is an armed support, the main support of the quasi-absolute government; for this purpose, the school of military art for citizens must be changed into a school of absolute obedience to superiors, into a school of royalist feelings. This can only be achieved through a long service life. This is where the incompatibility becomes apparent. Defensive foreign policy requires the training of a large number of men for a short period of time, so as to have a large number of soldiers in reserve in case

outside attacks; internal politics requires the training of a limited number of people over a longer period of time, so as to have a reliable army in the event of an internal uprising. Quasi - absolute monarchy chose an intermediate path. She kept people on active duty for three whole years and limited the number of recruits according to her financial means. In fact, there was no universal conscription (emphasis ours; B.Sh.), it was replaced by forced recruitment, the only difference of which from the recruitment of other countries is its great severity ... and at the same time what was originally a people armed for self-defense, is now turning into an obedient army, ready to attack, into an instrument of government policy.

Showing that the war of 1870-71. did not capture the internal life of the country, Engels says, "that the transformation of citizens into soldiers proceeded on such a scale that no states except Germany knew, but if the same writers look at Germany at the present time (during the war; B. Sh.) after over a million people have been cut off from civilian life, they will see; that the factories are working, the harvest is harvested, the shops and offices are open. Although production has been stopped, it has been stopped due to a lack of orders, and not due to a lack of workers, but on the streets you can see a lot of healthy guys who are just as fit to carry weapons as those soldiers who went to fight in France. Then, on the basis of statistical data, Engels proves that the Prussian government did not exhaust the entire annual contingent fit for the army, and that although the latter, according to the General Staff, "is nothing but a school in which the whole nation is preparing for war", " yet only a small percentage of the population goes through this school," concludes Engels.

He sees the reason for this in the fact that "the requirements of the dynasty, on the one hand, the financial situation, on the other, influenced the limitation of the number of recruits. The army remained an obedient weapon for the purposes of absolutism at home, for government wars abroad; but it cannot be said that the entire strength of the nation is. used for her protection."

“An armed nation, therefore, is simply a bluff,” says Engels elsewhere and explains: “as long as the hereditary policy is maintained, it is necessary to have an army that is an obedient tool of the Prussian dynasty and government ... and the phrase armed nation” hides under itself the creation of a large army to carry out policy abroad and to support reaction at home. “Armed Nation” would not be a good tool for Bismarck's work.”

Being a supporter of the actual application of the principle of universal conscription, Engels writes that “just as the Prussian Landwehr was a step forward compared to the French personnel system, since it reduced the service life and increased the number of people capable of defending their homeland, so the new system of universal conscription conscription will be an advance in relation to the Prussian system.” Asking whether Prussia could fully apply the idea of an armed people, Engels replied: “Of course, yes, but then it would cease to be the present Prussia. She will gain in defensive strength and lose in offensive strength; she will have more soldiers) but they will not be so fit for attack at the beginning of the war; she would have to give up the idea of conquest, and as for her present domestic policy, she would be in grave danger.”

As you know, for the sake of the latter, neither Bismarck nor Moltke could go into service with all elements of the German nation, the chief of the general staff completely excluded some of them from the number of citizens liable for military

service. It is hardly possible to find a better analysis of Moltke's judgments than the completely exhaustive analysis given by Engels. He clearly reveals the aggressive aspirations of the chief of the general staff in foreign policy and the desire to have an army to educate in the interests of only the ruling classes with the removal of the “worst” elements, i.e. politically unreliable segments of the population.

The working-class movement in Germany, which had already begun since the time of Moltke, worried him, but the “military estate” was obliged to educate the citizens who had passed through the ranks of the army for a future war in the spirit of obedience to the dynasty and the government.

Bismarck firmly held the affairs of domestic politics in his hands, and therefore the chief of the general staff avoided particularly intruding into it, and the "iron chancellor" himself did not allow his hands to be stretched there.

However, as we saw in the previous chapters, even during the lifetime of Moltke (senior), his assistants - "demigods" from the general staff, under the high patronage of first the prince, and then the emperor Wilhelm II, went on the offensive against the domestic and foreign policy of the chancellor. We will not go further into the vicissitudes of this struggle. Let us only note that, having overthrown Bismarck, they followed in his footsteps, for "politics is not a battlefield." If at the last they were masters of their craft, then in politics they were beaten by the development of those productive forces that accumulated and developed in Germany, so frightening Moltke (the elder). "Demigods" in official chancellorships and as

unspoken leaders of the country's internal life but wanted to change internal politics and, according to Engels's analysis, embarking on the path of conquest in the external, had to demand the development of a standing army. This path was chosen by them. War Minister Verdi, already familiar to us, was an intercessor for an increase in military loans.

In his Memoirs, Bismarck cites his conversation with Wilhelm about the increase in war credits. "Will you still spend war loans in the Reichstag?" Wilhelm asked him when the chancellor raised the question of his resignation in 1890. "I replied," continues Bismarck, "although I did not know the amount requested, that I would willingly contribute to their implementation. The question of the socialists was more important to me than the military one, since we were strong enough, down to artillery and officers... I did not consider it my duty to fight first of all for the grand plans that the nominee of the king or Verdi proclaimed "immediately". The requested 117 million were called first of all to the fight by the Minister of Finance, then the Allied governments and, finally, the Reichstag. For me, leading the rearguard action, the question of the socialists was more important than the draft submitted by Verdi, and even in essence it was so.

Bismarck plunged headlong into the fight against the Social Democrats, and for him "the question of the army was not a sufficient reason for breaking with the Reichstag." The internal policy of the chancellor withstood serious

battles, demanded repairs, which was completely incomprehensible to the "demigods" of the General Staff, just as the now overthrown "god" Ludendorff

does not understand this. Influenced by the thoughts expressed by Krauss in his work "The Reasons for Our Defeats" about the connection between domestic politics and war, Ludendorff published the book "Warcraft and Politics" in 1922. We have already partly talked about it, and now we will dwell on its analysis in a little more detail, taking into account also Ludendorff's revelation about domestic politics, made by him in his Memoirs.

With them we must begin, since his "Waging of War and Politics" appears after studying some political works, though chosen one-sidedly.

We are familiar with the political preparation of Ludendorff himself before the war, when he was not interested in political parties and considered politics to be the business of civilians. It turns out that he was not a courtier either, and "Napoleonic plans for the whole world did not interest me" he now tells us.

In a word, the former first quartermaster general turned out to be out of politics, but only took it into account. "As always," he says, "I stood ... on the point of view that the establishment of the foundations of policy is within the competence of the imperial chancellor, so long as they do not contradict the requirements of military security," and ... "in all our activities, we proceeded exclusively from military requirements "(our italics; B. Sh.).

It turns out that on matters of domestic policy, neither the emperor nor the chancellor even talked to Hindenburg-Ludendorff and: "I (Ludendorff) did not even strive for such conversations, since I was very far from domestic politics" (our italics; B. Sh.).

But here: "It has always been my conviction that the people and the army represent one body and soul and, therefore, the army could not remain healthy for a long time if the country was sick." In these views, from the side of Ludendorff, first in a roundabout way, and then in direct ways, an invasion of domestic politics begins, did the Historical leadership of Germany lack much? a hand that would rule the country with authority, "says Ludendorff and" in order to win on the battlefield, the high command needed the cooperation of a statesman, this became clearer to me, as

how I entered my position and understood the situation more widely" (our italics; B. Sh.). An attack

began against Chancellor Bethmann, and the latter, who at one time, for the sake of internal politics, had toppled Falkengine and called on Hindenburg-Ludendorff, fell at the request of the latter.

We consider it superfluous to dwell on Ludendorff's interference in the internal life of Germany, since, in its own way naivety, he himself declares that somehow it turned out accidentally that everything appealed to him, and according to Erzberger's memoirs, Ludendorff "remained postal the unlimited ruler of Germany and partly decided political issues himself, partly significantly influenced their solution" (our italics; B. Sh.) We can agree with Ludendorff that

indeed there were no Bismarck, who would quickly put an end to the "unrestricted power" of the General Staff during the war.

Looking back on the path traveled, Ludendorff, inspired by Krauss, enriched literature with a whole book on the conduct of war and politicians.

We noted above that, in his opinion, Clausewitz turned out to be a short-sighted person, not foreseeing the influence of domestic politics on the conduct of the war. Ludendorff hurries to fill the gap and clarify this issue. He begins his research from the time of Frederick II, using it mainly as an argument in defense of the strategy of destruction, which was the dogma of Ludendorff himself. Moving on to the times of Bismarck and Moltke, the former "ruler" of Germany comes to the conclusion

that the chancellor considered war as a foreign policy, but only by other means, and in the internal life of Germany he directed all his forces to the consolidation of the nation and the fight against the developing social movement. Ludendorff attributes the success of Bismarck's domestic policy to the fact that he, relying on the majority of the Reichstag, led him. We have shown above that indeed Bismarck shifted the whole center of gravity in the last years of his chancellorship to domestic politics, but he was hardly

successful in this. Germany was on the verge of a break in her inner life, because the productive forces had outgrown her national shell.

Bismarck's policy of consolidation could not overcome the growing indignation of the German workers and, as Engels wrote on January 7, 1888, "driven the workers and petty-bourgeois masses into our arms in droves," which is why Engels considered "general war" undesirable for the development of the revolution. For Ludendorff, of course, this point of view is incomprehensible, because in the "general war" he saw the completion of all the peaceful

activities of Germany. With the departure of Bismarck, according to Ludendorff, the dispersion of Germany began: on the part of the government, one can see flirting with the left wing of the Reichstag, which every year became more and more strengthened. Now the Reichstag led the government, and not vice versa, as was the case under Bismarck. Among the leading circles and party leaders of the Reichstag, internationalist and pacifist aspirations prevailed, which also infected Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, who did not believe in the politics of "power"

In a word, the "nation" was torn apart by none other than a government that did not want to increase the

army. Ludendorff "himself" was an ardent supporter of the strengthening of the army, the author of the 1912 report and, finally, a suffering person. However, we must point out that, crying over the decay of the nation, and after it the army, Ludendorff again chose the path that was predicted by Engels for the recovery of the latter, and the army, increasing in number, was by no means a reflection of the people, and politics was not "confident" » «all citizens of Germany». "The lack of political intuition and strong will of the chancellor in the field of development of the armed forces is a sad event in Germany before the world war. It shows the weakness of the government in domestic policy, due to which, unfortunately, questions of defense have not constituted the main part of our domestic policy. It is nothing but a sad consequence of the international pacifist sentiments of the head of the government, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg. In a word, Bismarck's times have sunk into oblivion. "The German people walked on an inclined plane and sank lower and lower. The spirit of the people was not prepared for the coming events." These are the results of Ludendorff on the state of Germany before the war.

"The internal connection between politics and the conduct of war, and vice versa, in all fields is so deep and all-encompassing that they

manifestation must be regarded as general actions," writes Ludendorff. Exploring

this connection further throughout the war, Ludendorff gives the following recipe for the German people. "It is not a 'frantic militarist' who speaks here, but a man to whom fate, in addition to his will, has given a lesson more than others in the course of history and who, as a strict necessity, sees that the people and their leader clearly imagine the mutual connection of politics and waging war and knowing beings" the latter. This knowledge is much more useful than believing in various promises. The job is thankless. In short, "the people themselves must know the essence of war." "Only then will we help ourselves, only in this case we will not follow false leaders, as before the world war, and we will not kneel before the golden calf, as has been done in recent years." The people express their will through the leader, who must necessarily be a German, full of strength, love for the fatherland and put this above his own "I", must bear only personal responsibility "before God, the people and his own conscience."

So Ludendorff thought in 1921, and in the next 1923, like everyone else known, made an attempt to become such a leader, but failed.

Ludendorff is not alone in his conclusions. Foerster, in his work "Count Schlieffen and the World War", speaking about the organization of the management of the war, points out: "It cannot be said that in the wars of Wilhelm I there were no frictions and clashes between the monarch, political and military leadership. They are quite famous, but it is also known that they were happily eliminated and never had an impact on the final success. The genius of Bismarck was able, despite the opposition of his king and chief of the general staff, to uphold and implement the principle that, in the conduct of war, considerations of a strategic order should be subordinated to considerations of military policy. "For politics gives birth to war, it is the brain, war is only its means, and not vice versa," as Clausewitz says.

"The Germans tried during the World War," continues Foerster, "from the outside to solve the problem of leadership, according to the type proposed by Schlieffen of the triumvirate of the monarch, head of government and chief of the general staff. However, in

The political and military leadership lacked unity of thought and action; it was no longer there long before the start of the war. The younger Moltke made serious attempts to achieve this unity even in peacetime, but to no avail: in our fact-based conviction, the blame for this lay primarily with the head of government. "Flaw

interactions between responsible political and military leaders of Germany in the years preceding the war, was fraught with consequences and made itself felt especially sharply in the world war. Even worse, from the very beginning of the war, more and more mistakes were made in this sense. Moreover, in the German triumvirate of 1914-August 1916, not a single member of the "committee, which was now supposed to replace the commander," "received not a drop of Samuel's oil."

"The situation changed," Foerster continues, "only after Hindenburg and Ludendorff joined this 'committee'. It does not matter that he became four-headed - Hindenburg and Ludendorff personified the unity of thought, will and unity of purpose. And yet in practice it turned out that it was not enough, as Schlieffen thought, if one of the members of the committee was gifted with a divine spark. There was no head of government like Bismarck, capable of leading the people, setting and pursuing clear foreign policy goals. There was no statesman who agreed with the high command in the conditions of the need for victory. "The relationship between politics and strategy,"

continues Foerster, "during the World War turned out to be much more multifaceted than it was before. Issues of domestic and economic policy played a decisive role. In this respect, the relationship between politics and strategy is different from what was said in the above definition of Clausewitz. The head of the government is already an assistant to the supreme command, and it is his duty to provide the supreme command with the widest possible material, intellectual and moral assistance. And the political leaders of the state did not fulfill this task in full. The methods used by them in some matters of domestic policy were detrimental to strategy, and despite all the efforts of the high command, the latter failed to change this.

Turning Clausewitz inside out, the mishap-clouded brains of the German "demigods" of our day seek salvation in military force. Bernhardt in his work "On the War of the Future" writes: "in domestic politics, one cannot indulge in any illusions in the same way. You need to know exactly what you can expect from your people and what exceeds their strength. It must be quite clearly realized that a large mass never represents the good of the whole in all its consequences, although it is capable of temporary inspiration in the name of ideal goals, but it is never able to preserve it with conscious obstinacy; she can still make a certain sacrifice, but in general she has in mind only personal material benefits. That statesman who has in mind the common good will not be understood by the masses, and therefore he must, under certain circumstances, resort to violent measures in order to carry out his will ... Therefore, a political leader must therefore have the courage, under certain circumstances, to mercilessly oppose his own people. (*Italics ours; B. Sh.*) In order to put an end to the views of the former luminaries of the General Staff on domestic politics and war, we must listen to Krauss, already known to us, Ludendorff's inspirer.

"Politics and war are the same military operations in which war is the extreme, the highest exertion of forces," writes Krauss in "The Reasons for Our Defeats." "War, as the highest stage of exertion of the forces of a single military action of policy - war requires the comprehensive use of all state forces and means. Everything: foreign and domestic finance, trade, mining policy, industry, industry, national economy - to the everything must be united in management and subordinated conduct of war.

"This joint work should not be carried out in the last minutes before the start of the war. It must be prepared in a long time of peace. This work requires from all people called to high posts, in addition to being aware of the seriousness of the war, also subordinating their activities to the interests of the war. "A high understanding of military phenomena and joint work with the command is the law of war. Ambiguity, difference of opinion and divergence of opinion should not take place."

“War must be best prepared in the field of domestic politics. The army and navy, of course, must be in constant readiness for war; the closer the war, the more should be the strengthening of the armed forces of the people. All internal deficiencies must be eliminated; only a people united in striving for the highest, for achieving its future, can enter into a decisive battle with full effort. In view of this, politics must promptly eliminate and uproot everything that hinders such a struggle. Internal struggle, not excluding the struggle of political parties, only weakens the strength of the resistance of the people, self-destructs it. “A strong policy is carried out only by a state full of strength. The strength and power

of the state is based on its internal relationships. Only that state, which is organized within itself and has firmly established relationships, can be considered strong and conduct the same military policy. (Italics ours; B. Sh.). This concludes our "search" into history. Let's not object that it can be one-sided, that we captured only the German General Staff and

did not look into the rest of the countries of Europe, where, very likely, there were other views and thoughts about the connection between strategy and domestic politics. We deliberately did not do this, and therefore we have entitled this chapter a “search” and not a long journey through the annals. The motives for this were: the most stable views of German military thought, its kinship with the Austro-Hungarian general staff we are studying, and, finally, in essence, the circumstances that in other countries military thought was directed by the same channel as in the river Spree.

There were also exceptions. So, A. Svechin in his "Strategy" gives us the thoughts of the French major of the General Staff Dupuis, who, based on the history of the Convention and its army, as we have stated above, proposed already in 1912 to replace "one-man command" with "cooperation" of "persons delegated political power so that they live in direct contact with the commanders and soldiers", The thoughts of this "outstanding advanced

military theorist", of course, were not recognized not only abroad, but also in

France, and before us passed the "brevet" of the republic, which not only did not intend to recognize such "cooperation", but considered it possible to exile the government itself ... in the colony!

A. Svechin, recalling Dupuy, comes to the conclusion that "one-man command, so appropriate in the lower and middle command instances, is now unrealizable at the top of the leadership of the war."

Being in the "search", we focused only on the general influence of domestic policy on the army and military affairs and almost did not touch on such issues as discipline, the position of command personnel, attitude towards the press - issues that are undoubtedly important, but the historical coverage of which would lead us very far and bore the reader. We already abused

his attention, forcing him to listen to the teachings of the shadows of the past, we chose a method of acquaintance with history, which is now considered obsolete in our literature. But we honestly warned in the introduction that we never intended to discover the Americas and steal his glory from Columbus.

We are more concerned about our next chapter, in which we are obliged to "reflect" on the ideas of the hero of our story - Conrad. We will not hide the fact that we, like the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, did not receive a complete political education and also "learned little by little, something and somehow." Therefore, our views in the field of politics can be not only erroneous, but also childish ... and here we are only trying our hand ...

Chapter XII

Domestic politics and the general staff

Economy and politics. – Accounting by the General Staff of the impact of the economy on politics. - Foreign and domestic policy, their relationship with each other and the economy. – War is a derivative of the economy. -

Domestic policy determines the nature of the war -

Lenin's thoughts. "War sums up domestic politics.

- The army is a reflection of statehood. - The political face of the army and domestic politics. — Conrad's thoughts on the political training of those

liable for military service before joining the army. - The

national question and the army. – Social movement

and army. - The press and the general staff. -

political work in the army. - A unified policy in the

army and in the country. - Special political

bodies in the army. - The role of command

staff in political work in the army and the requirements

for command staff. - Discipline. - Deployment of the

army. - The role of the General Staff in the domestic

policy of the state. - "Principled non-intervention" of the

General Staff in domestic politics and its wrong

side. - "National Defense Councils" and their role in the

conduct of the war. - The General Staff receives

orientation in domestic policy from the state body

preparing and waging war. - The role of a special

political body in the army. – General staff and press. - I.

P. Lebedev and A. Svechin on the importance of

domestic policy in preparing for war. - Blich's

prophecy about the reasons for ending the world

For one of the chapters, we threw an accusation against the General Staff that they did not clearly understand the foundation of "politics" and recognized as such feelings, ideas, etc. data that were derivatives of something "primary", which disappeared from the circle of understanding of the

"demigods" . "Depending on the nature of the productive means, the social relations of the producers to each other also change, the relations of their joint activity and their participation in the entire course of production change," says Marx. "The social relations of producers," he continues, "change, therefore, with the change and development of the material means of production, i.e. productive forces. The relations of production in their totality form what is called social relations, society, and, moreover, a society at a certain historical stage of development, a society with a definite character. In another place, Marx points out that "in the social production of their lives, people come across certain necessary

relations independent of their will - relations of production that correspond to a certain stage in the development of their material productive forces. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation on which rises the legal and political superstructure. "Legal and political institutions are formed on the basis of the actual relations of people in the social process of production," concludes Marx. Developing his teaching, Plekhanov gives us the

following orientation. "Any given stage in the development of the productive forces," he says, "necessarily leads a certain grouping of people in the social productive

process, i.e. certain relations of production, i.e. certain structure of the whole society. And once the structure of society is given, it is not difficult to understand that this character will be reflected in general on the whole psychology of people, on all their habits, morals, feelings, views, aspirations and ideals. Habits, manners, attitudes, aspirations and ideals must necessarily be adapted to

way of life of people, to their way of getting their own food. The psychology of society is always expedient in relation to economy, always corresponds to it, is always determined by it.

Elsewhere, Plekhanov teaches that "the internal relations of a given society are determined by the given state of the productive forces. But after all, this same state also determines its external relations with other societies. On the basis of these relations, society has new needs, for the satisfaction of which new organs grow. At a superficial glance at the matter, the mutual relations of individual societies appear as a series of "political" actions that have no direct relation to the economy. In fact, it is economy that underlies intersocietal relations, which determines both the real (and not only external) causes for intertribal and international relations, and their result. Each stage in the development of the productive forces, concludes Plekhanov, "corresponds to its own system of armaments, its own military tactics, its own diplomacy, its own international law." We took the liberty of recalling this doctrine of "economy" as "primary" in relation to individual individuals and entire societies, so that the reader of our work

would himself conclude how superficially the General Staff took a look at the matter and regarded the mutual relations of forces in the state as a series of "political" actions that are not directly related to "savings". If we briefly look at what was said above about domestic policy, as assessed by the general staff, then all the measures they proposed amounted to a direct correction of the psychology of society or parties, but did not affect the economic structure on the basis of which their relations developed inside. For the headquarters, the process of development of the productive forces that was taking place in Europe was completely incomprehensible, and, as a result, a turning point in the psychology of the population of the state. In Germany, this turning point was most apparent in the social movement, while in Austria-Hungary the national enmity escalated, going hand in hand with the same developing class movement. True, we heard that Conrad spoke of the gradual growth of the nationalities of the monarchy, but he identified this with their developing culture, education,

but by no means with economic life. In the new psychology of society - its class stratification, the former chief of the general staff saw only a force that destroys, but does not create the state, finding himself in this in complete unanimity with Bismarck, with Moltke, and, finally, now with Ludendorff, and not only with them alone, but also with a wider range of bourgeois politicians and generals. We do not know whether we have clearly conveyed our idea that for a correct orientation in internal politics, in internal relations in the state, it is necessary to deeply penetrate into those relations of production that exist at the present time, as well as to understand the process of their development by which they will go into the future. It is only on this basis that the so-called "political program" that is now necessary for the conduct of the war should be drawn. In our modern literature, a quite definite

and healthy view of this question has already been established. And Svechin writes in The Strategy that "since every program (political; B. Sh.) is based on economic interests, and the economy is the basis for the development of a historical offensive, we can see in politics a" concentrated expression of the economy. We do not refer to other works of ours. military literature, because we believe that what has been said from the main work on strategy is sufficient.

Although we promised to speak about foreign policy a little later, however, here we consider it necessary to say a few words about its relationship with the domestic policy of the state. The doctrine was cited above that a given stage in the development of productive forces leads to a certain grouping of people, societies, and it also determines external relations with other states. In other words, from the internal relations in the state, the external lines of its communication with its neighbors should also originate. One is intimately linked to the other, and the disruption of this connection usually leads to setbacks on one front or another. The basis, the basis for both domestic and foreign policy is the same - a given stage in the development of the productive forces of society.

Today, a healthy foreign policy of the state is unthinkable, which would not meet the interests of the driving forces of its population. If the opposite happened very often in history, then sooner or later, but also naturally, such a policy was followed by a collapse

domestic policy. One could give many examples of this. We will confine ourselves to the epochs we have touched upon above. Napoleon's foreign policy collapsed when France no longer had sympathy for it, when it diverged from the interests of the French bourgeoisie and peasantry, the driving forces of the state. Finally, the imperialist war on the side of the middle states in the fourth year was met with obvious hostility by the working masses of Germany and Austria-Hungary, who understood the whole pointlessness of the slaughter, in the latter, moreover, with an intensification of the national struggle. The predatory aspirations of the bourgeois classes in these states were shattered by the new psychology of the working masses, created by economic conditions. The philosopher of war

Clausewitz, subordinating war to foreign policy, introduced an indispensable condition for it (politics) to be a representative of all citizens, so that the internal interests of the latter were equalized, i.e., in other words, he considered war possible when everything was calm inside. We heard how Ludendorff, who

threw an unfair reproach at him, is now ardently proving the need for the closest connection between domestic and foreign policy, and his inspirer, Krauss, and the hero of our story Konrad, admit that only a state that is healthy inside can conduct a strong and active foreign policy. We understand the former Chief of the Austrian General Staff when he

tells us that the internal and external policies of the monarchy were closely intertwined, because, in essence, especially for Austria, it could not be otherwise.

Thus, we consider it necessary to join the thoughts of Krauss that "a strong policy is carried out only by a state full of strength. The strength and power of the state are based on its internal relationships. Nowadays, everyone knows that "war is

the continuation of politics by other means," that "war is not only a political action, but it is simply a real instrument of politics." These thoughts of Clausewitz are now universally recognized, and therefore we consider it superfluous to prove it. It is more interesting for us now to shed light on the idea that war is also a "superstructure" of the economy, just like "politics". Although

war in this light is not yet universally recognized, but its origin in "politics" has been firmly grasped in all countries, especially after the first world upheaval. The deep pacifist

Nidti declares: "War and battle are two different things. The battle is a fact of an exclusively military nature; war is primarily a political act. War is not decided by military action alone.

Long before the World War, the military writer Puzyrevsky testified that "the war is not waged to prove the knowledge of abstract academic truths) but for the sake of well-known political goals." With Marx, "politics" from a self-

contained area of human life turned into a "superstructure" of the economy, and it was followed by war. It is impossible to speak of the influence of politics on the war without forgetting the given stage in the development of the productive forces. "The period of purely political democracy is ending and is being replaced by a social one," Jaurès wrote in his New Army.

Lenin defined that "war is not an accident, not a 'sin', as Christian priests (who preach patriotism, humanity and peace are no worse than opportunists) think, but an inevitable stage of capitalism, a form of capitalist life as familiar as the world."

Recognizing "politics" as a superstructure of the economy, Lenin said: "War is not only the continuation of politics, it is the summation
politicians".

Without stopping further on the proof of this, we will return to domestic politics.

Recognizing that such should be the "confidant" of all citizens, whose "internal" interests are equalized, the philosopher of war Clausewitz came to the conclusion that the nature of war is determined by politics, meaning by such an external one. "The whole plan of war follows directly from the political existence of both belligerent states and from their attitude towards other powers," he wrote.

This principle was guided before the World War in determining its character in the "organic" era, as it can be defined. At that time, Europe was only gathering strength for those "critical" days, which have not passed even now.

After the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71. and the Paris Commune, "political stagnation" set in, ending the era of the formation of European nation-states. However, with outward calm, antagonism accumulated in capitalist society, on the one hand, and on the other, the forces of the social movement grew. The ruling classes of European states sought to smooth out the cracks that were forming in both international and domestic relations. The revolution of 1905 in Russia and the Russo-Japanese war stirred up not only the states of Europe, but the whole world. Everywhere in Western Europe, the social movement intensified, but it did not reach the point of open clash with the government, as it was in RUSSIA. The revolution of 1905 in Russia was strangled, but nevertheless found a response in the East - in Turkey, Persia and China. The World War strengthened the revolutionary movement and brought us

from the period of "political stagnation" to the era of "critical days".

We have already noted that in times of "political stagnation" war acquired its character depending on foreign policy, as Clausewitz wrote about, reducing the internal politics of the struggling states precisely to a state of "stagnation". Today, the picture is changing

dramatically. It was noted above that foreign policy should normally flow from the internal relations that develop in the state ... Everyone, of course, knows that the states of the modern political map are going through "critical" days within themselves and that it is not necessary to talk about their internal "political stagnation".

In these aspects, we depart from Clausewitz's formulation and dwell entirely on the thoughts of Lenin, which were quoted at the beginning of this chapter and which we now repeat. Lenin

teaches that "the nature of a war and its success depend most of all on the internal order of the country that enters the war, that war is a reflection of the internal policy pursued by the given country (our italics; B. Sh.). "All this is inevitably reflected in the war," concludes Lenin.

Taking into account what has been said about the nature of our era, Lenin's conclusions are quite understandable. The internal policy of both one's own country and the enemy will first of all determine the nature of the war and show us how far we can count on success.

For a Marxist, this understanding of the relationship between domestic politics and war has always been clear, starting with Marx himself. Today, after experiencing the storms of the world war, even from the lips of such people as Krauss, Ludendorff, we also hear revelations about the dominant role of domestic politics in the external relations of the state and the conduct of war. Therefore, in fairness, we cannot deny the hero of our story, Konrad, his correct judgments about the need for success on the external front, first of all, to improve the internal policy of Austria-Hungary. Brought up in the "organic" era, representatives of the general staff of other countries considered the internal order in the country as a constant value in the conduct of a future war, declaring their "principled" non-interference in the affairs of domestic politics, and connected the war mainly with the external relations of the state. Even Conrad was at times no stranger to established tradition.

In our literature, A. Svechin in his work "Strategy", pointing out that "the importance of a healthy domestic policy for waging war was recognized already in antiquity", comes to the conclusion that "the importance of the rear, and with it the domestic policy at the present time, compared with the past, greatly increased; his influence increased and the misfortunes he experienced during the war multiplied. The rear now often succumbs to the first decomposition ... Success in war is now possible only with a high discipline of the rear. Maintaining discipline in the army falls primarily, in addition to the consciousness of the soldiers, on the cadres of the army - its command staff. Maintaining the discipline of the rear is the business of the cadres of the people,

the organs of their civil power. Elsewhere, A. Svechin points out that "foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy, and therefore is far from free in its combinations." We

believe that after all that has been said, the significance of internal politics, as a factor that primarily determines the nature of the war, will become clear and irrefutable for us. We

threw out the accusation of the General Staff of its political illiteracy, for, as was seen above, already twenty years after the beginning of the "political stagnation" Bismarck was fighting with the developing social movement, and in Austria national conflicts were growing every day. "Critical" days were knocking on

the door to World War II and it was time to get out of the "political stagnation", but this required major steps in domestic policy, and not the recommendation of the notorious § 14.

Lenin taught us that "the question of which class fought the war and continues the war is an important question." Indeed, what else could the Western European bourgeoisie and tsarism advise but § 14 with its repressions. And from this point of view it is necessary to evaluate the views of leading military circles on domestic policy.

We ask you to remember well these words of Comrade. Lenin, since they will serve as starting points in our wanderings through the offices of the bourgeois general staff.

Counting on "political stagnation" within the state or promising "reforms" in domestic politics after "victory" on the external front, the governments of the states of the era of imperialist war were thrown out of the rut when "critical days" came within them, when domestic politics asserted itself powerfully. A search for new paths began, ending in revolutionary outbreaks in countries economically shaken by the war. We believe that a definite political program for the internal life of the state should always be present, but it cannot be considered firmly established in advance and will inevitably undergo changes in the course of the war. Lenin said: "War is not a languid continuation of politics, it is the summation of politics." Thus, one phenomenon directly affects another. Politics guides the war, but it also draws from it those new guidelines for itself that must be followed.

Neither the recognized politicians of the world war, nor the "demigods" in the uniform of the General Staff, who are now only gradually reaching the conclusions drawn by Lenin, have caught such a connection.

If the representatives of the General Staff verbally tried to fence themselves off from the internal policy of the state, then in the question of the army they considered it their first and most important duty to make such demands to the same policy that would contribute to the strengthening of the armed forces of the country. Several chiefs of staff and commanders passed

before us, and they all tried to create the necessary instrument for the war, which is quite understandable without our further explanations.

We deliberately traced the views on the army from the time of the French Revolution to the present day. Before us passed both the "soldier" army of Napoleon, and the class army of the personnel system, the so-called "armed people", and, finally, we heard modern views on the army.

This or that type of army existed under certain internal relations in the state and then was brought up within itself. It is hardly necessary to

repeat and prove that "the army is a reflection of society." We see how Napoleon tried to create something separate and failed in his attempts. We have given in detail Engels' criticism of the Prussian military system, or, in essence, of the views of Moltke (senior), and this criticism can be safely extended to the German army on the threshold of a world war. We showed the army of the Convention, and, finally, we dwelled in detail on the Austro-Hungarian system. All these armies reflected a certain statehood, and in this respect the chief of the Austrian general staff was deeply right when he said that the Habsburg army should be a splinter from a patchwork monarchy, and not be built like a German one. Even if such a conservative in thinking commander as Ludendorff declares that the army and the people are synonymous, then,

consequently, one cannot count on the revival of the type of "soldier" armies in the future. On the example of the Convention, we saw that the army was with the people, because the entire socio-economic policy of the Convention was at the request of

the people. Analyzing the Prussian military system, Engels argued that the Prussian government was far from realizing the idea of an armed people,

but created an army obedient to its internal policy and external conquests. Finally, Conrad also wanted to have a "single" army, which would vividly express the idea of the Habsburg monarchy. We have heard how Moltke was determined to give even the educator of the German nation none other than the army, to let the entire German people through the barracks. If we remember "the words of Comrade. Lenin that "the question of which class waged the war ... is an important question," then for us it will become quite

understandable is the desire of the illustrious chief of the German General Staff to create an army that would correspond to the internal policy of Prussia, and he himself does not hide this, stating that "we cannot do without the army ... in internal politics - in order to educate the nation", and therefore they should not join the army "worse" elements were allowed, which Moltke did not even want to educate, they were so dangerous for the regime of "political stagnation" in Germany, of which the "silent" field marshal was an admirer.

The hero of our story, Konrad, thought of the "armed people" in a slightly different way. Strong in its moral cohesion. This property of the army was always taken into account by all commanders, and all of them paid special attention to the "moral" qualities of the army, thinking even by the army to educate the nation. In contrast to such views, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff demands that the society supply already politically educated citizens to his army. This is the main basis for his demands on the internal policy of the state.

A fan of the "armed people" - Konrad, as we will see below, even wondered about the transition in Austria-Hungary to the militia system of building the armed forces, as the most reflective of the "armed people". However, under the same conditions of domestic policy, pursuing the interests of the dynasty and the ruling classes of the monarchy, the chief of the general staff was forced to hand over the militia to the archive, continuing to remain on the personnel system of the army, but with the largest possible pass through it for those liable for military service.

Taking into account the peculiarities of the state structure of the empire, Konrad rightly noted that a Prussian military uniform could not be put on it, but it was necessary to sew one to the measure of Austria-Hungary. He saw the reason for this in the domestic policy that prevailed most in the state on the banks of the Danube. We

noted that "critical" days had come for Austria-Hungary, during which national enmity burned and flared up more and more, and then class stratification deepened every day.

These two factors determined the internal policy, and consequently, the political mood of the Habsburg army. We note again that Konrad, of course, did not see behind all this

economic base, but saw only its superstructure - the psychology of struggling nationalities and parties. To

treat an army that was politically sick, according to Conrad, it was necessary from the outside, i.e. a corresponding change in the psychology of those liable for military service before they enter the army, and then continue this work in the army itself. This shows the opposite and more correct methods of approach to resolving the issue than Bonaparte or Moltke (the elder), who wanted to make the barracks the educator of the nation. However, the

Austrian Chief of the General Staff was by no means inclined to follow Engels and did not think of drastically changing the internal policy of the ruling classes, but in the external he embarked on the path of conquest. Austria must remain Austria, with its policy of absolutism, with its aggressive plans in the foreign field, and for this a strong and united army is needed. The presence of such an army is put by Conrad as the first task for the state, and for this purpose it is possible to introduce paragraph 14, and disperse the cabinet of ministers, and take the most repressive police measures, "etc., etc. Conrad

If recognized individual nationalities as in the army, and in the state, then only as a necessary concession to the demands of life, putting forward immediately proposals to fight the demands of the opposition of individual nationalities for the expansion of rights. The reader of these lines knows that the

socio-economic policy of the bourgeois ruling strata of the monarchy diverged sharply from the aspirations of the individual nationalities of the state and the working classes. It's clear. without further explanation, that the army was partly not with the government, and reflected in itself those internal contradictions that existed in the monarchy. Thus, we establish: 1) the modern army does not live outside

domestic politics, 2) the army is a cast from the state, 3) the political mood of the army requires special work on itself, identical to the domestic policy pursued in the state; 4) the army is not the educator of society, but, on the contrary, the society educates the army. The Austro-Hungarian army is an interesting attempt to resolve the principle of self-

determination by the hand of the bourgeoisie.

nationalities. If we recall all Conrad's arguments on this issue, we will see the same path of contradictions that he generally followed, interpreting simultaneously the "unity" of the army and the "equality" of nationalities in the state and in the army. The Chief of the Austrian General Staff did not want true equality either in the country or in the system of the armed forces. One cannot, of course, deny the validity of his arguments about the need for a single "official language", which should be adopted by nationalities in large military outlines, and not penetrate to the smallest formations, reducing the meaning of the "native" language almost to nothing. Then the commanding staff alien to the national part, as Konrad insisted, will not contribute to its corresponding political mood, since it can always make mistakes in relation to a sensitive nationality. With all that has been said, the main guarantee of success in the formation of national units lies, first of all, of course, in the internal policy pursued in the state that is in line with the self-determination of nationalities. The policy of the Habsburgs was far from this and so hopeless by the beginning of the World War that the famous Chernin expressed doubts whether it was even possible to speak of the recovery of the "sick man" that was Austria-Hungary. It has long since emerged from the "political stagnation" within itself, and it was not by "old-fashioned" methods that the bourgeoisie could save this collapsing state, and with it the army. The transition into "non-existence" of both the first and the second was predetermined already before the World War, and the efforts of the Chief of the General Staff to delay this process could be considered fruitless in advance. Since the middle of the 19th century, in the history of Europe,

the social movement has been prominent in the arena of social relations. We heard how Moltke (senior) frightened with the horrors of the Paris Commune and recommended saving the army from the "worse" elements. The social movement, which was developing every year, brought unrest to the minds of bourgeois politicians and chiefs of general staffs, who saw that the movement was also taking over the army. The year 1905 in Russia showed by example that the armed force is no longer such a reliable tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie as it used to be. Therefore, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff tirelessly talks about the dangers of revolutionary propaganda that corrupts the army. IN

In the social movement, Conrad saw only a force depriving the Habsburg army of its military prowess. It is difficult, of course, to demand a different way of thinking from the chief of the general staff, who represented the ruling class. It was incomprehensible to him that "workers' socialism conceals within itself an enormous store of moral strength," as Jaurès predicted in his New Army. According to Conrad, socialism, on the contrary, destroyed the moral foundations of the army. We, who lived through the heroic epoch of the Red Army during its revolutionary struggle, have no need, of course, to prove and develop Jaurès' thoughts; they are clear even without proof.

One of the means of struggle both on the part of the capitalist governments and the nationalities and various parties opposed to them was the press. This powerful weapon in domestic politics was widely used by both sides, and we heard Konrad recommend it to the government of Franz Joseph.

The opposition press tried by all means to open the ulcers of the state regime, and then of its organs, which included the army. On the part of government circles, this direction of the press met with a sharp rebuff both in censorship and in the corresponding press organs. It seems that this question should not be developed further, because it is clear even without us.

We will note only one common phenomenon for all general staffs - this is the presence in their hands of a general civil press with the special task of appropriately directing public thought about the need for armaments, openly preaching militarism. In a word, the "brain of the army" tried to influence domestic politics in this way, while at the same time cynically declaring its "principled" non-interference in the life of the country. We will return to this question later, but here we note that not everywhere the lines of thought and behavior of the General Staff in the domestic policy of the state coincided with those of the government of the latter. Hence we hear accusations of the General Staff of degenerating into a "caste", of forming a special "military party". The hero of our story, Konrad, protests against such attacks on the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, and in particular on him personally, however, the glory of the leader of the "war party" stubbornly held on abroad for

chief of the general staff of the Danube Empire and, perhaps, but without reason. We

have so far dwelled on the phenomena of social life in Austria-Hungary, the direction of which, in the desires of the bourgeois class, was to be the duty of all its political leaders. But, besides this, work must be carried out in the army itself to counteract those influences that undermined the power of the bourgeois classes.

Such work consisted of: 1) political work in the army; 2) in special measures for the selection of the commanding staff of the army, 3) in the introduction of military discipline into the army; 4) in the appropriate

deployment of the army. Political work was carried on, as a matter of fact, always in every army. We saw it in the armies of the Convention, but it was carried out in the army of Napoleon in the sense of eradicating from the soldier any interest in the internal life of the country. Under the "education" in the "obedience" not only of the soldier masses, but through it and of the entire nation, Moltke (senior) actually tried to carry out a well-known political program, which remained the principle in the Prussian army until the threshold of world war and, finally, Conrad demanded this work not only in the army, but throughout the state in the spirit of the "unity" of the latter.

There are no words that in the "organic" era this political work was easier, but as the "critical" days approached, the question of its proper leadership became more and more acute.

In the "soldier" army of Napoleon and the army of the "pseudo-armed people" that interceded it, internal politics was reflected either in the cult of soldier virtues, or in "obedience" to the ruling bourgeois class, in which directions political work was carried out.

The conductor of the latter was to be none other than the commanding staff, who belonged entirely either to the galaxy of "heroes", or to the ruling class. Bound by class interests with the program of domestic policy pursued by the government in the country, the commanding staff unconditionally introduced it into the army.

In the revolutionary era, the Convention did not have such a commanding staff, and entrusting it with political work in the army could only lead to the separation of the army from the revolution and a direct threat

last. Pursuing a certain socio-economic policy, the leading party of the revolution, the Jacobins, strove for adhesion between the army and the people and carried out gradual work in the army through special bodies. Critical days for Austria-

Hungary came earlier than for Germany, and in the thickness of the army they were reflected as in a mirror. The commanding staff of the Habsburg army was losing its authority in interpreting the events of domestic policy to the mass of soldiers, because such was far from being in the interests of the individual nationalities of the country. Yes, and the commanding staff itself was drawn into the struggle, taking to heart the interests of that nationality or that working class, from the depths of which it emerged. Conrad did not consider it possible to rely on such a commanding staff in political work in the army and demanded: 1) in order to mix, destroy ultra-nationalist tendencies in individual parts, 2) class selection and abilities, improve moral

Thus, the representatives of the Habsburg government could no longer leave the political education of the army in the hands of their commanding staff, and the chief of the general staff looked for a way out not only in the above measures, but in political work outside the army, considering this more important. He, perhaps, instinctively realized that it was impossible to carry out special political propaganda in the army from the same throughout the country. Desperate for advice to rectify the internal state of the monarchy, Conrad turned out to be ready even to start a war on the external front, if only to save the dynasty, the "unified" state and his favorite offspring - the army.

The realization of the idea of an "armed people" is possible only with an internal policy based on the working masses. The latter are the educator of their armed cadres, and not vice versa. In other words, the problem that the bourgeois general staff tried to solve must be solved in reverse. As a matter of principle, it must be recognized that the commanding

staff of the army is the conductor of internal policy in the army. However, one cannot adhere to a rigidly bare principle in this. First of all, there must be guarantees for the unity of political work in the army and in the country. In the directions of political work in the armies of the Convention, we saw one path, which was required by the situation, but which did not

excluded the work of the commanding staff, but only directed it. In the armies of "soldiers" and "bourgeois" we have passed the path of "educating" the nation through the army with the help of command personnel, and we saw that in Austria-Hungary, with the approach of "critical days", this path seemed unsuitable to the chief of the general staff. The author of this work does not intend to put

the reader in the position of a hero at the crossroads, pondering the choice of the path to truth. We propose to adhere firmly to the principle of a unified policy in the army and in the country, close ties between the latter, for which we consider it necessary to have a special body conducting this unity, hand in hand with which the commanding staff of the army should work. That for such activities of the command staff it is necessary to have appropriate political training, their moral authority, based not only

on "unquestioning", but also on conscious "obedience", there is no need to talk much about this, for it is clear even without us. "People who demand complete political and social freedom cannot be forced into obedience, discipline, and even patriotism in their obsolete forms," Jaurès rightly says. From the command staff of the modern army, different methods of gaining authority are required than in the old bourgeois armies, whose general staffs were afraid to deviate from the traditionally established means and sought a way out in strictness and unconditional discipline. Seeing that the attacks were justified and trying to maintain the falling authority of the commanding staff, the General Staff tried to protect it from the outside from the attacks of society and the press. Considering this, they made proposals for the appropriate political and moral selection of command personnel, but fundamentally

the cure lay not in that.

For obvious reasons, we cannot dwell on the issue of discipline in detail, as this would expand the scope of our work. There is no doubt that the strengthening of discipline is necessary in any army, but only in our day should there be methods corresponding to this. It has been argued before that the issue of army deployment is also closely

linked to domestic politics, and it has been noted that its demands collide with the purely military demands of rapid combat.

army readiness. In essence, such a question makes itself acutely felt where, according to Moltke, there are "worse" elements in the population who cannot be armed, where the army is cut off from the country and is intended to defend the policy of the bourgeois sections of the population. In a healthy state organism and a healthy, as a result, army, the interests of the combat readiness of the armed forces should prevail, and not their weakening. It is only in such countries that the idea of an "armed people" can be fully implemented.

We have the right to reproach us that, carried away by discussions about the significance of domestic policy, we have evaded the direct task of elucidating the role of the General Staff in it. May those who read these pages not think that the literary laurels of Ludendorff, Krauss, and the like of the modernized remnants of the past keep us awake. No... We are not seized with a feeling of envy, but we considered it necessary to establish a certain view of domestic politics and war in order to more easily understand the actions of the General Staff in this area of life.

All of the above suggests that the internal relations of the state leave a mark on its foreign policy and on military activity, or, in other words, the latter reflects, as in a mirror, the internal policy of the country.

Thus, if the internal relations of the state, which in turn stem from its economic structure, spread their influence so widely into other areas of the country's activity, then it is hardly permissible to disassociate from them the general staff, that substance that is called in the hostel "the brain of the army."

If today it can be considered firmly established that "the army is a cast from society", that "war is a political act", and not just one military action, then it is superfluous to prove the truth that the war is waged by the state as a whole, and not by its armed forces alone, abandoned to the front. In the

examples cited above, we also observed something else, when, on the contrary, the armed forces were intended for victories on the external fronts, while the rear lived its own life. But on the same examples, we saw how such a division of the efforts of the state led to defeats when internal relations went beyond

"political stalemate".

If by the end of the 18th century cabinet wars were receding into the realm of history, and the military figures of the middle of the 19th century proclaimed to us the power of the people in matters of war and peace, then it should be noted that the "people" in their understanding was identified with a strong government, usually represented by a dynasty that carried out the will of the ruling bourgeois classes in the country. In a word, it was again not the state that fought, but the ruling classes with their governmental superstructure.

Now again we hear talk about "armed people", "armed nation", "national armies", about "strategy of the state", etc. definitions as old as the universe.

One thing is clear from them, that it is impossible to close the war within the framework of one strategy - the property of military people, because war is a certain type of social relations, and not just a fight with weapons in hand to exterminate their own kind.

Meanwhile, already in the 19th century, the chiefs of general staffs declared non-interference in domestic politics, giving the reins of government in this area to civilian power. However, in matters relating directly to the army, its "brain" sought to extend its influence to internal relations in the state. Since the army was that "flywheel" without which the entire state machine could stop, the influence of the general staff on domestic politics went much further than its representatives claimed.

Indeed, the General Staff did not hesitate to recommend to the supreme power not only such measures that fundamentally affected the constitution of the state, but also those that were supposed to affect the selection of government offices and the establishment of a certain regime in the country that would correspond to the views of the General Staff.

Under the slogan of saving the army from the harmful influences of internal relations, with the desire to educate the nation with the barracks, the "demigods" of the general staffs conducted intrigues against those persons in whose affairs they "fundamentally" did not want to interfere. Above, we explained this, in words, "fundamental" dissociation from the internal policy of the General Staff by the fact that the General Staff, being legally removed from the internal affairs of the country, actually turned out to be very interested in them.

When the domestic policy of the state was directed along paths that did not coincide with those outlined by the general staff, in the bowels of the latter the oppositional spirit grew stronger and stronger, leading the general staff to an active campaign in the press, to processing "public opinion" in the desired direction, not to mention those behind-the-scenes intrigues that were characteristic of the "black clergy" of the armies of various countries. We do not want to give evidence of what has

been said, they are presented in this and the previous chapters, if the reader of our work remembers only the figures of Moltke (senior), Waldersee, Caprivi, Konrad, Ludendorff himself and other figures of the general staffs of Germany and Austria-Hungary, as well as "brevet" of the French General Staff, who sought to send their government ... to

colonies.

The reader also heard Ludendorff's hopes for a special leader of the people (apparently in the uniform of the general staff); he will, of course, remember that old Bernhardt frankly advises such a leader to use even force against the masses, in view of the unconsciousness of the latter.

In a word, even now, after the defeats of the World War, the General Staff does not at all want to let domestic politics out of its hands, just as it did not leave this area of the country's life before without its influence, hypocritically declaring its unwillingness to interfere in her.

The course of modern history in Germany confirms what has been said, when, in the name of "saving the army", the general staff, left without a uniform, lays an authoritative hand on the internal relations of the country, acting in the spirit of the teachings of Moltke (senior). And is it in Germany alone that this position is taken by the General Staff?! It is identical in other countries of Western Europe.

If "the whole state as a whole is at war", as it is recognized everywhere, then it is hardly possible to justify the previously observed and now intrusion of the General Staff into the field of domestic politics.

We gave credit to Conrad for his fair reasoning that in the end it is not the army that wins victories or suffers in war. defeat, but the people themselves and with them the entire state apparatus, in whose hands the leadership of the war is now.

The previous chapters show how the commander, the unified and sovereign manager during the war in the old days, in our days has been dismembered and turned into a collective.

Through the hard and bloody experience of the imperialist war, the states of Europe have come to this truth, paying tribute, along with the heroes at the front and the heroes of labor in the rear, who selflessly gave their sweat and hands to achieve victory.

What has been said above about domestic policy and its influence on the foreign relations of the state and the war with sufficient persuasiveness, in our opinion, will make it possible to put a limit on the power of the General Staff, especially since this has already been

done without us. In almost all states, national defense councils exist in peacetime or will be created with the outbreak of war, which take control of the war as a whole, and, consequently, the corresponding direction of the internal policy of the state.

True, we noted that the General Staff tried, by turning to the Super-General Staff, to again take the matter of the defense of the state completely into its own hands, but one way or another it must be considered

that its former position has been shaken. We will be told that, therefore, the statements of the old General Staff about non-interference in the affairs of internal politics were correct, since the author himself excludes his work in this area of the life of the state. Not only are we far from a sharp dissociation of the general staff from the internal relations of the state, but, on the contrary, we set it as a necessary condition that the general staff, as an organ of military command, be always aware of internal politics and take it into account under all

assumptions. With such a resolution of the issue, we preserve the now recognized principle of managing the war by the state, protect it from the invasion of the General Staff, bring the peacetime army closer to those working masses of the state who, in fact, during the war must endure all its burden, give both work and life to achieve victory. Finally, we will come to what Conrad also aspired to - this is the full implementation of the idea of "the armed people". It is hardly necessary to

repeat that the latter himself educates his peacetime cadres, trains them politically, while at the same time receiving technical training in military affairs from them.

It was said above that the leadership of political work in the army should be placed in the hands of a special body, and not be the prerogative of the General Staff. It is difficult for the latter to refuse such a powerful influence, and now in the bourgeois states this body of military control is trying to continue to be in the role of educator of the nation, which was recommended even by Moltke (senior). In modern general staffs, one can find special departments and departments whose duties are to direct political work in the army. True, these departments and departments are weak in composition, but their very presence indicates that the General Staff is not inclined to renounce the rights it has seized in this area.

The same can be said about the influence of the General Staff on the press. We do not reject his duty to see to the preservation of military secrets and to exert pressure on the press in this regard. But at the same time, they are far from the general staff's own agitation, from recognizing its right to give the "necessary orientation" to the press, from the fact that the general staff has a special printed organ that reflects its point of view on the country's domestic and foreign policy. In this respect, the press receives its directives from government bodies on a par with the general staff, and by no means from it. In order to be clearly understood, we consider it our duty to explain that the foregoing concerns the general press, but not specifically the military press, which treats purely military, technical issues. Here we do not intend to put a bridle on the General Staff, but, on the contrary, we find it necessary to influence it centralizing military thought.

The General Staff must take an appropriate place in the management of the aspen and in preparation for it, bearing in mind that war is a general historical phenomenon, that it is not decided by battles alone, that, in the words of Lenin, "the war of our days is a people's war," and that it can only be led by state lay, and not a highly specialized military body.

The self-sufficient role played by the General Staff in preparation for the World War and which it tried to preserve turned out to be so badly played that already in the course of the war itself measures were taken to reduce the power of the "demigods" and decisively transfer it into the hands of the highest state bodies. Our contemporary

literature on the doctrine of war, while recognizing the peremptory importance of domestic policy in the preparation and conduct of war, does not, it is true, yet reach such a clear and resolute formulation as Lenin gave when he pointed out that the nature of war is determined by domestic policy, or approaches it cautiously. . Thus, P. P. Lebedev in his pamphlet "State Defense" says: "The influence of the internal state of peoples on war is so great that it can predetermine the nature of the war. It can turn it into the type of imperialist and national war usual for the recent past, and into a purely internal revolutionary struggle. Further pointing out that "the internal state of the state cannot be placed in a subordinate, service

position in relation to no other side of the life of the people and, in particular, the tasks of its defense", Lebedev comes to the conclusion: "on the contrary, it should itself be the guiding principle for everything else. Whoever does not realize this will be punished with barrenness in their undertakings, no matter how titanic efforts are invested in them. A striking example of this is the German high command in the last war. Listing the tasks of internal policy in the matter of the country's defense, which "include the establishment of the very nature of the forthcoming struggle, depending on this (internal; B. Sh.) state," Lebedev finds that "these most important tasks, of course, will find the most complete and justified solution in the event that its leadership is united in the same body in charge of preparing for defense, in which all other aspects of this multifaceted matter are concentrated. P. P. Lebedev thinks of the defense council as such an organ, a state body, and by no means the general staff. Above, we cited the opinion of A. Svechin on the importance of domestic policy and a strong rear, "the

maintenance of discipline of which is the business of the cadres of the people, their civil authorities." "Future wars," writes A. Svechin, "will undoubtedly take place in an atmosphere of very sharp class struggle, which will create more or less strong defeatist groups in all the host states in the struggle. The significance of domestic politics grows from here to a very large extent.

Disagreeing with P.P. Lebedev in his structure of the civil apparatus for war: the labor and defense council, the secretariat of defense of the union in action, the mobilization committee, and so on, A. Svechin writes: how the mobilization committee is planned, and the general staff "(our italics; B. Sh.). If we recall that A. Svechin puts on the General Staff: "coordination, harmonization of training, so

capacious, so diverse, directed along so many separate lines", that the General Staff are agents of one whole high command, then we, apparently, will not be mistaken in understanding of A. Svechin, as once again transferring the direction of domestic policy into the hands of the General Staff. Meanwhile, in his own words, "maintaining rear discipline

- the business of the cadres of the people, the organs of its civil power. We are afraid that we misunderstood the author of the "Strategy" and think that he is still far from that "principled non-intervention" in domestic politics, which was pursued by the General Staff before the World War.

We are rather inclined towards the interpretation of the issue by P.P. Lebedev, but with a more decisive formulation of his definition of the nature of a future war. Today, one cannot do without a "parliament of departments" and, in any case, neither the general staff nor "trusted agents" can replace it and be the cement of the entire preparation of the country for defense. Cementing it can and should be carried out by the supreme council of state defense and no other body.

Above, we unfolded before the reader the attempts of the General Staff to link domestic policy with the aim of defending the country and showed what came of it.

We have also heard the modern truths of Ludendorff, Krauss and other modernized generals about the enormous influence of domestic politics and economics on war. Everyone now utters "mind-boggling" truths, meanwhile, the collective work "The Future War", published in 1898 under the guise of Blich, warned that "the future war, in all likelihood, will stop not because more or less major victories over the armies will be won by one of the parties, but because of the disintegration of the military apparatus, as a result of economic and socialist influences. But in order to reach such conclusions, the General Staff would have to

cease to be what it was - a closed and caste military body. The General Staff was incapable of such a transformation, and no one sought to re-educate it. When the "crazy

Cadet" from the ranks of the exemplary general staff began to rule the state in the war, Germany is now

reaping the fruits of such rule with various military occupations, the Dawes plans, Locarno ... and still unknown future projects for the "restoration" of the German Republic by capitalist hands, leading to the horror even of "himself" Ludendorff.

Chapter XIII

Konrad in matters of armament and supply of the army

The impact of the economy on the war. — Engels' doctrine of the influence of economic force on war. - Fundamentals of success in war according to Conrad. — Conrad on the importance of material supplies and equipment for the army. - Conrad and the rearmament of the army. - The competence of the General Staff in matters of armaments. — Conrad on the development of artillery. - The artillery development program is an obstacle to its implementation. - Trouble Conrad. - The bureaucracy of the War Department. - Conrad's conversation with the director of the Skoda plant. — Increase in the number of machine guns in the infantry and cavalry. - Re-equipment of the infantry with a new type of gun. - Conrad in search of an automatic rifle and his views on the rearmament of infantry with it. - Conrad's efforts to increase the production of the Steyer Arms Factory. - The General Staff on the issue of introducing improved models of other technical means into the army. - The development of the automotive business. - The General Staff and the development of the Austrian air fleet. - Conrad on the issue of feeding the army during the war with rifle cartridges and shells. - Preparation by France, Germany and Russia of the supply of ammunition and shells during the war. - Conrad as a judge of the army.

Since time immemorial, war has been combined with the economic side of human life. However, before the World War, the influence of the economy on the war, if recognized, was not to the same extent as it is

was revealed in reality and what we now consider irrefutable.

In our days, there has been a sharp change in the understanding of modern warfare and the role of the economy in it, which is already assigned one of the main places in a number of factors influencing the war. However, to say definitively that the nature of war is determined by a certain stage of production, military writers of our day cannot turn sharply into this. Although, in

fairness, we must note that A. Svechin in his "Strategy" says: "the economic goals of the war subjugate the efforts on all fronts of the struggle represented by the war." It is not far from here to determine the nature of the war by the state of the economy. Indeed, in another bridge, A. Svechin already declares with greater certainty that "the economy will be able to subjugate the nature of military operations and put its stamp on them." We fully subscribe to this and resolutely declare that in our days, as in the past, the economy will put "its stamp" on the war, determining its character.

The previous chapter shows that the nature of war is determined by internal politics, and it is also mentioned that the latter is nothing more than a "superstructure" of the economy, that "each stage in the development of productive forces, according to Plekhanov, has its own system of weapons, its own military tactics. , its own diplomacy, its own international law".

Based on the experience of the Great French Revolution, which, according to military historians of our day, determined by its political character a special era of military art during the revolution and Napoleon, Engels in the 40s of the 19th century saw the revolutionary force of this era in nothing other than "economic strength" , stating that "the prerequisite for the Napoleonic conduct of the war was the increased productive forces ... and the social and political emancipation of the bourgeoisie and the small peasantry." "War is a manifestation of violence in order to fulfill our will,"

Clausewitz teaches. Explaining what violence is, Engels in Anti Dühring says: "It should be clear to the most infantile axiomatist that violence is not just an act of will, but requires very real prerequisites for its commission, namely, some

tools, that these tools must be produced, that the manufacturer of more advanced instruments of violence, or simply weapons, defeats the manufacturer of more imperfect weapons; and that, therefore, victory is based on the production of weapons, and the latter, in turn, on production in general, therefore, on "economic strength", on "economic position", on the material means that strength can dispose of.

"Indeed," says Engels, "let us pose the question, what is 'primary' in violence itself?" - and answers: "economic power, the ability to dispose of the forces of modern industry."

"Power at the present time," according to Engels, is the army and the navy, and both cost "a hell of a lot of money," as we all know, to our misfortune. But power alone cannot produce money, and at best can contribute to the appropriation of already produced values; money, in its turn, is also of little use, as again, to our misfortune, we know from experience with the French billions. Therefore, money must, after all, be obtained through economic production; this means that strength is again determined by the economic situation, which provides it with the means to arm and maintain the weapons of struggle. But that's not all. Nothing is so dependent on economic conditions as the army and navy.

Armament, composition, organization, tactics and strategies primarily depend on the stage of development of production and communications reached at the given moment. (*Italics ours; B. Sh.*). It must be said that such conclusions have now been reached by a bloody

experience of the imperialist war.

Nowadays, there is hardly a sane military and statesman who would deny the entire correctness of the views expressed by Engels at the end of the 19th century on the importance of economic strength in military grandfather. It is interesting for us to

reveal how the economy was taken into account before the World War by the Chief of the Austrian General Staff. Konrad

admitted that the strength of the army rested not only on moral data, but also on the material side, on providing the army with modern material parts, which, of course, you cannot grab from the sky, but you can only get from your industry.

As we already know, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff attributed the final success in the war not to the special qualities of the army, but to the strength of the people and their will to win. The army is only an expression of these aspirations of the people. Conrad supported his arguments with a reference to Rome, and it must be said that it is difficult to find a more successful example for our days, if only the chief of the general staff himself had a clear idea of \u200b\u200bwhat exactly was the strength of this state from the time of hoary history. Unfortunately, we cannot go into explanations of this parallel, but we must point out that the strength of the Roman Empire was underestimated by Conrad precisely from the economic point of view.

It is known from the previous chapters that the Chief of the Austrian General Staff quite closely combined the army and the internal policy of the state and indicated to us in detail how this connection should be expressed. But it was also noted there that the idea of an “armed people”, as understood by Conrad, was far from being fully implemented, and that the Habsburg army should first of all serve the dynasty, and then the interests of the “unified” state and bourgeois growths on its body. Thus, there could be no question of any close connection between the army and the rear. We already know that the

chief of the general staff recognized all peacetime military activity as nothing more than preparation for war. The war, with its future character, was the initial given, which should be taken as the basis of all military work in peacetime. These deep thoughts of Conrad would be very fair if he understood the war as penetratingly as Clausewitz, who looked at it as one of the types of social relations that captures all branches of the life of the state. But the chief of the general staff saw in the war mainly only its military side, which he regarded both the politics and the economic life of the Habsburg monarchy.

But let us be especially strict with the venerable old man and listen to his arguments. His judgment has just been given that the strength of the army, in addition to its moral qualities, also lies in the material side, i.e. in appropriate armament, provision of technical means, food and other supplies. Conrad did not rely on the spirit of the army alone, which traditionally was still high in it,

but he considered it necessary to pay attention to the material supply of the army, in which it lagged noticeably behind its future enemies and, in general, neighboring armies. He was clearly aware of the importance of developing technology for military affairs, and studies of the experience of the Anglo-Boer and Russo-Japanese wars only confirmed his thoughts. We consider ourselves obliged to emphasize these thoughts of the Chief of the General Staff, as they reveal in him a man with a broad outlook in military matters. A more

detailed presentation of Konrad's views will begin with his judgments about providing the army with the necessary weapons, technical means and combat supplies. We accept this order of presentation from Conrad himself, since, first of all, in his activity he tried to prepare the necessary instrument of war - the army. Then we consider it necessary to warn that, due to the

size of our work, we are not able to investigate in detail and document everything that was done by the chief of the Austro-Hungarian headquarters on the issue we are examining, and we are forced to confine ourselves to general conclusions and references to the documents cited by him in his memoirs. Studying the battles of the last wars at the beginning

of the 20th century, Conrad came to the conclusion that modern combat requires the provision of troops with good weapons and equipment in general. Meanwhile, the Habsburg army, due to internal battles in the state, lagged behind in its numerical development and reinforcement with new weapons and equipment. The allied German army was far ahead in this respect, just as the armies of other first-class states of Europe strove to catch up with it. It was impossible to fall behind. Therefore, with the assumption of the post of chief of the general staff at the end of 1906, Konrad immediately found it necessary to raise the question of rearming the army. Providing the army with all types of

weapons, equipment and supplies was the responsibility of the general imperial minister of war and the ministers of both landwehrs. The General Staff did not have executive functions in these matters, but no one deprived it of the right to initiate, and the regulation on the General Staff even obliged it to take care of the proper material preparation of the army for war. IN

In the previous chapters, we spoke about the hostility that was observed especially on the part of the Hungarian parliament towards the general imperial army, as a result of which both landwehrs ended up with large loans, could be better provided with modern weapons and technical equipment than the general imperial army. This was joined by a new rival - the navy, the development of which closely affected the interests of large industrialists, and appropriations for the fleet passed more easily than for the army. First of all, the chief of the general staff considered it

necessary to familiarize himself with the available budgetary conditions and industrial productivity for the needs of the army and navy. In response to questions posed by him in early February 1907 to the War Ministry about re-equipping field artillery with quick-firing guns, mountain artillery with long-range guns and arming it with 10.5 cm howitzers at a narrow course, as well as about the readiness of heavy (siege) artillery, a rather disappointing response was received. the answer, namely: 1) from September of this year, it was possible to re-equip a division of one corps every month and complete all rearmament at the beginning of 1909; 2) due to budgetary difficulties, it was not necessary to talk about the beginning of the rearmament of mountain artillery before the spring of 1908, and for the introduction of howitzer mountain artillery, only two guns in the summer of 1908 and 50 guns in the summer of 1909 could be manufactured; 3) heavy artillery appeared in the army concentration area: 100 guns between 10 and 12 days of mobilization, and the remaining 250 guns on the 24th day of mobilization. Having secured these data, Konrad, in a report on February 8, 1907,

to Franz Joseph, puts forward a proposal on the need to re-equip field artillery with new rapid-fire guns and train training platoons in each corps for training with new guns. The chief of the general staff ended his report with a proposal to convert 24 cm howitzer batteries to automobile traction and, in general, to prepare automobile transport for each division in order to deliver supplies to it. During 1907, Konrad put forward proposals for an increase in mountain artillery and 15 cm heavy howitzer artillery in the army, as well as for the

reorganization of corps artillery by

composing it exclusively from 15 cm heavy howitzer batteries, while light guns (9 cm guns and 10.5 cm howitzers) should make up divisional artillery. The measures put

forward by the Chief of the General Staff for the reorganization of artillery met with obstacles: 1) in the person of the Minister of War, who in the activities of the Chief of the General Staff saw an intrusion into the terms of reference of him, the Minister of War, and Konrad himself was regarded by him as a restless and demanding nature; 2) for the new organization of artillery, it was necessary, in addition to the material part, the presence of people and horses.

As for relations with the Minister of War, they gradually, with each new proposal of the Chief of the General Staff, became aggravated and, finally, ended with the Minister of War's resignation from office, which we will discuss below. The necessary number of people for new artillery formations had to be found from the general civilian composition of the army, since it was still impossible to count on an increase in the contingent, in view of the resistance of the parliaments. Usually in these cases, even in our day, always refer to the reduction of the staffing of the infantry and cavalry. Konrad was in principle opposed to such measures, but the importance of the measures taken to improve the artillery forced him to take the same path of finding the right number of people and even horses. The chief of the general staff comes up with a proposal: by reducing redundant positions in the infantry (destroying the vestibule majors) and reducing the ranks in the cavalry, obtain the number of people and horses necessary for the development of artillery. All these were half-measures, which was clearly recognized by Conrad, but for the time being it was necessary to stop at this, if only to carry out the most necessary reform.

So go the other way, but in his annual memoir for 1907 (dated December 31, 1907), Konrad, among the necessary measures to raise the combat readiness of the army, puts forward: "reorganization and rearmament of field artillery; improvement of heavy howitzer battalions, re-equipping them with rollback guns; improvement of mountain artillery (pack and on wheels); the increase and reorganization of the fortress artillery, in particular the "development of attack artillery". Conrad believed that heavy artillery would be assigned tasks not only to attack long-term fortifications, but also

assisting the army in field warfare when attacking temporary fortified positions.

Having made these proposals, the chief of the general staff persistently carried them out every year, right up to the world war, and, it must be said, not without success. True, Konrad had to endure many battles, but such was the bureaucratic atmosphere of the Habsburg monarchy in which the chief of the general staff had to live. In 1908, the military horizon was

covered with clouds, and the question of the readiness of the army for war became more urgent than before, although diplomacy was confident in a bloodless victory. On the contrary, the chief of the general staff urged to use weapons to resolve the emerging conflict on the southern borders. In these types, Konrad submitted several reports to Franz Joseph, in which the urgent need to strengthen and re-equip artillery was noted.

In a report dated September 8, 1908, on strengthening the army, the chief of the general staff points to the need to increase the contingent, since all new formations require people, but it is impossible to take them away from the infantry, in view of the undesirable weakening of the already low staffing of infantry units. Repeating again about the need to re-equip the field artillery with rapid-firing guns, to increase its numbers, and to strengthen the army with light howitzers and medium heavy artillery, Konrad pays special attention to the development of mountain artillery for operations in the Balkans and Italy and to the renewal of the materiel of heavy artillery. The latter is armed with samples of 1880, which are outdated, not to mention the fact that in many fortresses the material part of 1861 is still in service.

Encountering the resistance of the Minister of War, who hindered the question of reorganizing the artillery according to budgetary conditions, Konrad on October 13 was forced in a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to point out the need to allocate funds to put the material part of the army in order, which takes a certain amount of time. The chief of the general staff noted that it was necessary to carry out the transportation of supplies before mobilization, since otherwise the plan for mobilization transportation would be violated. Proposing to take this into account in the proposals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Konrad asked in a

before the accusation of mobilization, when the war in principle has already been decided, to inform the War Ministry to carry out supply transports. In addition to

the lack of necessary funds, one had to run into the usual bureaucratic delay with the choice of weapon systems. Konrad gives data on the manufacture of materiel for 30.5 cm howitzers with automobile traction, which subsequently justified themselves during the World War and showed the high development of large-scale Austrian industry, in particular the Skoda plant. These guns worked perfectly under fortresses on all fronts of the middle states and in their fighting qualities far surpassed the 42 cm German guns. So, the beginning of the construction of 30.5 cm howitzers dates back to the beginning of 1908, the production of the first model at Skoda in Pilsen in June 1909, on June 22, 1910, the first howitzer was tested by firing at the artillery range in Bolevets and tested on a campaign. At the same time, it was recognized that the gun meets the assigned tasks. The plant began preparing for the first series of 24 howitzers only in November 1911, i.e. a year later, while the order from the War Department followed only on December 2, 1912. From this reference one can see how the Austrian bureaucrats were in no hurry to increase the power of their army. Returning to the post of chief of the general staff at the end of 1912, Konrad

found a bleak picture. There was nothing left but to turn to the director of the Skoda factory himself, in addition to the Ministry of War, and from him to obtain the necessary information about the manufacture of guns. On January 16 and April 10, 1913, Konrad had a conversation with the director about the production of all weapon systems intended for service. It turned out that instead of the 48-30.5 cm howitzers expected by Konrad, the plant could produce only 24 guns with the money allocated by the military department, since the cost of each gun, without auto-traction and a supply of shells, reached 160-170,000 crowns (about 50,000 rubles). The situation was no better with mountain artillery

and field artillery 10-10.4 and 10.5 sant. guns that should be put into service, all this was in the field of experimental research and endless disputes between various specialists, and expensive time was running out. Conrad

he immediately energetically gets down to business: he sends his assistant to artillery test sites and, finally, at the end of 1913, he himself is present at the final test of a developed sample of a mountain gun. At the beginning of 1914, on April 27, Konrad again talks with the director of the Skoda factory on the issue of re-equipping field artillery with new howitzers. The director indicated the plant's productivity at 8 howitzers per month, and it took 6 months for the preparatory work. According to his calculation, it would take 20 months to manufacture the 1512 howitzers needed for the army, or, rounding off, about 2 years.

Krauss, known to us, in his work "The Reasons for Our Defeats" also dwells on such red tape with the implementation of the artillery program and tells the following. In order to quickly overcome the fortified Italian border, already at the beginning of 1908, it became clear that it was necessary to put into operation heavy guns - 28 cm, 30.5 cm or 35 cm howitzers - "the heavier the better." At the same time, experiments with adaptation to 24 cm howitzers of automobile traction were successful in the summer of 1908, and, thus, the issue of their transfer could be considered resolved. When Krauss, who at that time was the chairman of the technical committee, turned to the head of the artillery section of this committee, indicating that it was now possible to involve heavy artillery in the actions of the field army, the latter laughed, since he did not see any need for an increase in caliber. "Only later did they seize on this idea, and not earlier than 12 or 13 years old I saw the first 30.5 cm howitzers on the Steinfeld field in Vienna. As a result," Krauss continues, "we had a limited number of this powerful weapon."

We intentionally dwelled on the rearmament and increase in artillery in the Austro-Hungarian army in order to show the difficulties with which the general staff had to create that force, which in the world war was a weighty factor inclining victory to the side of weak battalions, as it was in the time of Napoleon, but numerous and well-trained artillery. Along with the lack of budgetary appropriations, Conrad met with hostility in his proposals from the Minister of War and his subordinate governments,

pursuing either narrowly selfish goals or underestimating the full significance of the measures proposed by the General Staff. Making every effort

to improve artillery, Konrad did not forget his basic position, that the infantry still remains the main branch of the army. Meanwhile, her armament was of great concern to the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff. Considering it necessary to reinforce the infantry and cavalry with machine guns, Konrad annually sought to fill this gap with new formations of machine gun squads.

The infantry units were armed with obsolete magazine rifles of the 1888 and 1890-91 model, and only partially a more advanced model of 1895 was introduced. Thus, the huge question of rearming the entire infantry with a new rifle clearly arose, a question of great importance both in terms of training, combat use, and in terms of the financial costs that rearmament usually accompanies. Such a measure should be considered.

The Chief of the General Staff, realizing the seriousness of the question of re-equipping the infantry, proceeded from the following considerations. The need for such a rearmament is ripe, but if you start it, then you need to choose such images of hand weapons that could last a long time, meeting the increasing requirements for a modern gun. For a long time, the idea of arming the infantry with an automatic rifle was abandoned, i.e. gun with automatic feeding of the cartridge and the production of a shot by hand. Thus, it was not an automatic rifle as we understand it today. Conrad needed a gun that outperformed an ordinary repeating rifle in terms of speed of fire, did not increase the consumption of cartridges, retained the strength of the arrow when shooting, and made it possible to conduct calm and confident fire. Experiments on such a gun were carried out in all European countries, just as in

Austria-Hungary there were three samples of an automatic gun by 1908, but their suitability for field warfare was unsatisfactory. In these types, the chief of the general staff instructs military agents to monitor the appearance of an automatic rifle in neighboring armies and attempts to

introduction into service. Having received in January 1908 a report from a military agent from Berlin that the German army does not have an automatic rifle suitable for military purposes and no rearmament of the infantry is expected, Konrad does not calm down on this, and during a personal meeting with Moltke in 1913, he again raises this issue. At the beginning of the same year, Sheptytsky, a military agent in Italy, was instructed, together with a representative sent from Vienna, to test an automatic rifle manufactured by an Italian company. This time, Conrad was again disappointed - the gun turned out to be unusable. In pursuit of an

automatic rifle, the chief of the general staff, however, is aware that only such states as Switzerland, sparing no expense for the army, can re-equip the infantry with modern rifles, while in Austria-Hungary it will cost so much that to introduce an automatic rifle it will only be necessary when one of the neighbors introduces it. Therefore, for the time being, it is necessary to dwell on the improved repeating rifle of the 1895 model of the year, especially since the Steyer arms factory, with the observed reduction in orders for the guns supplied by the production (1895 model), would have to reduce production itself and lay off a significant number of specialist workers, which, of course, during the war would have greatly affected his productivity in the direction of its decrease.

It should be noted that the products of the main Steyer arms factory in wartime greatly worried Konrad. The reduction in orders for rifles by the War Ministry to the factory led to a decrease in production, which could hardly be established soon. Therefore, being an army inspector in 1912, and then returning to the post of chief of the general staff at the end of the year, Conrad protested against the order of rifles and machine guns determined by the War Ministry for several years. Such an order by the War Ministry for 1912 was determined only at 6,000 carbines and 100 machine guns. The reasons for the protest, in addition to reducing production by the factory, also lay in Konrad's hope that the budgetary conditions of 1913-1914 would allow an increase in the order and thereby create a stock of rifles. Speaking about this in his memoirs, Konrad points out in what difficult position the army was in relation to providing

rifles and with what difficulty, with the expenditure of enormous funds, with the outbreak of war, it was possible to overcome the crisis in rifles, by setting up mass production, mainly at the same Steyerovsky factory.

Speaking in 1911 with his large budget program, which we will discuss below, the chief of the general staff estimated the rearmament of the infantry according to preliminary estimates at 200,000,000 crowns (about 70,000,000 rubles), without presenting exact calculations of this amount. Finally, in his memoir for

Year 14 (January 26, 1914), Conrad raises the issue of arming the reserve army he is planning, which would require 450,000 infantry rifles. Order obsolete rifles of the 1888/90 model. Conrad finds it irrational, and in terms of practicality and economy, he proposes to arm the reserve army with a modern gun, obviously meaning either an automatic gun or an improved 1895 gun.

In the question of arming the infantry, one has to note an interesting detail. While for these needs for the general imperial army, loans were cut by the representative institutions of the monarchy, loans for arming the infantry of both landwehrs went through easily. As a result, the landwehr infantry was armed with a later type of gun than the infantry of the imperial army. Even limiting ourselves to the foregoing, we can boldly testify

that the General Staff vigilantly followed the development of military technology, trying to provide it to the Habsburg army. Not only in relation to weapons, but also in the field of other technical means, he was made proposals for the adoption of perfect samples in the army. Due to the size of our work, we cannot state this in detail, but let us focus on those means that the cop before the world war was just beginning to develop, revealing all its significance during the war itself. We mean in this case the automobile business and the air fleet. The car, as a means of transportation, was immediately appreciated by the chief of the general staff, and on May 27, 1907, he made a report on the need to

introduce automobile traction in the army for transporting heavy artillery, transporting food supplies, as well as

for the needs of senior officers. In view of the lack of funds for the purchase of cars by the military department, Conrad proposed the formation of a voluntary automobile

corps. Resistance was met primarily in Franz Joseph himself, who did not trust the new type of communication and preferred to use a horse. I had to first convince him to drive to the station by car, and then to the maneuvers.

One way or another, but the voluntary automobile corps was established, and by 1913 the army had at its disposal a fairly large number of vehicles that could be taken on mobilization. In addition, the machines were purchased specifically for the military department, while some of them remained in the operation of the department itself, and the other part was transferred for operation to private individuals. In 1911, in his large budget program, Konrad proposes to spend about 8.5 million crowns on the purchase of vehicles (for heavy howitzers, trucks and special workshop vehicles). In January 1913, the army had 87 tractor cars,

9 workshop cars, 51 light trucks for food stores, 600 trucks throughout the country, and 12 private trucks subsidized by the War Department. A total of 603 vehicles with a payload capacity of 2,000 tons and an electric train of the Landwehr system for transporting supplies. In addition, in 1913 it was planned to purchase 120 3-ton Fiats, 14 workshop cars (one per hull), 3 workshop cars for the army rear management, 2 Landwehr electric trains and 180 trucks, which should be distributed to the population. under a subsidy. In total, 1000 trucks would be at the disposal of the army. The use of vehicles for the transport of food supplies to Konrad was conceived according to the following scheme: each corps receives a heavy and light automobile convoy, the daily supply of food for the

division was considered to be 60 tons; daily food supply for a brigade of 9 tons; under personal cars there were private cars, of which there were 6000 in the monarchy, of which 1000 were intended for the high command and 1500 for the delivery of food; for each car, fuel reserves were calculated - with

car for 14 days, in the area of concentration of the army a 3-week supply, each corps received a gasoline column with a supply of 4 days. II Army Logistics Directorate had a warehouse with a supply of 10 days. A detailed plan was developed for the mobilization of automobile columns, which were distributed in advance in the corresponding war plans

among military formations. In his memoir for 1914, the Chief of the General Staff rightly pointed out that the provision of food for modern mass armies requires, as far as possible, the use of automobiles. If the delivery of this type of carts is ensured by automobile service, then the military department still needs to specially purchase tractor vehicles for heavy artillery. The Air Fleet also drew Conrad's attention. If in 1907, i.e. in the first year

of his service as chief of the general staff, he took care of the expansion of aeronautics, then in the following years his thoughts were directed towards the formation of an air fleet from aircraft. It must be remembered that Germany did not immediately give preference to airplanes and for a long time hesitated in choosing between an airship and an airplane. This, of course, affected Conrad as well. The Chief of the Austrian General Staff acted as a decisive innovator in the reconstruction of the air fleet, not embarrassed by the fact that he was called a dreamer for this. For a better acquaintance with the new combat weapon, Konrad rises at the training airfield in Vienna in an airship and flies in an airplane. In the autumn of 1910, Konrad urgently demanded the purchase of aircraft and the

training of pilots, asking for this for the first time 300,000 crowns (about 100,000 rubles). Concerns about the creation of an air fleet by France, Germany, Italy and Russia forced Austria-Hungary to pay special attention to this. In 1911, Konrad provides for the deployment of a fleet of 240 aircraft and contributes to the budget the necessary 8,000,000 crowns (about 2,700,000 rubles) for this. The indicated number of airplanes was considered by the chief of the general staff to be minimal, but

even it was not acquired, having met with sharp resistance from all sides. In July 1913, the army had only 55 combat-ready airplanes, which, with the addition

the most suitable school apparatuses were consolidated into 10 air companies (4 active and 2 spare apparatus each); in addition, two not particularly combat-ready airships were available.

Meanwhile, the neighbors were far ahead: in 1912, France had 23 airships and 374 aircraft, which increased to 454 in 1913, Russia - 190 airplanes, 6 ready-made airships and 3 under construction, Italy by the spring of 1914 was supposed to have 380 aircraft.

Konrad again strongly demands the development of the air fleet and in 1913 insists on bringing the number of devices to 240. Familiarity with the flights of airships on German maneuvers convinces him of the usefulness of this combat weapon, due to the large flight radius, which can be of particular importance at the beginning of operations.

In his memoirs, Conrad speaks bitterly of the resistance he had to meet in the development of new means of struggle, for which, of course, one can only sympathize with him. Another question is whether the state had the economic opportunity to equip the army with all modern technical means, but the desire to do this cannot be denied to the chief of the general staff.

The situation was no better with the supply of rifle cartridges and shells in case of war. Of course, the Austro-Hungarian army was no exception in this; the reason for this was erroneous calculations on the duration and nature of the war.

From the very first days of it, a shortage of cartridges and shells became apparent, which agitated the supreme power of the state. The result of this was the compilation on September 23, 1914, of a report by the stage management of the army, which outlined the topical issue both in peacetime and at the beginning of the war, and the role of the chief of the general staff in the new one. This reference report fully guides us in the participation of the General Staff in the preparations in the days of peace for the supply of cartridges and shells for the duration of the war. However, we consider it necessary to supplement it with some factual data given

both by Konrad himself and by Krauss and Aufenberg. First of all, we must dwell on the establishment of the data from which the General Staff proceeded, determining the necessary stocks of cartridges and shells, i.e. how long the war was considered by the general staff and how he intended to cover the expenditure of cartridges and shells.

Unfortunately, Konrad does not give us a definite view on the duration of the war. In his report dated July 12, 1909, he indicates that stocks of shells and cartridges should be prepared in peacetime "for a long period of war", without determining its size. Therefore, we consider it possible to conclude that the chief of the general staff did not think of quickly ending the war, but at the same time, no doubt, was far from determining its actual duration.

To the second question we have posed, the answer will be clear from the data below. The

reference report cited above says that already in 1906 and 1907 the Chief of the General Staff repeatedly and decisively drew attention to the need for a better supply of rifle cartridges.

Indeed, in his report of April 6, 1907 on raising the combat readiness of the army, Conrad, referring to a possible war with Italy in the spring, recognized it as necessary: to take care of the best provision of rifle cartridges by the beginning of the war and their ample production during operations. In the report, Konrad gives detailed data on

the state of stocks of rifle cartridges and considerations for their replenishment. Recognizing the calculations of the War Department as underestimated and not meeting future needs during the war, the Chief of the General Staff established that 100 million rounds of ammunition were missing for the deployment of the army. The existing cartridge factories could produce 4 million rounds per day (without gunpowder), while the powder factories produced only one million rounds per day, i.e. approximately one cartridge per day per person. Such unsatisfactory production of gunpowder factories attracts special attention, and therefore it is necessary as soon as possible: 1) to start manufacturing the 100 million cartridges missing for the deployment of the army; 2) to begin enhanced production of gunpowder; 3) to strengthen the productivity, at least, corresponded to the production of cartridge factories, i.e. it would be possible to receive

gunpowder factory equipment, in order to ^{their} 4,000,000 completely ready-made cartridges per day. Considering that there are no more than 70 days left before the start of operations, Konrad plans to replenish during this time

the missing 100 million rounds and, in addition, hopes to stockpile 80 million rounds. In any case, the daily output of cartridge and powder factories of 4,000,000 cartridges is considered unsatisfactory by him and he insists on the need to increase their production. To what extent the foreign market can be used for this work, the chief of the general staff does not know.

In 1908, by order of Conrad, a new calculation of the necessary supplies was made and the demand was sent to the War Department, whose duty it was to fulfill this demand and thus provide the army for a long time.

Krauss, known to us, testifies that his calculations during military games of the consumption of rifle cartridges and shells based on the experience of the war of 1870-71. showed insufficient standards for supplying the Austrian army with them, and the presentation he made on this occasion to the chief of the general staff was ignored. Today we have to recognize such a statement of the modernized general as unfounded, because, apparently, the General Staff did not stop at the calculations of the War Ministry, but demanded an increase in them as early as 1907. In his annual reports to Franz Joseph, Konrad

tirelessly notes the unsatisfactory situation with cartridges and powder factories, and in the report of June 12, 1912 we have already mentioned, he proposes an increase in them and an expansion of production.

In 1910, after the troubles of the chief of the general staff, with repeated resistance from the military ministry, the issue of the production of cartridges was more or less settled, and the latter was brought to 4 million per day, but the issue of gunpowder was not resolved, and it was necessary to prepare a mobilization stock of gunpowder at 350,000 kilograms.

In his big program of 1911, the chief of the general staff included 15.5 million crowns for the manufacture of rifle cartridges, noting the need to allocate funds to increase the productivity of gunpowder factories, but did not indicate the amount. Events 1912-1913

Y.Y. clearly showed

unsatisfactory production of cartridge factories, and the supply of gunpowder was only brought up to 100,000 kilograms, which was absolutely not

reported to the Chief of the General Staff and became known only in the autumn of 1913.

The opening of a cartridge factory in Wollersdorf helped to bring stocks of cartridges only up to the regular amount of peacetime and create very small stocks for the period of mobilization. The result of this preparation was that the army experienced a shortage of cartridges from the very first weeks of the war, the envisaged productivity of factories in peacetime, even the minimum, had not yet been achieved, and only by mid-September 1914, according to the Ministry of War, cartridge factories produced daily 3 .5-4 million rifle cartridges, which again was not enough. Conrad's efforts over a long period of peacetime did not achieve their goal. Even more unfavorable was the preparation for supplying the army with shells in case of war. In his report of April 6, 1907, Konrad found it necessary to provide

each gun with a minimum of 400 shots and believed that all measures should be taken to increase production.

In the annual reports he all the time he notes the unsatisfactory state of the stock of shells and proposes to expand the factories. In the big program of 1911, he asked for about 1,800,000 crowns for artillery shells, and this amount was supposed, in fact, to put in order the warehouses in the area where the armies were concentrated.

The report-reference of 1914 in gloomy colors draws the preparation of the peacetime supply of shells. Despite the numerous and persistent requests of the General Staff to the Ministry of War to provide information about the actual availability of stocks of shells and the productivity of factories, such data were not received by the General Staff until the summer of 1913. Only in the autumn of 1913 was it possible to obtain from the Ministry of War all the data on the supply of shells, and then the whole sad reality was revealed. On the basis of these data, norms for the supply of shells were developed,

and at the beginning of 1914 they were reported to the War Ministry. At the same time, a proposal was made to expand the factories that produce shells, with the appointment of an artillery loan of 3,000,000 crowns for this purpose.

Both proposals were communicated by the General Staff not only to the Ministry of War, but also to other military command and control bodies involved in artillery, and Konrad proposed to assemble a commission to resolve this important issue.

The Minister of War did not go towards the General Staff even after a secondary and rather harsh proposal in April 1914 to convene a committee.

On June 16, 1914, the General Staff again developed proposals for supplying shells for the 1914-15 mobilization year and forwarded it to the War Ministry.

Thus, the Austro-Hungarian artillery went to war with 500 shells per gun, while all the other armies went out with a large margin. With the very first battles, a shortage of shells set in, which was not eliminated throughout the war, despite the efforts that were made to develop production and mobilize civilian industry.

Krauss, noting in his work "The Causes of Our Defeats" the indicated lack of shells, attributes it to the limitations of the mobilization plan, which did not provide for the mass deployment of the entire industry of the country. We have no right after a while to make such a stern assessment, and we will say this below when we talk about the training of other belligerent states in this matter.

Auffenberg, former Minister of War, ie. the person primarily responsible for the shortage of shells, in his book "From the Austro-Hungarian Participation in the World War", says that everyone knew about such a shortage of shells, but that it was difficult to get out of the situation due to the cuts in credits, and besides: "Oh such a duration (of the war) and such an isolated blockade at the beginning (of the war)

one man".

Krauss, in the work mentioned above, notes that when choosing shells, shrapnel was given priority over a grenade, for which the infantry had to pay with blood. No words, this was a mistake of the general staff, but again we cannot condemn Conrad severely, since the same mistakes were made by the general staffs of other armies.

The report-reference of 1914 known to us makes the following conclusion about the preparation of peacetime supply of rifle cartridges and shells: "1) It was quite clear to the Chief of the General Staff that our peacetime training in supplying the army with cartridges and shells during the war was completely unsatisfactory. He repeatedly and persistently drew attention to this; the improvement of this most important issue for the combat readiness of the army has always been the subject of his special attention, and he has repeatedly made decisive and quite specific proposals on this. 2) The warnings and suggestions of the chief of the general staff for the most part did not find an appropriate response and support from those responsible bodies whose duties were to take care of the mobilization and combat readiness of the army. Many questions were dragged out for an incredibly long time, or were not considered at all. 3) A very unfortunate consequence of this unsatisfactory preparation of the supply of cartridges and shells was that after the heavy fighting of the first phase of the war, the shortage of cartridges and shells became noticeable.

In stating this, the reference report resolutely removes the blame for the lack of ammunition and shells from the stage-by-stage command of the army and places it entirely on the War Ministry.

For greater clarity, we will allow ourselves to deviate aside and briefly consider the mobilization considerations of France, Germany and Russia. By the beginning of

the war, France had a "mobilization stock" of military supplies: 1) a small number of guns and rifles; 2) 5,000,000 shells of 75 and 155 m/m caliber; 3) 1.388.000.000 rifle cartridges; 4) 729,000 kilograms of gunpowder, designed for 400 days. Without providing for the manufacture of field guns, rifles, machine guns and explosives during the war, the mobilization plan only planned the manufacture by means of state military factories according to the norms (daily) of 13,600 shells for a 75 mm cannon, 465 shells for a 155 m / m caliber and 2,600,000 rifle cartridges, and the manufacture of shells was supposed to start from the second month of the war. For 2-3 months of the war, the mobilization plan turned out to be untenable.

In Germany, too, there were no special military stocks, and the production of both rifles, machine guns, guns, as well as cartridges and shells, was envisaged in small quantities. The production of rifles was so insignificant that they had to immediately use the Russians taken near Tannenberg

rifles and only after five months did the soldiers make rifles

(at 250,000 per month) fully provided for the needs of the army. By the end of 1914, only 100 pieces of field guns were re-manufactured. Heavy guns had to be put into production almost anew, having made only 20 guns in 1914. Machine guns in September 1914 were produced at 200 per month. The production of gunpowder was calculated in peacetime at 200 tons per month, in the autumn of 1914 it rose to 1,000 tons, while the demand was expressed at 3,500 tons, which was not only achieved, but also surpassed in December of the same year, when 4,500 tons of gunpowder were produced. The acute shortage of shells affected immediately after the battle on the Marne.

The calculations of the Russian General Staff of the armament standards and stocks of cartridges and shells also turned out to be far from satisfactory. The available 4,652,000 rifles were only enough to arm the army deployed for mobilization. Losses in rifles also

exceeded the expected monthly output of 44,000 rifles, which state factories could only provide for the 10th month of the war. In the states of 1914, the entire stock of rifle cartridges was estimated at 2,746,000,000, and by July 1914, 11% were missing from the states. The available armament of the army, in terms of the standard number of rifles and machine guns, required up to 4-5 billion rounds of ammunition. State cartridge factories, designed to produce 550 million rounds of ammunition per year, could not meet the needs of the army in cartridges, which reached 3 billion per year, in the development of triple production. By July 20, the wartime reserve in shells was: 6.432.605 rounds for 3-inch guns, 449.477 for 48 linear howitzers and 99.910 for 6-inch guns, while in the first five months of the war 2.720.000 3-inch cartridges were used up and in the future, the monthly need for them was determined at 1,500,000 rounds.

Thus, no matter how bad the position of the Austro-Hungarian army was before the world war with combat supplies, it is not much

inferior to other armies, and in some cases even better. If we recall that Conrad set the minimum requirement for the daily production of 4 million rounds, then the French General Staff recognized that 2,600,000 rounds of ammunition were sufficient, and the Russian General Staff 1,700,000 rounds per day. In shells, the Austro-Hungarian artillery certainly found itself in a more difficult position than the rest of the armies. Only one thing can be seen in Conrad's complaints, that the Chief of the General Staff did not foresee those new ways to meet the combat needs of modern armies, which alone could remedy the situation, namely: the mobilization of the industry of the whole country. But more on that ahead. Conrad himself explained it differently. In his letter dated September 22, 1914, to the head of the military office, Franz Josef, forwarding the above report-

certificate of the stage control, he wrote: "The fact that, unfortunately, we ended up with a small number of shells is the act of those criminals who , starting from 1906-1907, all my continuous requests and proposals directed towards the realization of this issue were rejected

Or they didn't want to know.

"The time will come," continues the stern chief of the general staff, "that after the war an investigation will be ordered on this issue, to establish, stigmatize and severely punish those people who are to blame for this, by the way, also all those who, for the sake of a childish game of dreadnoughts deprived the army of shells. So the chief of the general staff wanted to pay off his enemies, not suspecting that the course of the war would condemn not only the perpetrators of the shell shortage, but would also reduce the entire Habsburg monarchy to oblivion.

We will not dwell in detail on the work of the General Staff in the preparation of other types of supplies. Conrad also had to take part in this or that, making proposals for the introduction of a marching uniform, for supplying the army with camp kitchens, and developing one or another system for organizing transportation.

With regard to the latter, Krauss, known to us, accuses the general staff of inertia and backwardness. The quartermaster's war game convinced Krauss that the army's food system, based on the regular delivery of a daily dacha, was no different.

flexibility, preventing the use of local funds or, if resorting to them, leads to the loss of stocks. All Krauss's proposals to change the adopted system, to replace it with a combined system of supply and requisition, ran into resistance from superficials or simply those of the general staff who were little knowledgeable in the organization of the rear. His personal report on the same issue to Konrad was also ignored, but for that Krauss was appointed head of the Military Academy. At the new duty station, the restless general decided to teach the students of the academy a new food system, but had to stop it, having received a strict order from the chief of the general staff not to innovate. The war proved the correctness of the proposals made by Krauss: the army was forced to resort to requisitions, and the latter, in view of the lack of preparation for them, took on the character of robbery.

Chapter XIV

Austria-Hungary preparing for war

Konrad on the use of the country's material resources for war purposes. - Mobilization of military factories. - Mobilization of civil industry. - Conrad's ignorance of the foreign military market, the state of the economy of his country and its financial power. - The real financial strength of Austria-Hungary. - Preparations for a food war. - The General Staff in the economic preparation of the war. - Military budget. - Conrad's concerns about increasing the budget. — Konrad on the development of the navy. - The big ten-year program of Konrad in the autumn of 1910. - The desire to be ready for war by the spring of 1912. - The growth of the armies of European states and the growth of their military budgets. — Analysis of the big program of Konrad in 1910. - Consideration of the military budget in delegations in February 1911. — Isolating Konrad from protecting the military budget. - His relationship with the Minister of War. - Conrad's report to Franz Joseph. — Conrad's request for resignation. - The Council of Ministers on March 3 and Conrad's defense of his program. — Conrad's last effort to carry out his budget program. - The attitude of Franz Ferdinand to the question of the military budget and his struggle with the "clique" of Erenthal. - Retirement of the Minister of War. - The Konrad program of 1913, the project for the formation of a reserve army and the project for the reorganization of the Landsturm. - The second battle for the military budget. - The Council of Ministers on October 3, 1913 and the reduction in the requested loans. — Development of the contingent

We have previously pointed out that Conrad sought to carry out as fully as possible the idea of an "armed people" in relation to the use of human material. It would seem that it was logical on his part to continue the desire and use of the country's material resources for war purposes, i.e. in other words, we have the right to expect proposals from the chief of the general staff on the use of all the resources of the country. However, in this Conrad did not surpass his colleagues in other armies and limited himself to long-established views on the preparation of food for the army on the same basis.

We have developed in detail Konrad's views on the preparation in peacetime of the combat supply of the army, based on the accumulation of supplies for a long period of war and on the activity, however, expanded, but only military factories. In other words, the chief of the general staff provided for the mobilization of factories, but only purely military ones, and he did not think about any mobilization of civilian industry, but meanwhile the industry of Austria-Hungary was not so weak as not to provide the necessary assistance to the army.

The reasons for such a lack of understanding of the new methods of fueling war must be sought in the false principle that reached the world war that money, money and money is needed for war. Conrad learned it well, but as rigidly as he did the food system. The chief of the general staff was well aware that war needed money, he constantly talked about it and even, paraphrasing Clausewitz, compared the war with a financial operation, pointing out that losing the war is the same as failing in a big financial deal. Other ways to feed the war by the country, except for the provision of banknotes, Conrad, apparently, were not conceived. All his thoughts were directed to obtaining the necessary loans both in peacetime and especially during mobilization, as he pointed out in his 1911 memoir. We heard that in 1907 the chief of the general staff turned out to be unfamiliar with

the possibility of foreign orders for rifle cartridges, which, of course, cannot be approved.

Unfortunately, Conrad was not only ignorant of foreign industries and markets, but also of the economic situation of his own country. He was so thirsty for money, in a report dated September 8, 1908, he declared that "he does not arrogate to himself the right to judge the financial power of the monarchy," and he proved the need to allocate funds for the army not by the financial well-being of the monarchy, but by referring to the sacrifices made even by small states. In short, the General Staff proved ignorant of the country's financial preparations for war. From the Minister of Foreign Affairs, from the General Minister of Finance and others, Konrad constantly heard about financial difficulties, which served as the reason for the reduction of his monetary requirements. The Minister of Finance told him that, as far as finances were concerned, the country could withstand no more than two months of war.

Meanwhile, with the beginning of such a monarchy showed its stability in this. Auffenberg, and German Secretary of State Helfferich, agree in their memoirs that Austria-Hungary, during the years of the long war, got out of financial difficulties through internal loans, turning very little to Germany's help. Indeed, the Habsburg government had no money, and the country's financial condition caused concern among responsible and private financial figures. However, no one assumed that the population of the monarchy had such financial solvency, which it showed during the war, despite the fact that the richest nationalities, like the Czechs, were reluctant to make sacrifices for the war. Such financial stability of the decaying state surprised everyone, and if it finally failed, then the reason for this was: the long duration of the war, the close blockade and the war with almost the whole world, the excessive tension demanded by the government, which did not take into account the situation that was being created, and, finally, internal strife of nationalities. In other words, there was no financial preparation for war in the country, and only the successful use of internal loans helped to avoid financial collapse for the time being. The situation with food preparations was no better. As stated in the first chapter of our work, Austria-Hungary had

inside the country there were some surplus stocks of food, livestock and other agricultural products, which, however, were unevenly distributed throughout the country and, due to internal complications, difficulties were created in their use. The war with Russia and Serbia and initially tense relations with Romania, which then turned into an armed conflict, deprived Austria-Hungary of foreign markets for food products, leaving it to its own forces and means. However, the situation of the war could be foreseen in advance, and therefore, it seemed necessary to attend to the creation of food supplies in advance. But the war was not prepared economically, as Krauss testifies to us. There were no special food supplies, and those that were in the country and which had to be spent with great skill in order to provide the army for a longer period

and the population with vital products, were completely ineptly and predatory destroyed. All kinds of speculation, price increases, etc., soon led the country to starvation. Only then was the slogan "money does not play any role in a warrior" thrown up, and a food dictatorship was established. Krauss says that back in 1908 he raised the question of introducing so-called "war money" in case of war, i.e. establishing a certain currency for the occupied regions and paying with this currency for requisitioned products, for which maximum high prices were set. Krauss did not receive a response to his proposal to the War Office, although, as he later learned, a special meeting was convened from representatives of the War Office and the Ministry of Finance, but the meeting came to a negative conclusion. Krauss explains this decision by the inertness of the highest representatives of the General Staff and officials of the Ministry of Finance. The harsh reality of the war forced him to turn to "war money", and now Krauss is triumphant. Auffenberg, in a work known to us, testifies that "the monarchy, within its old borders, was the only continental state that, in the event of war, had all the raw materials it needed, and could satisfy all its needs on its own territory." The same Krauss comes to a certain conclusion,

that with good economic preparations for the war, Austria-Hungary could hold out until the end of the war. In his memoirs, the chief of the general staff did not speak of the preparation of the country in terms of food, apparently on the grounds that there is nothing to say, since this question did not stop his attention in peacetime. Conrad probably believed that the food reserves that were in the country would be enough for a short-term warrior. It is now known that in the other states that participated in the World War no more was done in this respect than in Austria-Hungary.

For the time being, we do not stop the attention of those who read our work on the concerns of the General Staff about preparing for war the means of communication of the monarchy, as well as on strengthening its borders, since these issues will be considered by us separately.

Looking ahead, let us point out here that in these areas the General Staff sought to systematically prepare the country for defense. All of the above clearly indicates that in the

material preparation for the war, Konrad and his collaborators were far from implementing the idea of an "armed people." "Armed people" was understood by them as the maximum use of the country's human resources. As for the involvement in the war of all the material resources of the state, the use of all its industry and other types of economic activity of the population in the interests of the war, the possible close linking of the army with the rear, this escaped the attention of the Austro-Hungarian general staff. However, we cannot hide the fact that he did a lot of work, spent a lot of effort, energy and nerves for better material support for the army both in peacetime and in time of war. All modern technical means, not only

recognized everywhere as suitable for combat purposes, but also those that were just beginning to develop or were at the stage of experiments, promising to provide the army with a significant service in the future - all of them were taken into account by the general staff, which sought to introduce them into the army.

The entire material preparation of the army for a future war was in fact in the hands of the War Ministry, and the General Staff did not

had a direct influence on her. Needless to say, of course, that the preparation and maintenance of the army required the release of funds, which constituted the military budget of the state. Chapter II of our work gives indicative data on the military budget, so there is no need to repeat them here. Our study of budgetary questions will be directed to clarifying the role of the General Staff in them, to determining those ways in which the Chief of the General Staff considered it necessary to go in defense of the monetary demands put forward by him and, finally, to the correctness of these demands in the basis, and not in the accounting calculation. certain amounts. The military budget of the

Austro-Hungarian army consisted of 4 parts: the general imperial budget, the budgets of both landwehrs and the budget for the maintenance of troops in occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina. The general imperial budget and the budget for the occupation were drawn up at the Ministry of War and submitted by the Minister of War to meetings of delegations, the budgets of the Landwehr by the Ministers of National Defense of both halves of the monarchy were carried out in the respective parliaments. Prior to the introduction of delegations to the meeting, the budget was previously discussed in the Council of Ministers, in which, in accordance with the national budget, general indicative figures

Thus, the chief of the general staff was not legally responsible for the monetary demands that were made to the representative institutions of the state - the all-imperial minister of war and the ministers of both landwehrs were responsible for them.

However, the chief of the general staff understood his participation in the preparation and implementation of the budget differently. Proceeding from the responsibility assigned to him by the position on the chief of the general staff for the readiness of the armed forces for war, Konrad argued that, although his main duty is to develop operational plans for the war in various theaters of military operations, but from them the need arises both for the appropriate organization of the army and providing it with material data. As a result of operational considerations, according to Konrad, the need for one or another weapon and material support for the army and the normalization of the necessary supplies of both are revealed. In these types, Conrad considered his participation in the preparation of the budget obligatory and did not re

possible to confine ourselves to the position of the spectator in the ongoing struggle for the budget. On the contrary, the chief of the general staff found it abnormal to dismiss him from work on the budget, and already in 1909 he asked Franz Joseph for written confirmation that the Minister of War, before submitting the budget to the Council of Ministers, and even more so at a meeting of delegations, would inform him in advance so that the chief of the general staff could discuss the current situation. The strained relations between the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff, even before this request of the latter, on April 15, 1909, forced Franz Josef to give an order to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the military that all measures to strengthen the defense of the state be decided in full agreement with the Chief of Staff and in detail and accurately discussed. Upon

taking office at the end of 1906, Conrad clearly saw the backwardness of Austria-Hungary in the numerical development of the armed forces and their material support, which was the root cause of all his monetary demands. It was necessary to further develop the technical troops and better provide the army with combat supplies; the first, in addition to monetary appropriations, required an increase in the contingent. Since 1907, the chief of the general staff has come forward with a proposal to introduce a 2-year term of service in order to pass through the army a greater number of those liable for military service; moreover, the associated increase in the contingent made it possible to expand the formation of technical troops. If the two-year term of service had not been carried out, then it would still have been necessary to increase the contingent for these formations in order not to produce them at the expense of the already weak infantry staff. In his

demands for monetary appropriations, Conrad mainly proceeded from the readiness of the army and sought to keep up with the arming neighboring states in this. It was noted above that Conrad did not consider himself obliged to discuss the financial possibilities of the monarchy, but at the same time he was not inclined, however, to make concessions in monetary appropriations for the army. The external situation, according to Conrad, promised a fraught future, the enemies of the monarchy were armed more and more, and it was possible to save the state from disaster not by diplomatic victories, but exclusively by military successes, which requires a strong and

combat-ready army. If small states, like Serbia, Bulgaria and others, were arming themselves, spending money for the development of their defense, then Austria-Hungary was also obliged to completely use its forces, even if this tension was heavy for its population.

Conrad saw another mistake in the development of the defense of the state in the desire to develop the navy of the monarchy to the detriment of the interests of the army. Austria-Hungary was a purely continental state, and the fate of the war was decided on land, not at sea. Therefore, the development of the navy, the construction of dreadnoughts, the love for the fleet and the oblivion of the army was recognized by the chief of the general staff as nothing more than child's play. It would be more useful to spend the money allocated for the fleet on combat supplies for the army. In addition, the developing fleet demanded for itself an increase in the contingent, which was already lacking for the ground armed forces. Earlier, we have already explained the reasons for the development of the fleet by the desire to support the domestic industry, but purely political considerations must be added to this. The arbiters of the destinies of the states of Central Europe, smoking cigars on the banks of the Spree, saw in the development of the Austrian navy an opportunity to draw part of the naval forces of their future opponents into the Mediterranean Sea and even, as we will see below, create some trouble in the Black Sea,

prompting Romania to act on the side of the middle states. In the spring of 1907, pointing to the armaments of Italy directed against the monarchy, Conrad found it necessary to be ready for war by July, and therefore asked for the release of funds for the army. In all his verbal and written reports, especially in his annual memoirs, the chief of the general staff considered it necessary to ask for an increase in the contingent and the allocation of loans to strengthen the army, to provide it with materiel and to stockpile mobilization stocks. More detailed demands were sent by him to the Minister of War, as well as to the Ministers of both Landwehrs. Due to the size of our work, we cannot dwell on the analysis of these

documents in detail. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 1908-09, when the readiness of the army for war was required and when various improvisational measures had to be resorted to, convinced Konrad of the need for a decisive action with great

a program to strengthen the army, bringing to the attention of delegations the plight of the armed forces. In his report to Franz Joseph dated July 12, 1909, arguing the need to increase the combat readiness of the armed forces and specifying the measures necessary for this, Konrad says that since the failed war with Serbia would cost 800 million crowns, now, in a deteriorating situation, it is necessary to let go of this amount to increase the combat readiness of the army. The responsibility for accepting or rejecting this credit, in the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff, falls on the representative institutions, but he considers it his direct duty to prove its necessity. True, nevertheless, the crisis indicated made it possible to receive 180 million crowns;

of which 41¼ million kroons were spent on the maintenance of those recognized for mobilization in Bosnia and Herzegovina to strengthen the army, and 138¼ million kroons were spent on combat supplies for the army, mainly for the rearmament of artillery. But all this was not enough, and therefore, in the fall of 1910, Konrad sent a large program to the War Ministry, designed to introduce a 2-year service life, the release of large funds for the material support of the army and the country's engineering defense, so that the Minister of War would introduce this in the spring of 1911 into delegation for approval. The program, which was designed to be implemented within 10 years, demanded nothing less than allocations for the army and navy of emergency loans in the amount of 1.100 million crowns and an increase in the ordinary budget from 370 million crowns by 1918 to 500 million crowns.

As has been pointed out, the need for such sacrifices was motivated by the gathering clouds on the outer horizon, the feverish armament of neighbors, especially Italy, which was preparing for war with Austria in 1912. Conrad, in a report on July 12, 1909, pointed out the need for the monarchy to be ready for war by the spring of 1912, according to which the main appropriations should be made in the first 5 years. In view of such high demands for an increase in the military budget, some of the applications of the Landwehr were not included in some), when on average at least 300 million crowns were required for military needs per year, it seems necessary to consider

to what extent such appropriations were really needed and made by the allied states.

The growth of the peacetime contingent is visible from Table No. 17.

Table No. 17

ГОДА	Ежегодный контингент							
	Германия		Австро-Венгрия		Франция		Россия	
	Число	Увеличение	Число	Увеличение	Число	Увеличение	Число	Увеличение
1894-903	262.670	—	126.000	—	259.062	—	330.800	—
1904-907	265.097	2.427	130.630	3.350	272.910	3.848	463.050	32.250
1908-911	273.712	8.615	137.570	6.920	261.668	-11.242	455.100	-7.950

Thus, all states went almost evenly along the path of increasing the contingent, and only Russia was ahead, but here it is necessary to take into account: 1) a two-year term of service in France and Germany, due to which the reserve of conscripts was more quickly worked out, and 2) the discrepancy between the contingent of the Habsburg monarchy and the population. While in other states the size of the peacetime army corresponded to 1% of the population, in Austria-Hungary it was much lower.

As for the military budget for the army and navy, the latter, as can be seen from table No. 18, in millions of German marks reached:

Table No. 18

Года	Германия			Франция			Австро-Венгрия			Италия			Россия		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
1908	1.164	18,40	—	933	23,68	—	429	8,77	—	360	10,59	—	1.106	7,49	—
1909	1.279	19,70	115	974	24,68	41	459	9,00	30	377	10,99	17	1.246	8,33	140
1910	1.241	19,13	-39	998	25,27	24	464	9,01	05	435	12,60	58	1.227	8,10	-19
1911	1.266	19,28	25	1.052	26,56	54	549	10,55	85	473	13,58	38	1.285	8,37	58

1 — Размер; 2 — На 1 душу населения; 3 — Увеличение

Over the given four years, military budgets increased: in Italy by 7%, in Austria-Hungary - 6.8%, in Russia - 3.3%, in France - 3%, in Germany - 2%.

The above figures show that the Habsburg monarchy, following Italy, followed the path of increasing its military budget, overtaking, however, only Russia in terms of the severity of the military tax per capita.

population. But if we take into account the solvency of the citizens of Austria-Hungary, then, without a doubt, the military budget was much harder for its population than in France

and Germany. The dancing of billions for military credits went all over Europe, and every year public debts increased. So in 1911 they were expressed (in billions of marks): France - 26.046, Germany - 20.000, Russia-19.313, Austria-Hungary - 15.713, Great Britain - 13.447, Italy - 11.590.

There was public debt in marks per capita: France - 657, Italy - 334, Germany - 314, Austria-Hungary - 305, Great Britain - 296, Russia - 117. Thus, the Habsburg monarchy

surpassed England in terms of the severity of public debt and almost equaled with Germany, the paying capacity of the population of which was, of course, many times higher. It cannot be said that the Danube Empire could not make new sacrifices to increase its defense capability, it could pay more, but at the cost of undermining its economic condition. If in peacetime this would not have been clearly noticeable, then, of course, it would have affected during the war. Below we will hear the arguments against the increase in war credits on the part of the responsible persons of the Danubian Empire. In the autumn of 1910, the chief of the

general staff made general proposals for the budget for 1911, which were directed to satisfy three major needs: 1) an increase in the contingent; 2) engineering defense of the state; 3) combat and technical supply of the army. The increase in the contingent was developed according to two

options: a) with the introduction of a two-year term of service and b) with a three-year term, but with an increased contingent. The cost of this reform was determined: a) for a two-year period (for 10 years), 120 million kroons of emergency loans and 200 million kroons in addition to the ordinary budget; b) for a period of three years - 90 million emergency appropriations and 90 million kroons in addition to the regular budget. For engineering defense (for 10 years), at least, was subject to

appropriation of 155 million crowns.

Combat and technical supply, after development in the military ministry and the ministries of both landwehrs, is estimated at 260 million crowns, of which 36 million for engineering defense and 124 million for urgent preparations. In addition, an

allocation of 200 million crowns was provided for the upcoming rearmament of the infantry, and no exact calculation was presented.

Finally, for the next 5 years, 312 million crowns were requested for the needs of the navy. Thus, the total amount to be paid in excess of the ordinary budget was:

	Миллионов крон
Добавлении к обыкновенному бюджету	120 или 900
Чрезвычайных ассигнований	1.217 или 1.017

On November 20, 1910, a few days before the specification of the requirements for combat and technical supplies, a meeting of the Council of Ministers was held, to which the Chief of the General Staff was not invited, which established the following approximate figures:

	Миллионов крон
Чрезвычайного кредита для флота	312
Чрезвычайного кредита для армии	100
Добавление к обыкновенному бюджету	100
Всего	512

The Chief of the General Staff was informed only on January 6 about the elaboration of his proposals and about the results of the November 20 meeting of the

Council of Ministers. Immediately Conrad turned to the Minister of War with a request to draw up a budget so as to cover all needs, and this required:

	Миллионов крон
Для введения двухлетнего срока службы	100 добавленных к бюджету 100 чрезвычайных кредитов
Для инженерной обороны	119 (155 – 36)
Для материального обеспечения	260
Для перевооружения пехоты	200
На морской флот	312
Всего	1.091 или за округлением 1 миллиард 100 миллионов крон.

By order of Franz Joseph, the credit for the military supply of the army was crossed out, which was not reported at all to the chief of the general staff by the Minister of War. The

delegations gathered in February in Budapest, the meetings began, when ... On February 5, 1911, from the newspapers, according to the speech of the Minister of War at a meeting on February 4, Conrad learns about the budget submitted by the Minister of War, which far from met Conrad's requirements. This rather abnormal orientation of the Chief of the General Staff is explained by the fact that the Minister of War forbade his subordinates to tell any of the members of the General Staff about the preliminary cuts in the military budget in the War Ministry. The cup of patience of our hero was overflowing, and on February 13, Konrad raced on a train to Budapest in order to personally report to Franz

Joseph about what had happened. Staying at the same hotel where Minister of War Schonaich lived, the Chief of the General Staff saw Schonaich on the morning of February 14, informing him that he, Konrad, would resign. When asked by the Minister of War why this was being done, Conrad explained that the budget required only half the amount required. To Schonaich's remark that the chief of the general staff had fulfilled his duties and, moreover, was not responsible to the delegations, Konrad indicated that he considered himself also responsible for the military budget, and if his demands were necessary, then if he refused them, he should leave his post, or, if they are unfounded, then the chief of the general staff does not correspond to his position. Noting that Franz Ferdinand, who was entirely on the point of view of Conrad and was generally dissatisfied with Schonaich, was still not aware of such a formulation of the issue with the military budget, the chief of the general staff tried to prove to the Minister of War

the fallacy of Erenthal's peace policy, which in reality may turn out to be completely different.

Seeing that it was difficult to convince the Minister of War, Konrad went with a report to Franz Joseph. Beginning with a request for his resignation, Konrad detailed his minimum requirements, indicating that he no longer considered it possible to remain in his position, because everyone in the army would point fingers at him. After reassuring his excited chief of the general staff, Franz Joseph frankly admitted that not everything is done the way he and the government want, that the country has no money and Italy is richer, and therefore spends more money on the army and navy. Conrad considered it his duty to emphasize the timid speech of the ministers to the delegations and the unlawful binding by the delegations of the military department with a proposal not to enter into new demands for an increase in the budget for five years. At the end of the report, he asked to equate him to the head of the navy, in order to also participate in meetings of the council of ministers and delegations, if not with a decisive vote, then at least as an expert. Pointing out that all the assumptions of the General Staff were criticized by small employees of the War Ministry and finding this abnormal, Konrad again asked for his dismissal. Returning home, he immediately reported his request for

resignation to Franz Ferdinand in writing and wrote a letter to the head of the military office with a request to facilitate his departure.

from office.

On February 17, a reply came from Bolfras (chief of the military office), in which he wrote that Franz Joseph's resolution was being sent with a refusal to accept the resignation, and added on his own behalf that the departure of the chief of the general staff would lead to a bad course of the meetings of the delegation and it would be bad interpreted abroad, especially in Berlin, where

Conrad is so highly regarded. The latter did not calm down and again turned to Bolfras, proving to him the impossibility of remaining in one place and outlining the whole negative side of the behavior of the Minister of War in

the budget issue. The result of Conrad's troubles was the order of Franz Joseph to convene a council of ministers so that the chief of the general staff

reported his views in detail, and the latter's request to invite representatives of the delegations to this council was

rejected.

On March 5, a meeting of the Council of Ministers was held. It was attended by: Chairman-Foreign Minister Ehrenthal, the Minister-Presidents of Austria and Hungary, the General Minister of War, the Ministers of both Landwehrs and the Chief of the General Staff. Ehrenthal, having opened the meeting, explained its purpose and, warning of special secrecy, gave the floor to the chief of the general staff. "I know that, by and large, I am making a strike on the water, since my speech takes place

after time" (*italics* ours; B. Sh.), began the chief of the general staff, but since he was ordered to report in detail his considerations on the budget, then he does it. Starting by outlining the duties of the chief of the general staff in preparing for a probable war, and pointing out that the budgetary requirements that we discussed above follow from this preparation, Konrad noted) that he was deprived of the opportunity even, as an expert, like the chief of the navy, to defend the swap proposals in the council of ministers or in front of delegations. Later, having detailed the history of the budget, from 1907 until the order of Franz Joseph to convene a real meeting, the chief of the general staff, on the basis of operational considerations, analyzed in detail all his requirements, proving their necessity. Turning then to a discussion of the emerging situation with cuts in credits, Konrad pointed out that only 47.9 mil. kroons, while they asked for 379 mil. kroons and, thus, 331 mil. crowns. The proposed misallocation of allocated funds by year leads to the fact that the engineering defense program is stretched over 26 years, i.e. until 1937, when all this becomes obsolete again, and the issue of re-equipping the infantry can only be carried out at 40 years old, i.e. completed by 1951. At the same time, the navy receives in full the 312 million crowns it requested. Conrad is looking for a way out of the current situation, aggravated by the fact that for 5 years the military department has no right to enter with new demands to increase the budget, and sees it in

one of the following six paths. First of all, the discrepancy between the appropriations of 200 million is striking. crowns for the army and 312 mil. for the fleet. One cannot help but welcome the presence of a strong fleet, but one should not forget, Konrad says, that Austria-Hungary is a continental power, and the solution for it will be on land, not at sea. The most brilliant naval victory will not be able to smooth out defeats on land. Therefore, the chief of the general staff proposes to reduce the appropriations for the fleet and at least 60 mil. crowns to give to the army. The second way is the refusal to introduce a two-year term of service, but to increase the contingent to strengthen the staff and the formation of technical troops. Then you can make an internal regrouping of credit, focusing on the release of money on the most important. The fourth way is a frank and clear presentation of the existing situation to the delegations, and, finally, the fifth way is to present the delegations with a fait accompli, as is done with the fleet. It must be remembered that Austria lost the campaign of 1859 because of bad cannons, the war of 1866 because of a bad gun, and therefore now it is necessary to give in advance the means necessary to achieve success. At the end of his report, the chief of the general staff referred to the example of Russia, which cut military credits before the Russo-Japanese war and lost the latter, paying dearly for it.

After the speech of the chief of the general staff, Erenthal invited those present to speak. All the ministers of war supported the need to satisfy Conrad's demands. The Minister President of Austria pointed out that in order to correctly assess military requirements, it is necessary to listen to: 1) the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the external situation; 2) confirmation of the Minister of War on the need for appropriations; 3) the conclusion of the Minister of Finance on the solvency of the country. To the figure indicated by Konrad in 1.100 mil. crowns must also be added to the requirements of both landwehrs, of which for the Austrian one must be considered at least 100 million (the Hungarian Minister of National Defense inserted that the figure would be even higher for the Honvéd). In view of such a large amount required by the military department, it may turn out that, with all the desire of the delegations to allocate these amounts, the country will not be able to withstand

economically.

The Minister-President of Hungary, noting that the political and financial situation of Hungary is different from that of Austria, drew the attention of those present to the fact that in all states military credits pass with great difficulty. The representative institutions of the monarchy must be sure that the government, entering with such great demands, is aware of the solvency of the population. In Hungary, the conviction will be created that the government does not take this into account. In addition, a project is being introduced again to introduce a two-year service life, which has a 10-year history of struggle behind it. He does not doubt the correctness of the requirements, but asks to take into account that they must be combined with the political, financial and economic situation of the country. These requirements of the military department can be satisfied after the financial and economic strengthening of the state, since the modern budget does not at all allow making these appropriations. The Hungarian government would consider it frivolous to strain the forces of the country, not to take into account the development of its economic life. Of course, reforms cannot be stretched out over 20 or 40 years, but in modern conditions it is also necessary to keep within the limits of the possible.

Foreign Minister Ehrenthal notes that, in his position, he should welcome the strengthening of the army, but it must be taken into account that the new requirement of 260 million crowns for military supplies will make an unfavorable impression in domestic politics, and will be considered abroad as a sign of aggressiveness. Meanwhile, foreign policy, at the direction of Franz Joseph, should be restrained, striving to resolve issues peacefully. In conclusion, he, as chairman, must express gratitude to the Chief of the General Staff for today's report and declare on behalf of all those present full satisfaction with Konrad's activities, but at the same time notes that the government cannot step over the solvency of the state. The chief of the general staff could only point out that the difference in the assessment of the situation is due to a different

approach to it: while those present assess it from the point of view of today's peaceful day and put forward peaceful demands,

he, Conrad, in his position, must first of all reckon with the war and proceed from it. Having

been defeated, Conrad, however, still did not lose hope of turning the budget issue in his favor. In view of the tensions that had arisen in the Austrian parliament, Konrad proposed a change of cabinet, as we know from the previous chapters, and then on April 23 submitted a written report to Franz Joseph, in which, having outlined the emerging external political situation, threatening conflicts, indicates that the military the position of the monarchy worsened due to the increased armament of its neighbors. In contrast, 312 mil. crowns for the fleet, and for the army only 200 million. crowns The reasons for the denial of appropriations lie in the financial possibilities of the state, but the tension of those is still far from the limit. As an example, the chief of the general staff cites Austria, which does not find it possible to allocate 30 million crowns a year for the army, but for the development of local railways, which are not important for the general network of tracks (apparently from a military point of view), and even harmful , releases 278 million a year. crowns The same is true in Hungary, which willingly releases 125 mil. for the Honved and is stingy to allocate 68 million crowns for the all-imperial army. Moreover, huge sums are spent on the maintenance of a colossal bureaucracy; suffice it to point out that the number of officials in both halves of the monarchy reaches 536,000 people, thus surpassing the peacetime army - 415,300 people. In conclusion, the Chief of the General Staff again asks for measures to be taken to increase the combat effectiveness of the all-imperial army at the expense of the fleet and both landwehrs. The fight over the budget did not end there. Franz Ferdinand accumulated a lot against the Minister of War, who entered the "clique"

of Erenthal, who waged a behind-the-scenes fight against him - the heir, and Conrad and "crawled on his knees in front of parliament." It was time to end this, and in the summer of 1911 Schoenich was dismissed, replaced by Auffenberg. But the latter, due to Franz Joseph's personal dislike for him, did not hold on to his new position for a long time and was replaced by Korbatin a year later.

So, in 1911, the war of the “scarlet” and “white” roses ended, i.e. military ministry with the general staff. The Krauss known to us, as well as Nowak in *The Road to Disaster*, according to testify to the hostile position taken by the Minister of War towards the Chief of the General Staff, and not for reasons of any divergence in fundamental matters, but solely because of personal relationships. In short, the Minister of War, convinced by Erenthal of the possibility of pursuing a peaceful line in foreign relations, did not want to aggravate relations within the state, and also did not want to spoil his reputation with the representative institutions of the monarchy. Konrad cites in his memoirs his conversation with a Hungarian politician and then a letter from the latter, which clearly shows how the Hungarian opposition sought to use the fight for the budget to achieve concessions in domestic politics. Unfortunately, the chief of the general staff did not understand that his government was not trusted, and both halves of the monarchy were more willing to develop the landwehr than the general imperial army, seeing it as a stronghold of the Habsburg regime. The thought of somehow changing the decision on appropriations does not leave the chief of the general staff, and

in his memoir for 1912 of November 15, 1911, Konrad doubts that there is no way to release more money for the military department. He is aware that it is difficult to carry out high military credits, but if we take into account the spending on local railroads, on the maintenance of the army of officials, etc., then there is no doubt that if such expenses are reduced, money will be found for the military department. Conrad divides his requirements into two groups: a) those to be realized before the end of 1913 and b) those that must be fulfilled in 1912. The presentation of the memoir to Franz Joseph coincided with the end of the conflict between the chief of the general staff and Erenthal, when

Conrad's departure was decided, and he, having left his memoir, returned with a report no longer the chief of the general staff. During the year of Conrad's absence, a two-year service law was passed, and loans were obtained for the formation of heavy artillery.

True, all this passed with strong resistance from the parliaments, but the deed was done. With the

return to the post of chief of the general staff, Konrad again began to work on strengthening the army and providing it with combat supplies, but this time in complete unity with the minister of war and with the ministers of both Landwehr, which pleased Franz Joseph.

Due to the size of our work, we do not have the right to dwell in detail on the program for strengthening the army proposed in 1913, especially since it was not actually carried out. But at the same time, and in view of her interest and the preliminary discussions connected with her, we cannot pass her by. The 1913 program began to be developed

in January of this year and was completed in December. It consisted: 1) in an increase in the contingent for some new formations in the army and landwehr and to increase the staffing of the frontier corps; 2) in supply development. material provided for 36,000 people. In addition, during the Conrad same year, Increase contingent developed a project for the formation of

a reserve army, designed to be completed for 10 years. The project provided for the deployment in wartime, in addition to the existing units, another 22 infantry divisions and 14 infantry mountain brigades, with a total strength of about 450,000 people.

With the implementation of this program in 1922-23, the chief of the general staff planned from 1924 to reorganize the Landsturm, completing it in 1929. The reserve army project was of

great interest to both Conrad himself and other persons who were at the head of the military administration, as well as Berlin. The project gave a significant increase in strength during the war of the Hasbsburg army. Of course, the creation

of such an army required money, which amounted to 400 million. kroons of an emergency loan and an addition to the ordinary budget of 36.7 mil. cuts annually.

What importance Conrad attached to the reserve army is evident from the fact that in January 1914, talking with representatives of the War Department on this issue, he said openly that he knew how his, Konrad, projects in the War Department were being criticized, but this time he won't give up. "I insist on creating

reserve army and I will fall with it, "the chief of the general staff ended his conversation.

Having met with sympathy for the creation of a reserve army from Franz Josef, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom he turned with a request to support military requirements, from the Minister of War, who, however, did not find it possible to contribute it to the budget before 1916/17, Konrad proved the possibility of implementing the project the fact that once the fleet can be released 426 mil. crowns, it is more profitable to allocate them for the reserve army. In support of these considerations, Conrad drew attention to the fact that even if the fleet won a naval victory while defending the shores of the monarchy, then with a defeat on land it could happen that the victorious fleet would not even have to return to its shores, because they would be occupied

by the enemy from land . In an effort to ensure the implementation of the project of the reserve army, and in general the military budget for 1913/14, Konrad suggested that the military agent in Berlin convey to Moltke Konrad's request to support the projects of the Chief of the Austrian General Staff. The military agent carried out the order and in a letter dated May 20, 1913, reported that Moltke willingly promised to support Konrad's demands and, apparently, he would talk about it with Wilhelm and government leaders so that Wilhelm would influence Franz Ferdinand, and government representatives, respectively, on political circles of the monarchy.

In general, the chief of the general staff decided to fight again for the military budget. At the report of Franz Josef on October 2, 1913, in view of the Council of Ministers to consider the budget on October 3, Konrad ardently defended the need to adopt a project to increase the budget and contingent, referring to the neighboring states going ahead in this. In response to Franz Josef's remark that perhaps the increase in the contingent will pass, but it is more difficult to increase the budget, since there is no money, the chief of the general staff again pointed out that since there is money for officials, then for the army they should be found. If the military budget is cut in the council of ministers and the increase in the army is rejected, then he, Konrad, petitions for the use of exceptional measures by Franz Joseph, in the form of a direct order to carry out all this, since the disfavor of Franz Joseph among the ministers means much more than public

opinion. In carrying out the project for the construction of railways, Conrad advised, if the project fails, the all-powerful paragraph 14 of the constitution should be applied to Austria. To all this, Franz Joseph remarked that in money matters he did not agree to use the said paragraph.

Be that as it may, the chief of the general staff decided to achieve the implementation of the planned measures. On

October 3, a council of ministers was held, which was attended by: the chairman - Minister of Foreign Affairs Berchtold, both ministers of the president, three ministers of war, three ministers of finance, the chief of the general staff and the chief of the navy.

Berchtold opened the meeting with a speech on the external situation, describing it as not excluding the future of armed conflict, and recognizing the need to take measures to strengthen the armed forces to the limits of economic power, and especially to strengthen the southern and

southeastern borders. After an exchange of opinions on the external situation, the council proceeded to discuss the military budget. Minister of War Korbatin, referring to the strengthening of the armed forces by the neighbors, pointed out the need to strengthen the combat readiness of those in the monarchy. Military requirements come down to: 1) strengthening the staffing of the frontier corps; 2) new formations in a limited number; 3) to organizational measures to increase the staff of some units, and mainly to the development of artillery. At the same time, he noted that the least possible taxation of the population was taken into account.

The chief of the general staff pointed to the insufficiency of forces in wartime.

The main opponent was the Minister-President of Hungary, Stefan Tissa, who began by pointing out the reasons for the backwardness of Austria-Hungary in the development of the armed forces, a struggle for which has been going on since 1888, i.e. for 25 years. These reasons lie in the insufficient financial and economic capabilities of the country, from which one should always proceed. If they were overstretched, it would do one harm. However, he fully agrees that it is necessary to strengthen the military power of the country, and therefore proceeds to a detailed consideration of the requirements put forward. Without objecting to the development of artillery and technical troops, he recognizes the need to strengthen the frontier corps only in Galicia. As for the increase in the staff of the company by 5 people, Tissa considers the significance of this measure to be exaggerated, but meanwhile, it will cause a strain on financial resources. It must not be forgotten that the financial and economic well-being of the state is as necessary for war as the combat readiness of the armed forces. Tissa analyzes in detail the significance of the proposed measure and proves that it will come to light no earlier than in 10 years, a very long period. To the remark of the Minister of War that the reform could be extended over 5 years, so that the increase in loans would be only 40 million crowns per year, the minister-president replied that with a three-year term of service, such an increase in the contingent would be understandable, but now, when a two-year term is set only in 1912, it seems inappropriate to enter 1913-14 again with a new project. The Hungarian government is in favor of strengthening the power of the army, but in order to enter with an additional increase in the contingent under difficult conditions of parliamentary struggle, it is necessary to more accurately assess the future course of events, the economic development of the country, and likewise other important needs, such as, for example, the construction of railways in Bosnia. It is difficult to start talking about a new increase in the contingent without worsening the external situation, and besides, this will only

Berchtold remarked that there was no reason to expect a worsening of relations with Italy in the coming years. Politically, military measures cannot be justified. To this, Conrad

objected that military measures should not depend on the temporary political situation. We must convince our neighbors of the peaceful development of our armaments.

Finance officials pointed out that the acceptance of war requirements placed a heavy burden on the finances, which had been experiencing this since 1909. From that time until 1914, 1,200 mill. kroons, not including appropriations for emergencies caused by political crises. Meanwhile, the financial situation of the country is not brilliant. Both halves of the monarchy have a fund of only 900 million crowns. It should not be forgotten that financial readiness must also correspond to military readiness, and therefore the representatives of finance insist on reducing the requirements and stretching them for five years, as the Minister of War suggested. As a result of the discussion, the credit for combat supplies was cut, money for howitzers was transferred to the 1915/16

budget, and as for increasing the contingent of 5 people per company, the Minister of War had to additionally agree on this with both governments. Subsequently, applications were considered for the fleet, which also asked for an increase in credit. The loan was not reduced, but stretched over the years.

In the usual manner, on January 16, 1914, Conrad submitted to Franz Joseph his last memoir for 1913 before the war, in which he outlined his demands.

To complete the picture, we consider it necessary to compare the development of the contingent and the military budget of Austria-Hungary with other states of Europe. Table No. 19 shows the increase

contingent:

Table No. 19

Года	Австро-Венгрия		Германия		Россия		Франция	
	Числен.	Увелич.	Числен.	Увел.	Числен.	Увел.	Числен.	Увел.
1911	137.570	-	271.000	6.000	455.100	-1.500	243.000	-9.000
1912	175.870	38.300	284.000	13.000	455.100	-	256.000	13.000
1913	200.402	25.032	356.000	72.000	505.100	50.000	445.000	189.000

The sharp increase in the contingent of France in 1913 is explained by the introduction of a 3-year service life. As for the rest

states), it must be admitted that the Habsburg monarchy did not lag behind in the development of its army, but, true) in relation to the population, it did not show that military tension, which was done by other countries. During the same time, the military budget, in millions of francs, as shown in Table No. 20, was:

Table number 20

Года	Австро-Венгрия	Германия	Россия	Франция	Италия
1912	387	1.647	1.924	1.217	648
1913	661	1.623	1.938	1.343	638

Thus, while Germany, Russia and Italy refrained from raising the budget in 1913, France and Austria took the path of strengthening it, but if the Frenchman, by his ability to pay, could withstand the burden of the military tax relatively easily, then the tax pressure on the citizen of the dual monarchy pressed pretty hard. For 1914, this tax was to be, according to the project of the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff, increased even more.

We heard how the responsible persons of Austria-Hungary assessed its financial and economic power. She did not hide in the press either: "Arm, arm," the military writer, under the pseudonym "Cassandra", called on the citizens of the monarchy in his article "Armament of Europe and Austria." "Arm for a decisive battle. We must acquire the Balkans. There is no other way to remain a great power. For us, it is a question of the existence of the state, of avoiding an economic collapse, which will undoubtedly entail the disintegration of the monarchy. For us, it is a question of whether to be or not to be. Our difficult economic situation can only be improved when we acquire the Balkans, as a colony exclusively belonging to us, to sell our industrial production, to export the surplus of the population. Arm yourself, arm yourself!! Bring money with shovels and slippers, give away the last penny, fuse cups and silver, give gold and precious stones for iron. Give your last strength to armaments unheard of, what else the world has not

I saw, for it is a matter of the last decisive battle of the great monarchy. Give the gun into the hands of the lad and arm the old man. Arm yourself incessantly and feverishly, arm yourself day and night, to be ready when the day of decision comes. Otherwise, Austria's days are numbered." Poincaré, in his book *The Origin of the World War*, writes: "To all the political motives that pushed Austria onto the risky path of war, we must add those financial difficulties that have been growing since 1912, thanks to armaments and re-mobilizations."

"On December 16, 1913," continues Poincaré, "Dumaine, our ambassador in Vienna, wrote to us: 'Austria-Hungary is in a dead end from which it does not know how to get out. Thus, the feeling that the peoples will move towards the battlefields, pushed by an irresistible force, increases day by day ... military, however, fruitless, the tension that has been made over the past year. Such was the economic situation of the Habsburg monarchy when, in the opinion of the chief of the general staff, it had to again make sacrifices to satisfy the bloodthirsty god of war. "Arm, arm!" Conrad called for

Kassandra, but ... the call met with opposition even from the country's bourgeois politicians, who rightly noted that for military readiness there must be financial readiness. The government did not have it, but whether the population would give money, whether it would carry them with hats, it was impossible to say ahead, since the internal policy of the state was going through "critical days". If, as we saw above, during the war, the population of the state gave their savings into the hands of the government, then this exceeded the expectations of both the leaders of the state and other citizens who had one or another relation to the economic life of the country. This was the last and terrible tension of the forces of the monarchy, followed by a political and financial collapse, the more destructive, the greater the tension was shown during the war. We apologize for dwelling in such detail on the budgetary issue and the participation of the General Staff in it, but we considered

this is necessary, since we fully share Engels' view that "nothing depends so much on economic conditions as the army and navy." Researchers of the General Staff service usually either avoid this question or consider it in passing, while the military budget is one of the main works of the military department, the real basis on which only positive, and not fantastic, measures for strengthening and development can be carried out. combat readiness of the armed forces. Before us was a picture of heavy fighting, which the Chief of the General Staff of the Danube Empire had to wage for the allocation of the necessary, in his opinion, funds. The rest of the general staffs had to endure the same battles on the threshold of a world war. They have not ceased even today, especially where the general staff does not combine its demands with the economic condition of the country, or where the government is on the wrong track in developing its military might.

Chapter XV

Historical reference

Economy in the era of cabinet wars. – The influence of economic power on war in the era of the French Revolution and Napoleon. - The strategy of crushing and the strategy of starvation. - Engels on the role of the commander. — Clausewitz on the impact of the economy on the warrior. – Significance of the war of 1870-1871. - Thoughts of Moltke (senior) on the nature of the future war and its duration. - The arrival of the exhaustion strategy. - Schlieffen on the nature and duration of the future war. - Schlieffen's mistakes. — Views of the German General Staff and politicians in Germany after 1908 on the duration of the war. - "Prophecies" by Blichov about a future war. - Modern attempts of official historians of Germany.

After the World War, economic strength is recognized as the main factor in military affairs. We are now

interested in the question: how did such a decisive factor in the war as the economy was overlooked, and in the world war the belligerents were taken by surprise by its influence. In the era of armchair wars, the

economy undoubtedly also influenced the nature of the war, but was not a decisive given, because, firstly, technology was at a low stage of development, and secondly, the small armies of those times had little effect on the population of hostile countries, replenished by recruitment and eating from shops.

However, in those days, the war lay its burden on the population, which was obliged to replenish military stores and give the government money for waging war.

And in those days, the best weapons contributed to the achievement of victory. The division of strategy into two types is now associated with the era of cabinet wars:

strategy of crushing and strategy of exhaustion.

Recognizing such a division as natural, we cannot delve into a detailed analysis of the era of cabinet wars and its prominent representative, Frederick the Great. We must only note that this commander went as far as the strategy of attrition, for motives somewhat different from those that brought the German strategists of our day to it in the world war. The general of the armchair wars could not freely risk his army in such decisive means as battle, and therefore resorted to the latter as a "vomit." The well-known historian Delbrück writes about Frederick the Great: "he certainly lived in an atmosphere of starvation strategy views, but at the climax of his military career he approached the pole of decisive battle so close that one could get the impression that he was a supporter of the strategy of crushing and, as such, , was the forerunner of Napoleon ... To act according to the principles of the strategy of crushing, prerequisites are needed that were lacking in Friedrich's understanding of the state and the army. Frederick, step by step, inevitably lagged behind the requirements of the strategy of crushing ... If Friedrich is correctly placed within the framework and on the basis of the strategy of exhaustion, then you get a living and monstrously great image. The French Revolution, having brought the masses to the fore, backed them up with the economic development of the country. Everyone knows that extensive organizational activity of the Convention in raising and developing the military industry of France, which formed the material basis for the future victories of the armies of the revolution and Napoleon. As tempting as it is to delve into the influence of economic power on military art during the French Revolution and Napoleon, we must refrain from doing so. This was

masterfully done for us by Engels, who, from a study of this epoch, came to the conclusion that "armament, composition, organization, tactics and strategy depend primarily on the stage of development of production reached at the given moment and on the means of communication." Marx said that "with the invention of a new military weapon - firearms, the entire internal organization of the army, as well as all those mutual

the relations in which the individuals who make up the army stand and thanks to which it is an organized whole; finally, the mutual relations of entire armies have also changed.

This is how the founders of Marxism revealed the relationship between economic strength and military affairs. We will not analyze in detail the influence of the economy on the war in this era, but we will only ask you to remember that, depending on the new weapons and new material, a new French tactic appeared, and after it a new strategy - the strategy of crushing Napoleon. If we delve into the reasons that forced the Corsican to resort to thunderbolts, in an effort to end the war as soon as possible, then we will find in them either the direct influence of economic force, or a derivative of it. France, although it accepted the "industrial revolution", however, could not compete in the development of industry with England, which was at a higher stage in the development of production. But in Europe, economically, France was ahead of other states. The strength of the latter rested on the armies that belonged to the dynasties, and by no means to the people. With the defeat of the armies, the dynasties could hardly or were completely unable to restore their armed forces.

This was the situation in Europe until 1812, when first in Spain, and then in Prussia, the beginnings of people's armies appeared. Until this year, Napoleon had successfully used the strategy of crushing: one or two good defeats of the enemy's armed forces opened the door to peace for him. Since 1812, in the Spanish wars and campaign in Russia, the little corporal had to face the strategy of starvation. True, in those days such scientific terms were not known, but the fact remains - the strategy of thunder strikes did not reach the goal, new forces of his opponents grew up in front of Napoleon's armies, and, finally, near Waterloo, the god of war ended his glorious military career, for economically exhausted France was already could not give him new legions. It should be added to the

above that at the time of the rise of Napoleon's star in the fields of Italy, the French Republic was experiencing a severe economic crisis, the treasury was empty, and it became more and more difficult for the revolutionary armies to withstand a long struggle. We needed victories, the conquest of territories, so that for them

account to improve the economic situation. Bonaparte understood this, and his Italian campaigns turned out to be the source from which the finances of rich regions began to overflow into the empty money box of the republic, making it possible to continue and start new wars.

The French Revolution threw out the slogan: "war feeds war," that is, the army lives on local funds. If you take a closer look at the campaigns of the armies of the revolution, the armies of Napoleon, then in its pure form this principle was never applied, and the French armies did not lose touch with their country. From it they scooped, mainly, replenishment in the human composition and in the material part. We by no means want to ascribe to Napoleon such an economic preparation for war, as we understand it today, but that the little corporal never lost sight of the economic development of France and other occupied regions, seeing in them the basis of his victories, is also a historical fact. It is believed that after 1807 the military genius of Napoleon went down a line, but about this year the economic exhaustion of France began. In this we must look for the reasons for the further failures of Napoleon, whose genius turned out to be powerless with the weakening of the economic strength of the republic and against the new soldier material that appeared among the opponents. Considering the

role of generals in the development of military art, Engels says this: "Every great commander who, through new combinations, creates an era in military history, either finds himself new material means, or gives new use to the material means that existed before him." Napoleon used the development of the productive forces of the French Revolution. "Napoleon's merit, which makes an epoch in military affairs," says Engels, "is that for the colossal armies already created, he found the only correct strategic and tactical application and did it so well that even the best modern generals in their most dexterous and talented operations they just want to copy it.

If we pointed out that in the era of cabinet wars, "the armies of the old monarchies, according to Delbrück, were too small, tactically too helpless and too unreliable in their composition to be able to carry out these principles (of crushing; B.Sh.) in their strategy", then "Napoleon saw himself freed from

these fetters, he placed all his hopes from the very beginning on a tactical solution, which should put the active enemy troops out of the game, and then developed victory until the enemy obeyed his conditions. Saying that "Napoleon

brought his wars to an end not only with victories, but also through politics," Delbrück concludes that "in the innermost depths of his being, Napoleon was much more of a statesman than a warrior. Neither in his youth nor later did he devote his attention to either military history or military theory. In other words, Napoleon was a "man of state", who took into account the growth of productive forces, was

well oriented in the economic development of both France and neighboring countries. Delbrück attributes the emergence of the "new strategy" to the "genius of Napoleon", but we take the side of Engels, who saw in Napoleon only a man who "found the only correct strategic and tactical application" for his armies. The "new strategy" was the product of the French economy, which provided the basis for Napoleon's victories. This concludes the era of the French Revolution and the times of Napoleon. From the views of Engels and Marx cited above, it is clear how profound the influence of economic force on war is. "The organization and combat method of the army, and at the same time the success and defeat of the latter, turn out to be dependent on material, i.e. economic conditions, from human material and from weapons, consequently, from the quality and quantity of the population and from technology," Engels explains elsewhere.

Therefore, some people stop with surprise at the fact that there is no indication of the relationship between the economy and war in anyone other than the poet of Napoleonic strategy, the philosopher of war, Clausewitz. In his work "The Conduct of War and Politics" Ludendorff notices this shortcoming of the strategist of the German school, pointing out that in his time the economy was of great importance. If Ludendorff's last conclusion is correct, then the first must be corrected. We do not want to instill in the philosopher of war a "monistic" view of military affairs, but it is impossible to deny that the "Hegelian" correctly takes into account economic strength in the soldier. It is known that Clausewitz attributed war to the phenomena of social life and material

compared with a banking house. "The war is spreading in almost all directions, not finding definite boundaries for itself," says Clausewitz, understanding by this the penetration of war into all areas of the life of the belligerents. We heard earlier how war and internal politics should be related in the understanding of Clausewitz. He defined the nature of the war with nothing else than foreign policy, and put forward two types of war, which we now call the strategy of crushing and the strategy of exhaustion. A contemporary of Napoleon, Clausewitz, was far from unconditionally recognizing one strategy of destruction, just a permanently established method of action.

"No one starts a war (or, at least, acting reasonably should not start) without telling himself: what he wants to achieve with the war and what in the war itself. The former is the purpose of the war, and the latter is the purpose of the war. This basic idea gives direction to everything, indicates the size of the means and the measure of energy; its influence descends even to the last divisions of actions.

Further pointing out that war can be "absolute" (decisive, extremely tense) or "more or less remote from it," Clausewitz finds it necessary that "the first understanding, as a fundamental one, is placed everywhere and everywhere in the basis, considering the other only a modification the first, justified by the special given circumstances. Recognizing two types of war, Clausewitz

says that "the theory requires that before any war, first of all, on the basis of probability, to recognize its character and the general in a large outline, taking the political magnitude and the situation as the basis."

"The purpose of war, according to the essence of

the concept of it, should be the overthrow of the enemy," Clausewitz teaches. "This is the basic concept from which we start" and "all that the theory can say here will be the following. The point is to take a sharp look at the most outstanding relations between the two states. They will find a certain center of gravity, a center of force and movement, on which the whole depends. A joint strike by our forces must be directed at this center of gravity of the enemy.

"Wherever the enemy's center of power is located, on which we must act," he continues, "in any case, the defeat of his fighting forces will be a good start and an essential part of the matter."

Speaking about the forces and means necessary for war, Clausewitz understands them as "actually fighting forces, then the country with its space and population, and finally the allies", adding that "the entire surface of the country with its population serves as a source of fighting forces." Clausewitz's definition of forces does not stop there, but goes further. "Force is armed with the discoveries of science and the inventions of art in order to overcome another force hostile to itself" -

he concludes.

According to the philosopher of war, forces and means should be proportionate to the goal for which they are assigned. "So," he says, "in order to get acquainted with the amount of funds that need to be prepared for the war, one has to determine its political goal, both one's own and the goal of the enemy; as well as the mutual forces of states and their internal relations; further the character of governments, peoples, and the abilities of both; finally, political ties with other states and the impact of the upcoming war on them. "It is not difficult to understand that it is absolutely impossible to weigh and overcome all these various and varied mutually intertwined subjects by one school-correct discussion alone."

"So, we have to admit, first of all, that the definition of the possible goal of the upcoming war, as well as the means required to achieve it, can be derived by a general look at all relationships, including all the most particular features at a given time. Such a conclusion, like all others in war, can never be purely objective; he, on the contrary, will bear the imprint of spiritual and mental properties, as well as the qualities of rulers, husbands of states and commanders, regardless of whether these titles are divided or combined in one person.

This is what Clausewitz teaches. We did not hear the word "economic strength" from him, but, on the contrary, he put "politics" in the corner of everything, because in those days the "industrial revolution" had not yet manifested itself in full growth and "political causes" were more noticeable than changes in economic development.

We believe that the essence is not in this, but in the essence of the theory of the philosopher of war. First of all, he proposes to define the "center of gravity", "the center of force and movement, on which the whole depends" and under that not always

understands the enemy army. We have seen that under Napoleon it was predominant, but with the development of technology, this center of gravity shifts to the economic life of the enemy. For his time, Clausewitz advised to delve into "all correlations, including all the most particular features at this particular time" and obliged war leaders to correctly grasp and evaluate them in order to find "the enemy's center of power." Finally, in the same Clausewitz, we also find the significance of technology for the strength of the army, and as the "source of combat forces" is "the entire surface of the country with its population".

If Ludendorff expected from Clausewitz a modern interpretation of the influence of economic conditions on war, then we can only note that he, the former military dictator of Germany, has not left the "school-correct" understanding of the theory of the philosopher of war.

In the first half of the 19th century, there were no big wars on the fields of Europe, and the development of industry took big steps forward. The

wars of 1855-1859, 1866 broke out, which already gave victory to the side with more advanced weapons and advanced technology. Thus, the course of history led to the war of 1870-71, conducted by Moltke according to the rules of the strategy of crushing, as once in the era of Napoleon. Although

mass armies appeared on the battlefields, organized on the basis of universal military service, the "armed people" came out to fight, but their connection with the rear, with their country was weak. We heard Engels say that in Germany there were still many "healthy guys" and that the war had little effect on the country, which lived an ordinary life, and if industrial production and trade were reduced anywhere, it was by no means due to military operations. In his book "The Conduct of War and Politics," Ludendorff

points out that France, having recognized itself defeated, did not exhaust all its forces and means of resistance, just as Germany did not resort to special tension of the country, which calmly maintained contact with foreign countries. The war was carried out and ended with the forces and means that were prepared in peacetime. Battles were rare, and casualties in combat stocks were negligible. Technique played no role. About such tension of the people, what

needed in the World War was out of the question. Industrial warfare was unknown. The country hardly felt the war of 1870-1871, which the army fought with its own forces and means. There is much truth in Ludendorff's

judgments, but there are also errors. War of 1870-1871 for the inquisitive military mind was already a source warning about the new nature of the war. Under the influence of technology, the battle order changed and, therefore, it is impossible to say that technology did not play any role. The new weapon required a large expenditure of cartridges and shells, and Krauss, known to us, reports that the same war of 1870-71. revealed an insufficient norm for providing combat stocks established in the German army. The most

important thing is that the war of 70-71. predetermined the advent of the strategy of exhaustion. Having defeated the regular armies of France in a "Napoleonic" way, Moltke found himself face to face with the newly formed armies of the French, and there is no need to hide that in order to continue the war, if the government of the republic had not surrendered, the German army would not have had enough of its reserves and mobilization reserves prepared for war. A. Svechin considers "the army of Gambeta" to be the "second echelon", with which "I had to mess around for four months." France was not annihilated, she was still strong economically, and victory would have required greater strain on Germany herself. The second period of the war was a good warning for the German field marshal, which he took into account. A. Svechin rightly believes that "this experience, as it seems to us, formed the basis of Moltke's views on the future war of Germany on two fronts, as a fight to the

point of exhaustion." As for Moltke's views on the importance of economic force in military affairs, as everyone knows, Moltke attached great importance to the development of railways, pointing out that this new means also predetermines a new method of waging war, concurring in this with

Engels. Then: "For the conduct of war, in comparison with the past, new auxiliary means are now needed. Now we can not do without the help of science and technology in all their forms. Everyone must work together to emerge victorious in the great struggle of the peoples."

So teaches Moltke. "But this is still not enough for all these forces to unite. Both in politics and here, - the field marshal continues, - the coalition will always be weaker than the sum of individual absolute forces ... Therefore, for successful warfare, technology and science must not be allies, but vassals of military control. We will not quote Moltke's views on the importance of railways.

"Happy is the people who will timely study this power and all the estates of which will support each other in this," declares the old field marshal. The imperialist nature of the coming wars did not escape the attention of Moltke, who noted that "at the

present time the stock exchange has also acquired influence, which can call on armed force to protect its interests." Proving the need for a well-trained army to wage war, the field marshal predetermined the nature and duration of a future war. "If

the war," the old field marshal said in 1890 in the Reichstag, "which has been hanging over our heads for more than ten years like the sword of Damocles, if this war finally breaks out, then no one will be able to predict its duration and its end. The greatest European powers will enter the struggle with each other, armed as never before. Not one of them can be crushed in one or two campaigns so that she admits herself defeated, that she is forced to make peace on harsh terms, so that she cannot rise up and resume the struggle ... It may be seven years old, and may there will be a thirty-year war **and woe to the one who ignites Europe, who is the first to throw a wick into a powder keg** " (*our italics*; B. Sh.).

Thus, the experience of the war of 1870-71, and then taking into account the latest factors - the stock exchange as the manager of the war, and the impact of the war on the state economy, lead Moltke to conclusions about the future nature of the war, neither starvation nor its significant duration.

In another place, he points out: "Let us assume that neither the Thirty Years' War, nor even the Seven Years' War will be repeated. But nevertheless, when whole millions of people stand against each other in a fierce struggle, one can hardly believe that the matter will be decided by a few victories.

Thus the clear mind of the old field marshal foresaw the advent of the strategy of attrition in the conduct of war, abandoning those methods that had given him unfading glory. It

seems to us that, if we are consistent, it is permissible to ask how, during the course of a 7 or 30-year intense war, Moltke thought to ensure the combat supply of the army with the help of pre-prepared combat stocks and how much they would need. Apparently, it would be impossible to do without the use of the entire industry of the country. "Only on its own strength rests the fate of every nation," says Moltke. How he wanted to use this power is unknown to us - the old man took this secret with him to the grave. However, as an example to his general staff, he left a very definite judgment about the tense nature of the war, its duration, about the impossibility

of deciding the fate of the war with a few victories until the economic strength of the enemy was broken.

To use this heritage, and not to hand it over to the archive, was already a matter of the General Staff.

With the beginning of the 1990s, Germany embarked on the path of imperialist policy, for its productive forces were growing every day, just as other states of Europe, the future enemies of the middle powers, were rapidly advancing along the path of industrial progress. It would seem that one should have listened to Moltke's

words about the nature and duration of the war. But "his successor of genius, Field Marshal Count Schlieffen," writes Ritter in his Critique of the World War, "took the opposite view, saying: "long-lasting wars at the present time, when the existence of nations is based on the continuous progress of trade and industry, are impossible, ***the stopped course must be resumed by a quick decision***" (*our italics*; B. Sh.).

Further exaggerating Schlieffen's justification that, from a military point of view, the latter considered the war to be quite long, Ritter cannot hide the fact that "the possibility of a prolonged European war, in itself being in absolute connection with purely military conditions, was completely denied by the commander

General Staff for economic reasons. Based on the superiority of the German army in the first period of the war, Schlieffen put forward his "Cannes" as a method of carrying out the strategy of crushing. "However, from the consideration that it was necessary for Germany to end the war as soon as possible, there should not have been a tendency to ignore the facts that spoke for a long duration of the war, or at least not

look for those."

"In fact, it was exactly like that," continues Ritter. - The German General Staff was not preparing for a long war. In this way, he put everything at stake, at the stake of the unstoppable desire for victory of the German army in all its superiority of spirit, knowledge, combat training and command. The calculation was based on the unsteady

soil."

In a false assessment of the influence of economic force on the war, the whole "genius" of Schlieffen as a "statesman" was reflected. The Germans of our time regret that Schlieffen failed to carry out a world war - we also grieve about this, because then the "genius" would pay for his limitations, knowing it on his own back. Having inherited the correct orientation from Moltke, the newly-minted "genius" decided to be independent in his judgments, drawing conclusions from a field that was apparently quite alien to him.

However, the economic development of the productive forces advanced so much that since 1905 (the year Schlieffen retired), the idea arose in the same German General Staff of the economic preparation for the war, namely: the procurement of food resources for the war and the formation of an economic council under the Prussian military ministry, or the establishment of a special "economic general staff". In the work "The Conduct of War and Politics", already known to us, Ludendorff points out that the assumption of the General

Staff was not carried out, since they hoped to always maintain contact with Rumania and America, from where the supply of food supplies would ensure the need for them. If financially the preparation was carried out, then economically it was not carried out, and Ludendorff finds that the general staff should have been more insistent,

In the book "War and the National Economy" Arthur Dix writes: "only in the last five years before the war did an extensive economic literature appear (in Germany; B.Sh.), which developed questions of the economic preparation for the war as a whole." Speaking of his book in this field, published in 1909, Dix notes that in it he "pointed to the need for the establishment of a permanent economic conference at the War Department." "This proposal," he

continues, "subsequently supplemented and developed in my other articles, met with a favorable reception in the Great General Staff, and in July 1913, published by it, my article was published on the economic preparation for war." "Unfortunately, the opinion prevailed in the Great General

Staff that the practical work of economic preparation for war should be the responsibility of the highest body of military command - the Prussian War Ministry; the latter, for its part, believed that this was the business of the civil authorities, in particular, the imperial ministry of the interior. The Minister of the Interior was negative about this issue, and back in May 1914 he made a statement that he did not see the need for special economic preparations for the war. "The real comprehensive economic preparation of Germany for the war was not started even in the

summer of 1914 ... the military economic council for the general mobilization of the national economy and the labor market was not only not established, but its organization, as already indicated, at the end of May 1914 was categorically rejected by the Imperial Ministry of the Interior."

As noted above, Ludendorff admits that there was no "perseverance" in the German General Staff in economic preparations for war, in the creation of a special "economic headquarters". We see the reasons for the lack of such "persistence" primarily in the fact that the German General Staff hoped to win the war by "crushing" and, consequently, to end it in a short time.

"This war," Minister of War Falkenhayn told his employees before leaving for the front, "will last at least 1½ years." This is the duration of the war that the future

Falkenhayn, an adherent of the strategy of exhaustion, who still left a sad memory for most Germans.

It cannot, of course, be said that the importance of industry for the conduct of the war was not taken into account by the General Staff. No matter

how little Moltke (junior) answered his appointment, but, according to the same Ludendorff, he showed special concern for protecting the industrial regions of Germany in case of war and even changed the plan of the "brilliant" Schlieffen, appointing more forces to cover Alsace and Lorraine. Some of his contemporaries now blame the former chief of the general staff for this, but Ludendorff himself looks at it differently, believing that with the capture of the industrial areas by the enemy, at least temporarily, Germany would not be able to withstand the war for that time, what she actually did. Former German Secretary of State Helfferich in his memoirs notes the good financial preparation for the war and the complete absence of the same in the economic field. Paying tribute to German industry

and the people, who showed high tension in need, Helfferich finds an explanation for this in the established opinion both in military and industrial and economic circles that the future war will be short in nature and therefore all talk about the economic general staff has remained one conversations. "I think no one in Germany can say that he was considered at the beginning of the war with such a long duration and with such a close blockade. Considerations that the modern war would be short-lived were dominant in military and economic circles," says Gelferich and cites his conversation at headquarters in November 1914 in which the high command expressed a definite idea to end the war by the end of 1915. Even in April 1915, the high command was still convinced of the end of the war through

a few months.

The world war itself, of course, better than us, refuted all the guesswork of the German General Staff about the duration of the war and the influence of economic power on it. Modern criticism of the General Staff after the time would be unfair. We heard from Helfferich that in Germany even the economists did not believe in

prolonged nature of the future war. It is quite understandable that for modern Germans some passages from the collective work of Blioch mentioned by us: "The Future War", which appeared in 1898, i.e. just at the time when Schlieffen's "genius" also "prophesied" about the nature and duration of the future war. In one of Blioch's volumes it is written: "First of all, we had to note the fact

that most military writers, as specialists, pay main attention to the technical conditions of the case, look at the future war and plans of action only from the point of view of achieving the goals of the war by means of destroying armies. the enemy with weapons, the economic and social upheavals that will appear from the moment of mobilization, as well as the consequences of the war, if they are discussed, then only as something secondary. "Meanwhile, weighing only one military-technical side of the course and results of

operations is completely insufficient. In contrast to what happened in previous wars, the future war, in all likelihood, will end not because more or less major victories over the armies will be won by one of the parties, but because of the disintegration of the military apparatus, due precisely to the influence of economic and social ".

"Modern million-strong armies can no longer, as they used to be, feed and be supplied with everything necessary mainly from local funds. Armies will be able to operate only on the condition that they are constantly supplied from bases located within their own countries.

"The lack of funds, or even the impossibility of delivering them in a timely manner, due to a break in communications or a poorly organized administration, would cause hunger and deprivation in the army, with its present strength, which would lead its enemy to the goal with less danger and sooner than the use of weapons . In view of this, in a future war, some nations, after attempts to resolve the dispute with weapons that will cost too significant sacrifices, others, due to their confidence in some advantages of the organization, may have calculations to decide the fate of the war by exhausting the means of their enemy, using weapons are only as an auxiliary means.

Having come to such conclusions about the duration of a future war, due to the great influence exerted by economic power, the anonymous author of *The Future War* involuntarily wondered whether the industrial and economic preparations for war were being carried out in the states. "The

general plans of operations for a war with one or another enemy are undoubtedly worked out at the main headquarters of all armies," says *The Future War*. In these plans, in all likelihood, it is indicated, by approximate calculation, and the time that may be required to achieve one or another goal. But it is permissible to doubt that economic conditions have been sufficiently taken into account in these plans.

"We happened to speak on this subject several times with the former French Minister of the Navy (later President of the Council) Burdeau, a man of outstanding abilities. He openly admitted that in France at the time when Freycinet was the Minister of War, it was supposed to undertake a calculation of those economic conditions that would accompany the war, but that this assumption was abandoned due to the opposition of the military spheres. "Economists would have to be invited to participate in such a study,

which could not remain a secret. In the meantime, nothing of the sort had been heard. Even if the official study were not carried to any definitive definitions, the very clarification and comparison of all economic phenomena and conditions connected with the war could induce a more cautious conduct of international negotiations on such questions, because of which there will be a war; in the extreme case, if it became inevitable, then the parties would have it with full consciousness of its economic consequences, and not with their eyes closed, as in most cases it happened hitherto.

The German General Staff can take comfort in the fact that the rest of the "brains of the armies" were also conservative in their views on the nature of the future war and did not go along with the proposals made by the "civilian" people for reasons of keeping secrets. The latter was hardly carefully kept by the French general staff, and the harm from the lack of economic preparation for the war was great.

We do not believe in all sorts of "prophecies", and the above judgment of economists about the nature and duration of a future war is attributed exclusively to a well-thought-out account of economic strength and its influence on the war. What we have

said about the two types of strategy, of course, was not a secret even before the World War. As is known, the civilian professor Delbrück, who preached the strategy of exhaustion, was fiercely attacked by the German General Staff long before the World War. It cannot be said that this attack has ended even now.

The "fiends" of the destruction strategy were strong not only on the banks of the Spree, but also in the rest of the states of Europe, numbering many outstanding military minds in their camp. To prove the correctness of their propositions, they subsumed under the strategy of crushing the same economic basis from which Delbrück proceeded.

A. Svechin rightly writes that "all the general staffs of all states organized all the preparations for a world war, based on an unshakable faith in the strategy of crushing, they experienced the most severe disappointment; during the war itself, they could not orient their thinking, artificially one-sidedly educated, towards starvation in the actual conditions of the war.

It should be noted that even after the war, 10 years later, the compilers of the history of the world war in Germany under the label of the State Archive do not want to admit that they made a mistake in determining the nature of the past war.

In the first volume of the "History of the Reichsarchive", devoting a chapter to "the duration of the war and the economy", historians from the banks of the Spree prove that Germany could not exist for a long time on its own means both in food and in stocks of raw materials for industry. It was impossible to remain long without contact with the outside world, otherwise the spirit of the people would be undermined. "In these types," writes "History," "all responsible state institutions, as well as economic ones, were of the same opinion that in the event of war it is necessary to seek a solution as soon as possible. Also, for economic reasons, it was necessary to achieve victory as soon as possible.

Forgotten was old Moltke with his prophecy about the nature and duration of the world war, not to mention Clausewitz, the name

which, although remembered with honor, but as a tradition. The spirit of the teachings of this philosopher of war was fundamentally alien to the German General Staff, which turned Frederick the Great himself inside out.

“Could anything be more surprising,” Delbrück wrote, “than the fact that a hundred years after Frederick, the Prussian general staff ceased to understand his strategy ... But, surprising as it may seem, it still remains a fact” ...

Today we are again facing a significant fact, when the German General Staff, which has descended from the scene, in the person of its remnants - archival people, "ceased to understand the strategy" not only of the era of Frederick, but also of our days. So strong is the mirage of "crushing"...

Chapter XVI

Economy and war

"Primary" in the war. - The nature of the war. - Clausewitz's position. - Mistakes and determination of the nature of the world war. - Who determines the nature of the war and the application of the strategy of crushing or the strategy of attrition. - The nature of war and the economy. - The nature of the future war. - Preparation of war on the economic front. - The economic plan of the war. - Stocks of raw materials. - Financial preparation. - Transport. - Mobilization of civil industry. - Economic mobilization. - Leading the preparations for war on the economic front. - "Economic General Staff". - "Integral General Staff". - The organs of the state, and not the General Staff, direct the preparations for war on the economic and political fronts. - Tasks of the General Staff in the economic preparation for the war of the state. - Military supply plan for the army. - Participation in the Name of the General Staff. - Conrad's activities in the military supply of the Austro-Hungarian army. - "Real" army supply plan. - Military budget. - His definition before the World War and now. - The military budget and the size of the army. - The military budget and the cost of war. - Compliance of the military budget with the economic life of the state. - The General Staff is a "usurer". - "Budget size" of the armed forces. - Military budget and economy regime. - The ratio of the main elements of the armed forces and the military budget. - Installment of the military plan by years. - Preparation and approval of the military budget. - The role of

The cruel lessons of the world war fully confirmed the thesis of Marx and Engels that the "primary" in social relations, and consequently in war, is economic force.

It is difficult to reveal more exhaustively the influence of economic force on war than was done by Engels. "Armament, composition, organization, tactics and strategy primarily depend on the stage of development of production reached at the moment and on the means of communication," says the founder of Marxism. As is known, all these

questions, basically, constituted the terms of reference of the General Staff, and therefore, in solving them, we deem it necessary to take correct account of the growth of productive forces.

To resolve all this, first, as Clausewitz advises, "the nature of the future war and the general in a large outline" must be determined. Success or failure will largely depend on the correct forecast in this regard. Using the example of the German General Staff, we have seen how the mistake made by Schlieffen led to excessive tension, which the country had to endure, not being prepared for this, and end the war with defeat. Similarly, in Austria-Hungary no correct account was taken of the nature of the future war. We cannot say with certainty how long the war Conrad expected, but hardly longer than his colleague on the general staff in Berlin assumed.

In our reasoning, we took a stern view of the erroneous definition of the nature of the world war by various general staffs. The reason for this was a vague idea of the stage of development of the productive forces reached, of the economic strength accumulated by hostile states, and of the degree of its influence on the war. It was also difficult to demand from the "demigods" the correct solution of the question of the nature of the war, because, as Ritter explains to us, "in peacetime, the general (German) headquarters maintained only insignificant direct relations with civilian departments and posts." Such isolation of the "black clergy" was one of the reasons

its backwardness in matters of the current state of the economy.

If Clausewitz warned that war captures all areas of life, then after the change in the nature of war, already in the time of Moltke

(senior) one could come to the conclusion that the management of the preparation and conduct of the war itself is no longer the work of one general staff. Today everyone agrees that this should be primarily in the hands of the government. Only it, having weighed all the factors of the economic development of its country and the countries of potential adversaries, can correctly predict the nature of a future war. Only one government determines the application of the strategy of crushing or the strategy of attrition.

We listened with satisfaction to the teachings of the civilian participants in the Council of Ministers of Austria-Hungary, who suggested that the chief of the general staff, in his monetary demands, take into account the circumstances of foreign and domestic policy and the stage of economic development of the Habsburg monarchy, rightly noting that military readiness alone would mean little for success if economically the country is not ready.

Today we can say with complete certainty that the nature of a future war is determined by the economy. The

world war is over, and we are again, on the threshold of the coming war, the nature of which must be determined in order to conduct correct preparations

for it. The reader of our work, of course, knows that many pages have been written on the question of the nature of a future war, both in literature and in official documents of various states. This topic occupies the minds of everyone, and quite often the walls of various audiences hear the arguments of speakers about one or another character of a future war.

In view of our criticism of the former General Staff, we consider ourselves obliged to make our own judgment on this issue. We are by no means going to be soothsayers and prophets, but we take economic force as the starting point for our reasoning. Its

development shows us: 1) that a future war will inevitably entail an economic struggle, in which the rear will be captured no less, if not more, than the front; 2) that the economic struggle will exacerbate the ongoing process of class stratification and may naturally turn the war into a revolution; 3) that the development of the productive forces will put into the hands of the fighters new means of struggle, more lethal than those used today.

We have the right to ask what kind of strategy we adjoin. We do not consider it necessary to evade the answer.

The development of economic strength gives stability to the party joining the fight, providing her with the best weapons.

But the same development of the economy makes us recall Lenin's teaching that it is very important to know which class is waging war, because the class struggle that flares up will lower the defense capability of the state that has entered the war.

We are not going to be "prophets" or "predictors", since we fully agree with A. Svechin that only "charlatans" can claim this in the field of strategy. We only consider it our duty to

emphasize that, most likely, a future war will take on the character of a struggle to the point of exhaustion, but depending on the size of the enemy's country, on its internal state, on the class struggle developing in it, the possibility and strategy of crushing cannot be ruled out. We are by no means going to give recipes, but "the point is," as Clausewitz says, in order to take a sharp look at the most outstanding relations of both states. They will find a certain center of gravity, a center of force and movement, on which the whole depends. A joint strike by our forces must be directed at this center of gravity of the enemy.

We have developed the views of the philosopher of war in sufficient detail, we will not repeat them here, but we will suggest to anyone who wants to think about the nature of a future war, to search in each specific case where the "center of gravity" of the enemy will be, and to direct a "joint strike of our forces" at him ", by which one cannot now understand only military forces, but also political and economic ones.

There are no words that the defeat of the enemy's manpower would be the best start - as the same Clausewitz says, but this "destruction" does not yet signify the final victory in our days. The latter may be hiding on a different "line of conduct". In order to achieve success, we consider it necessary to have complete harmony of "all lines of conduct", good preparation for war on each of them.

Thus, we are not going to predict either a "seven-year" or "thirty-year" struggle, but we advise you to be prepared for a long and intense tension in a future war. If, in order to shake the middle states in the world war for "reasons

the decomposition of the military apparatus, due precisely to the influences of economic and social, "as Blich predicted, it took 4 years, then in the days we are experiencing this period may turn out to be less.

Economic strength and consideration of which class is waging war will be the surest ways in determining the nature of a future war, which we propose to follow the "strategist" - "the husband of the state." We have shown above that very little was

done in Austria-Hungary before the World War in terms of preparing for the struggle on the economic front. And not only in Austria... The same thing happened in Germany, France and other countries. In Germany, it is true, even literature appeared, and the question of an "economic general staff" was raised. In France, there was a "National Defense Council" on paper, which did not function in reality. Nowadays, of course, it is not necessary to prove the necessity of economic preparation for war, the existence of an economic plan for war. This is now realized everywhere and everywhere. True, it must be said that from consciousness to actual realization is a distance of a certain size, which cannot yet be crossed in any state ...

Given the size of our work, we cannot, of course, develop in detail the theory of the economic preparation for war.

As indicated above, determining the nature of a future war requires a correct assessment of the economic power of both one's own country and that of the enemy. Therefore, it is clear that in modern conditions the body directing the war as a whole, as well as the strategist, needs to be aware of all these issues. In other words, on the one hand, they must have at their disposal complete information about the state and development of the productive forces of their country, and, on the other hand, measures should be taken for extensive reconnaissance of the same from the enemy. Economic intelligence is now just as necessary and necessary as the collection of information about other elements of the power and strength of an enemy state. We

pointed out that the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff was not aware of the economy not only of foreign states, but also of the monarchy. True, we also noted that other politicians, including financiers, made a mistake in

determining the solvency of Austria, considering that the country can only withstand the war for 2 months.

The economic plan of the war must provide not only for the preparation for war of the army and the theater of operations, not only contain the "military side", in the sense of supplying the army with everything necessary, but generally affect the "economic line of conduct" of the state during the war. The plan must provide for the development of the country's national economy, and financial and economic mobilization and transport must be thought out and prepared. We have repeatedly

pointed out that the reserves of raw materials in Austria-Hungary were unevenly distributed over the territory of the state, and the developed industry of the country encountered difficulties in this already in peacetime. Of course, the body that would be in charge of preparing for the war should have thought about this, because there was no such thing in the Habsburg monarchy, and the chief of the general staff did not delve into the development of preparation so deeply.

We must say the same about the financial side of the economic plan, if it existed at all in those days on the banks of the Danube. If measures were taken in Germany in this respect and the outbreak of war gave the German currency a much greater stability than its opponents, nothing of the kind happened in Austria. We cited Krauss' testimony about his proposals for "war" money, proposals that did not touch the inert brains of the General Staff and the financiers of the state. The chief of the general staff even told us that he did not consider himself entitled and not competent to assess the financial possibilities of the country. It is impossible, of course, to recognize as correct such a statement by the "husband of the statesman", who received a well-deserved reproach from other figures of the state during the discussion of the military budget.

We did not touch upon the issue of preparing transport for war, as we will cover this in a special chapter. However, here we also showed the activities in this area of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. In this we must give him his due. Transport, as an important factor in the war, was taken into account by all general staffs, and Conrad was no exception in this.

Turning to the question of the mobilization of civilian industry for the purposes of war, today we can say that not a single state before the world war took into account the full importance of such preparation of the country. It is impossible to make harsh demands on the chief of the Austrian general staff in

this regard. We heard how he took care of the material preparation of the army for war, how he insistently pointed out the need to accumulate mobilization reserves, to concentrate them in a timely manner and to ensure production for the

duration of the war. The chief of the general staff, not receiving data on the productivity of military factories from the Minister of War, himself tried to have them at his disposal in various ways, set production standards for wartime, took into account the need to support factories with orders in peacetime in order to maintain the qualified force necessary for the war. .

In a word, we cannot say that Conrad did not care about the preparation of the military industry in case of war, providing it with manpower and even raw materials for the production of the necessary products.

This reliance on the strength of one military industry to feed the war is common to all general staffs and military administrations before the world war. Today, of course, it is well known that such a method of feeding the war provides only 10-15% of its needs, and the rest should be transferred to civilian industry, which is mobilized from the first days of the war.

We do not have the right to present the readers with a complete picture of the entire preparation and mobilization of civil industry, as it is now conceived by us. Those who are hungry for this knowledge are referred to the corresponding works on this issue, of which there are now enough in all languages. We would only like to note that industrial mobilization must be carefully prepared, closely linked to military requirements, i.e. to give in the right amounts what the army needs and what can be used by it, and not for the purpose of accumulating supplies in general. By no means should there be an "overproduction" of "military material", as A. Svechin rightly notes, because this leads to an overstrain of industry, an overstrain of the entire country and a weakening of its defense capability and

resistance. The "Great Hindenburg Program" in Germany largely contributed to the country's internal crisis and capitulation to the Entente. The mobilization

of civilian industry and preparation for it in our days is such a necessary and so important work that the study of its basic principles, and even details, should be well known to every statesman and responsible military worker, regardless of whether he is a particle of the "brain of the army". " or not. It is necessary to know the duration of industrial mobilization, the methods of its implementation, the provision of the necessary drawings, templates for setting up new production and the provision of an appropriate labor force in general, and a qualified one in particular, etc.

The questions that the Chief of the Austrian General Staff had in regard to military factories must now be applied to the entire industry of the country. In addition to the mobilization of

civilian industry, economic mobilization in general must be carried out throughout the country. We heard from Austrian military writers that this question was not at all developed in Austria-Hungary, and not in her alone. Today, in theoretical writings on strategy, we read about "an economic balance between town and country," about the need for food preparation for war, and so on. 12 years ago they didn't write about it. At the cost of hard experience, they reach truths that are now a revelation and which in ancient times of history were well known to the leaders of the country entering the war.

At this point, we break off our story about the preparation for war of the economy of the state as a whole, repeating again that, despite all the topicality of this issue for our days, we cannot embark on a detailed interpretation of it.

We will focus the attention of the reader of our work on who should lead this preparation of the country.

Throughout our work, we have more than once revealed our point of view on the leadership of the preparation for war of the state as a whole and said that now this is the business of the "collective", the business of the government or an organ specially created by it, which in all countries

either there are various "councils of defense", or else they will undoubtedly exist from the very first days of the war. A similar

body, created before the World War in France, turned out to be "dead". As noted

above, before the World War, the General Staff and the Ministry of War were considered responsible for preparing for war, according to military legislation. This responsibility did not extend to any other state bodies, except for the appropriate provision of the correct course of mobilization in the sense of supplying people, horses and carts, for which the Ministry of the Interior with its bodies was responsible, and the corresponding accumulation of funds by the financial authorities of the state. Economic preparation was reduced to the work of the supplying bodies of the military department, to the strengthening of the activities of military factories and enterprises.

Within this framework, preparation for war was understood by the general staffs of various countries. We acquainted the reader of our work in detail with the activities of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. We heard how the Great German General Staff, agreeing in principle with the need for economic preparation for war and the existence of this special body, did not intend to include it in its bowels, blaming the War Ministry; the latter, in turn, found it necessary to have him in the Ministry of the Interior, which finally brushed him aside. Such is the "history" of the "economic general staff" before the World War. Today there are no two opinions regarding the significance of the economic preparation for war—everywhere it is

recognized as important and necessary. But as to who is in charge, there are different views.

In the chapter on the general staff and domestic policy, we have already given two points of view on the leadership of preparations for war, which are available in our literature: P. I. Lebedeva and A. Svechin. If the former builds it on a "collective" body - the "mobilization committee", which is the body that cements the preparation for war, then A. Svechin puts the preparation for war on the "general staff".

In particular, with regard to economic preparation for war, in his work "Strategy" A. Svechin says: "Economic

General Staff" is a reflection of the modern expanded understanding of the leadership of the war. If combat missions lie ahead during the war not only on the front of armed struggle, but also on the class and economic front, then it is necessary to create combat agencies in advance, in charge of training and preparing themselves for the leadership of the corresponding front. The creation of a military economic headquarters is in the order of the next events.

"The experience of the past shows that without a special combat body, the activities of various high non-departmental bodies in general preparation for war may freeze" ...

"The economic general staff," A. Svechin continues, "may be few in number, but its qualifications should be very high. We believe that part of it should consist of persons closely connected by their training and service with the Red Army and who have received a higher military education, supplemented by an internship in industry and certain works in the military economy, and part of outstanding economists and technicians with a broad outlook, who specially develop questions economics associated with the war, and who took the time to familiarize themselves with the history of some recent wars, strategy and administration. Perhaps the reader of our work

will remember Blich with his advice before the World War about attracting prominent economists and sociologists to work in the preparation of the war. If in those days the "military" did not want to allow "civilians" to the defense of the country for fear of disclosing military secrets, now, as we see, such an entry is recognized not only as desirable, but even obligatory. For us at this time it is interesting to determine the

place of the "economic general staff" in the system of military administration and the state apparatus.

Earlier we cited A. Svechin's thoughts about the General Staff in general, let us now recall them. A.

Svechin says that "to streamline the gigantic work of preparing for war, a "team" is required. "Only the general staff can harmonize, harmonize training, so capacious, so diverse, directed along so many separate lines" ...

Thus, if we understand the author of the "Strategy" correctly, then in order to prepare for war "we need not the semblance of a parliament of departments reflecting any centrifugal aspirations, which is planned by the mobilization committee, but the general staff." In

other words, again the leadership of the preparations for war must be transferred to the general staff.

However, the general staff of our days, as it was found out earlier, is not the commander of the past, and if we have reached the "integral commander", then we have also come close to the "integral general staff". Today, along with the "operational" general staff, there must exist an "economic" general staff, and since the war is also being waged on the political front, there will consequently also be a "political" general staff. But since some body will have to coordinate the work of all three headquarters, the existence of a "super-general headquarters" is necessary. We make the reservation that these thoughts are ours, and by no means want to attribute them to the respected author of the Strategy.

If the "operational" general staff can be equated with the former "brain of the army", then the "economic" and "political" general staffs should, in our opinion, constitute the "brain of the country", and only one government can be the "super-general staff". We do not mind that "agents of one whole" - representatives

of the "operational" general staff will be included, and even should be part of the "economic" and other headquarters to link work, but assign "combat bodies" in charge of preparing for war on the fronts "economic" and "political", the names of the general staffs, we would abstain. In a word, we believe that the leadership of the preparations for war on the political and economic fronts should be left to special

organs of the state, and not to the army, and by no means to the general staff, even if it is "integral". The General Staff, as such, will have enough work in the field of operational

preparation.

What should these bodies be: "whether it's like a parliament of departments", as P.P. Lebedev puts it, or special state bodies, as A. Svechin thinks, is

another question. We believe that a "parliament of departments" is indispensable, but along with it there should be state apparatuses that would concentrate preparations for war on one front or another, as the "brain of the army" does on the military front.

It will rightly be pointed out to us that if before the world war the general staff was interested in the proper preparation of the war in the field of supplying the army, then now it is no less; if not more, it turns out to be interested in preparing for war, and in particular on the economic front, of the entire state as a whole. We are by no means going to deny such an interest, for rightly the English field manual imposes on the General Staff "the choice of such a course of action, which, with the quality of the armed force prepared for war, could in the shortest possible time exert an influence on the hostile people in the desired direction." But it is also true that the same charter notes: "In view of the fact that the plan of war is influenced by various considerations concerning sea and land forces, the air fleet and politics, the responsibility for adopting, changing or revising this plan falls on the government, which, having approved the plan, assumes, in principle, the responsibility for ensuring that it is carried out with the necessary forces." On the whole, war is

prepared, waged, and responsible for success or failure, not by the general staff, but by the government of the state, which, either by itself or through a special body (the Council of Defense), cements preparations along various "lines". As for the General Staff,

through its representatives in the "combat bodies" in charge of preparing for war on various fronts, it must be aware of their work, is obliged to make certain proposals in the sense of the greatest satisfaction of operational requirements, but not dictatorship in them. , bearing in mind that the final approval of the war plan is the business of the government, that the overexertion of the economic strength of the state is fraught with threats of losing the war, no matter how brilliant the victories on the battlefields are. Bismarck once said that "politics is not a

battlefield." We take the liberty of referring this saying to the entire war as a whole, because today the war is not concentrated on the theater of operations alone. We do not give proofs, since it is clear even without them.

So, if Conrad did not consider himself obliged to enter into a discussion of the economic power of Austria-Hungary, her ability, as a state, to war, but at the same time found it possible to make high demands on her in spending money on the army, then now such actions on the part of the chief of the general staff would have been sharply and decisively condemned. Concerning the

questions of the economic plan of the war, which we have outlined above, we must point out that the modern General Staff will be interested in all of them, each of them must be taken into account in full measure, and each of them must be supported by the General Staff. The general orientation in the economic plan of the war will give the general staff, as a conclusion, an idea of the economic power of the state, which in turn will give the government data for determining the nature of the war and "choosing the mode of action" of the "armed force" in general.

These are our thoughts about the General Staff and the economy of the state in preparation for war. They are not original, they may be erroneous - we do not claim their immutability, because "more powerful heads" resolve them than ours.

In order to put an end to industrial mobilization, we will focus on its operational cover from enemy attacks. Measures must be taken: 1) to assign factories and factories deep into the territory of the country that will work for defense, not to mention purely military factories; 2) special measures were taken to cover the industry and extractive industries, if any are located near the border, we noted that Moltke (the younger) had to change the idea of the Schlieffen plan, given the possibility of the French invading the industrial regions of Germany; 3) measures must be taken to protect such centers from enemy air raids, chemical defense measures and internal security measures. All this must be thought out by the General Staff, guiding grounds and the necessary constant orientation in the actual implementation of the measures taken must be given.

Strong Rome had strong legions - this is how the chief of the Austrian general staff tells us, but both he and the generals of the German school considered it necessary first of all to prepare a strong and efficient army for war. In this up

there were no two opinions anywhere. Everywhere they tried to arm the army in the best possible way, supply and prepare the necessary supplies for it.

“Regardless of the plan for economic mobilization, a plan developed on a nationwide scale, the military department should have its own plan for resolving the tasks of supplying the armed forces in case of war,” A. Svechin rightly says in the “Strategy”.

It is certainly impossible to reproach the General Staff for not taking an active part in drawing up and carrying out the military supply plan. Each general staff was aware that the modern army should be well-funded in case of war, and in terms of its weapons and technical means not only keep up with, but even, if possible, surpass its probable opponents.

We have before us the activity in this field of the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, which exhaustively confirms what has been said.

In all armies, direct concern for the material support of the army, both in peacetime and in time of war, was concentrated in the War Ministry, and in Austria-Hungary even in three (all-Imperial and two Landwehr). The General Staff, however,

resolutely came up with certain proposals both in the field of armaments and in general the supply of the army. We know what continuous fighting on this front the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff had to endure. Was the general staff right in starting these battles? The direct responsibility of the General Staff is to prepare the army for victories in the theater of operations. We think it is now clear that, as Engels says, victory in most cases will go to the manufacturer of better, more advanced weapons. Therefore, the General Staff could not be indifferent to the issues of arming the army.

Conrad's aspirations to re-equip the infantry with more modern guns, his efforts to develop artillery, to create heavy artillery that could immediately give success at the beginning of the world war to the armies of the middle states - speak of his correct approach to

resolution of such important issues of armaments. True, in the development of artillery, the chief of the Austrian staff followed the path indicated by the Germans, but at the same time he overtook them. It is now well known that 30 s/m. Austrian howitzers in terms of their combat qualities turned out to be much better than 42 s / m.

howitzers of the German army. On the issue of re-equipping the infantry, Konrad correctly sought out a new, better type of rifle, but he came across the enormous importance of this issue in every army in general, as requiring large expenditures. We cited the figures that the Chief of the Austrian General Staff planned for this operation, and they clearly indicate that Austria-Hungary could not master the plans of the Chief of the General Staff. There is not much to say about the expediency of increasing machine guns in the infantry and cavalry, about which

Konrad was busy. We heard how, in the artillery program, Konrad stumbled upon the unwillingness of the War Department to orient him in the course of its implementation, the possibilities of strengthening the program, the inertia of the views of bureaucrats in artillery uniforms, and bureaucratic red tape. All this was characteristic of more than just Austria. The same was true in other countries. The Chief of the General Staff of Austria had to talk directly with the director of the Skoda plant himself, to bother everywhere, to push forward the implementation of the planned artillery program. Having

earned the nickname "dreamer", Konrad strenuously sought the development of the air fleet of Austria-Hungary. True, the absence of an industrial base in the country made his plans "projectile", but the desire to give the army a new combat technical means and the correct consideration of its importance in the future to the general staff of the monarchy cannot be

denied. To characterize the obstacles to the development of technology in the army, it is enough to recall how Franz Joseph himself had to prove the advantages of the automobile by taming him to this new means of transportation and traction. We heard how Conrad managed to provide the army with both military vehicles and create a voluntary automobile corps. We cannot

fail to note that the General Staff in peacetime took great care of the uninterrupted power supply of the army, in case of war,

ammunition and projectiles. We will not repeat here again what we have said about this above. We must only note that all the general staffs were mistaken in the calculations of the required combat stocks, but the Austro-Hungarian general staff was closer to reality than others.

The shortage of shells and cartridges is a vivid example of how necessary it is to correctly determine the nature of a future war and, depending on it, to establish the norm for the necessary combat stocks and the procedure for their replenishment. The World War clearly showed that it was impossible to meet the needs of the army in cartridges and shells by the military industry alone; it was necessary to mobilize civilian industry. As regards mobilization stocks, they should be calculated in such a way as to provide for the army until the time when the mobilized civil and military industry is in full swing, giving the army a regular influx of combat supplies. We have no right to dwell on this issue further. Our conclusion is simple: in the matter of material support for the army, the general staff must take the initiative, enter into the establishment of the general principles of this support, and in general be always aware of military supplies, being, as before, the "brain of the army" in this. There are no words that it is impossible to build "houses of cards" here, one cannot ask unrealizable ideas - all of them must be subject to the law of the development of the country's economic strength, strictly consistent with reality and be "real". It seems that it is not necessary to prove the entire usefulness of creating "real" branches of the armed forces, "real" reserves and carrying out reforms in military affairs that have a material base.

The former Russian General Staff especially sinned in this, and he was not alone. We have heard the projects of the Austrian General Staff—good projects, but impracticable for reasons of the economic backwardness of the country, but, meanwhile, Konrad considered it possible and necessary to make demands on money sacrifices on the part of the population, proceeding from the rather false premise that in all states the population bears money. on the altar of the god of war, and therefore Austria cannot lag behind. A. Svechin in the "Strategy" rightly says: "The importance of the supply plan makes it necessary to demand

drawing it up with the participation of persons leading the drawing up of the plan of operations; its features, capabilities and needs - the high command and its responsible employees should be well acquainted. In drawing up the supply plan, they should play not a passive, but a very active role. The life of every state must proceed according to a certain plan, and each of the branches of this

life also requires planning, especially the one that is connected with the economic side.

The "display in numbers" of the life of the state is found in its budget, which presents in the same "form" the life of individual departments of the state machine of control, their plans.

One of these plans is the military one, which is expressed in the military budget of the state. The military budget before the World

War was understood as a plan for the construction of a military system by the state, as a well-known preparation for war - as a "financial expression" of the state's war plan, and one or another of its sizes in relation to the general budget marked the degree of intensity of the state's preparation for war. At present, in one military budget, we cannot include the entire idea of the state's war plan, since the

war plan should cover the preparation for it of the entire state as a whole, and we think that each of the departments of the state apparatus in its budget should have certain paragraphs and articles intended for preparation for war. Nowadays, the military budget "expresses" only the preparation of the armed forces for war, and from this point of view we consider it necessary to approach the military budget today. The "military plan" or "military budget", being an indicator of the military tension of the country, rests on the so-called budgetary size of the army, i.e. the army that the state maintains in peacetime. The well-known

correlation between the size of the armed forces and the cost of maintaining them constitutes a certain pattern, and usually the cost of one soldier determines the severity of the blood tax. Of course, here it is impossible to understand precisely those costs that fall directly on the maintenance

one soldier, in the sense of his food and equipment. The budget cost of a soldier, so to speak, includes the costs of carrying out the entire program to prepare the army for war: the maintenance of the army, the accumulation of mobilization supplies, etc.

Since in peacetime the armed forces of the state are preparing for war, the military budget must contain part of the costs of the war itself, a component of this must be included in the "cost of the war." "The advantage of the

military economy is not to maintain troops, but to inform the state of the ability to have all the means (material and financial) for war in a difficult moment," Stein said.

A. Svechin rightly notes that "the military budget should be not only a means to train a powerful army, but also to reduce the costs of a future war." The relationship between

the military budget and the cost of war is large. The richer the military budget, the cheaper the war will cost. A large military budget makes it possible to accumulate mobilization reserves, and A. Svechin even proposes to "characterize" it by "the percentage devoted to the procurement of mobilization reserves and capital equipment." Indeed, by the percentage of the budget that is allocated and spent on the accumulation of mobilization reserves and on the preparation of a theater of war, one can judge to what extent and with what intensity the state is preparing its armed forces for war. A budget that goes only to maintain troops in peacetime is a waste of public money and public property.

Thus, we put forward the demand for a large military budget, especially considering that modern wars, due to the wide use of technology in them, are incomparably more expensive. We can safely be told that before the World War all the general staffs came up with the same demands for an increase in the military budget, and the states suffocated under the weight of those blood taxes that were heaped on them by the mutual competition of the general staffs.

We fully take this into account and take the side of those ministers and politicians of Austria-Hungary who pointed out to Konrad that the military budget, in addition to satisfying military data, must always be combined with the conditions of the country's economic life and its development. If a war is lost because of an overstrain of the country's economic power, then such a loss can begin already before the start of the war with a high military budget, the burden of which does not correspond to the solvency of the population, and the military budget does not keep pace with the economic development of the state.

The above is evidence of what was said, and we showed with figures that Austria-Hungary was close to the limit of its financial elasticity, and therefore it was impossible to shoulder those "big programs" that the Chief of the General Staff proposed, we did not give explanations for such plans of Konrad let us recall them once and here: the chief of the general staff did not know, did not want to know, and did not consider himself obliged to enter into an assessment of the economic situation of the state; the motives of his demands were reduced, on the one hand, to military necessity, and on the other hand, for example, other states whose population bore the burden of increasing military budgets. The politicians of the Danubian monarchy were right, the old Habsburg was right, who in such cases pointed out to Conrad that it was necessary to take into account the financial power of the monarchy, that in other states it was stronger than on the banks of the Danube. The mode of correspondence of the military budget to the economic development of the state is absolutely necessary, and this must be well mastered by the modern general staff. We have heard the witty comparison of "operator", i.e. the general staff, with the "usurer" - a man who, observing his own benefits, makes heavy demands. It seems that a "reasonable" usurer, before lending money, will always make inquiries about the creditworthiness of the one to whom they are given and from whom they will subsequently be required, and then the percentage itself should be commensurate with the solvency of the recipient of the loan. Otherwise, the debtor may become insolvent, declare himself bankrupt. We would not recommend the modern general staff to be a "usurer-grabber", making demands on their state in excess of its economic capacity. If the strategy for

Clausewitz is a "banking house", then today, to be a good banker, you first need to know economics well.

We do not give here any percentage of the military budget to the total, since we consider them not entirely indicative. A high percentage of this ratio in an economically strong state does not yet signify an overstrain of the state; to judge this, it is always necessary to take into account the solvency of the population.

Above it was mentioned about the budgetary size of the army. To it we must add the budgetary size of the fleet (sea), as well as the air force, if it is separated from the army. As

you know, before World War II, the budgetary size of the army was determined at 1% of the population of the state. It was believed that the state was able to maintain in peacetime, according to its economic power, such a number of armed forces. After the World War this percentage is lowered, which, of course, will be exchanged for nothing else than the economic ruin of states. "The army and the navy ... cost 'damn money', as we all know, to our misfortune," Engels rightly used to say. None of the pacifist ideas of the bourgeois states are a force that reduces the size of their armed forces, but only "damn money". In addition to the economic upheaval of the states, even the victors, after the World War the budgetary strength of the armed forces was also affected by the rise in the cost of maintaining the modern army, due to the widespread use of technology in it. Therefore, we are now witnessing a widespread reduction in the budgetary size of the armed forces, supported by all sorts of talks, projects and conferences about disarmament.

In a word, in the military budgets there is a desire to implement an economy regime, which, in fairness, must be recognized as correct. A healthy regime of economy lies in the adoption of the correct organization of the armed forces and the correlation of the main elements within them corresponding to their tasks. We cannot here dwell on this point in detail, but we must note that in the modern armed forces every man must be weighed in terms of his need in time of peace; as a frame for the military army

time. Extra mouths should not be allowed either in wartime, let alone in peacetime. In this regard, we have shown the measures that the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff had to take in order to find people for new formations, and given his thoughts on increasing the budgetary size of the army. Similarly, the objections of the Hungarian Prime Minister Tissa about the inexpediency of increasing the staffing of the company and 5 people in peacetime were announced. All this suggests that the modern organization of the army must be very, very well thought out, calculated, because it "costs 'damn money', as we all know, to our misfortune." At the same time, the question arises of the relationship between the army

and the navy, which ran like a red thread in disputes about the military budget of Austria-Hungary, which was in Germany, and in Russia, and in other states before the World War, which has not lost its significance even now. It is impossible not to pay tribute to the

correctness of the reasoning of the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, who pointed out the excessive spending of money on the navy at a time when the fate of the state in the war should be decided on land. We do not repeat here all of Conrad's arguments, for they have been given in detail above. In modern conditions, with the advent of the air fleet, it is necessary to be very careful, after weighing all the tasks that will have to be solved with weapons, to approach the correct ratio of the main elements of the armed forces, it is necessary to grasp correctly for the future the ratio between the "patents", of which there were two in Peter's time, and now we take into account so far already three. If we compare the cost of these "patents", then "unfortunately" the marine is especially worth "damn money", and therefore its development must strictly meet the need to perform those tasks) that may fall to its lot. Luxury must not be allowed ... "War does not appear suddenly," says Clausewitz,

"its preparation cannot be a matter of an instant." War costs money, preparations for it cannot be carried out without a strong strain on the economic strength of the state in a short time. In these types, all military plans, certain programs are calculated in their implementation for years, and in the military

the budget is paid only a part of the general plan of military development. For how many years the last one can be stretched out - this will be said by only one government, which fully takes into account the likelihood of a war breaking out after a given period of time. This concludes with the general principles of the

military budget and
we proceed to the order of its development and approval.

It was pointed out above that the approval of the budget and its consideration were the prerogatives of the representative institutions of the state and the supreme power. Of course, this was not the case in Austria-Hungary alone.

Today there can be no two opinions about this, especially with the principle proclaimed everywhere that the war is waged by the state as a whole.

"The size of the armed forces to be maintained in time of peace or mobilized for war is determined by the policy for which the imperial government or the government of the respective self-governing colony is responsible." So now the English field manual clearly speaks of this. There is no need to prove the validity of this proposition, because this is understandable without us to any "axiomatization". We have pointed out that the military budget is "the

financial expression of the military plan." To give the military plan "financial expression" was the duty of the War Ministry in all armies, and in Austria-Hungary even of the three War Ministries. The protection of military budgets before representative institutions fell on them, as bodies responsible for this under the constitution.

However, in all armies the general staff claimed the leading role in drawing up the military budget, entering into heated battles on this front with the War Ministry. We saw these fights in the Austro-Hungarian army, heard Konrad's heated speeches in defense of "his" big and other programs, his requests for resignation and other decisive steps. Before us were Konrad's requests for admission to the defense of the budget, as an exception to the constitutional rules, if not with a decisive voice, then at least as an expert, on a par with the head of the marine department. Let us recall that the chief of the general staff, having obtained Franz Joseph's order to the council of ministers to listen to Conrad's program, spoke with it at this council. In a word, the General Staff proved the need for its closest participation in the preparation, discussion and defense of the military budget. As we know, in Germany the military budget was also drawn up and carried out by the minister of war, and the chief of the general staff did not always succeed in carrying out his proposals for military development. Everyone knows the fate of Ludendorff's 1912 report on the creation of three new buildings. The Minister of War, as Chancellor Bethmann informs us, found it possible to refuse the measure proposed by the Chief of the General Staff, and these three corps were then not enough under Maria. In each army, one could observe battles for the military budget, not only in government bodies, but above all within the military

departments. Everywhere the General Staff came up with "its own" program of military development, even giving it a numerical expression - as we saw in the example of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff.

Of course, it is impossible and even unthinkable to deny any participation of the General Staff in the preparation of the military budget. "The brain of the army" and should remain so. All basic proposals for the military plan not only can, but must be made by the General Staff. But it is not his duty to provide a detailed economic basis for the military plan, to give it a financial shell - this is within the scope of the economic bodies of the military department, in other words, the former military ministry. Of course, we may be told at once that such work by the General Staff will be reduced to the old "fantasy", to the construction of "houses of cards", to the game of "robbers or soldiers". So it was and will be, if the general staff in its basic assumptions does not take into account the economic might of the state, does not prescribe "real" programs, does not consider itself obliged to enter into a discussion of the economic life of the country. But we have warned against such deviations before, and now we will only point out again that we do not recognize such work of the modern general staff.

We consider it his duty to give impetus to the military budget, which will be worked out in detail in the economic bodies, and in the process of this study, certain amendments will be made, in agreement with the General Staff, and in the final form the military plan will be submitted for discussion to government bodies from that body or person of the military department, which is responsible to the government under the constitution. We do not see the need

for the participation of the chief of the general staff in the defense of the military budget in government bodies, as Konrad demanded for himself, because, in the normal course of affairs in the bowels of the military department itself, the person who defends the military budget should also defend it, like the chief himself. general staff. Of course, if the wheels of the military administration machine itself creak, if there are continuous battles between the general staff and the economic administration, then the general staff may have to come out in defense of its individual positions, but, as a principle, put forward its own

military list of expenses, its "big" or other program but follows. It must never

be forgotten that "the art of war is not a decree to politics," and the military budget is not only a purely military matter, but also a political and, above all, economic one. We heard how the Austrian-Hungarian ministers thanked the Chief of the General Staff for "his" programs, reserving the right to adopt them and letting him know that this was primarily a matter for the government, and not for the General Staff. The "brain of the army" should not get out of its skull. This concludes our brief account

of the influence of economic power on warfare. We do not know whether we have been able to clearly show the full depth of this influence, but Engels grasped it much earlier.

"To what extent the conduct of war depends ... on the productive forces and means of communication of our own deep rear, as a theater of military operations," Engels instructs, "in our days ... every ambitious non-commissioned officer can enlighten on this score."

"In a word," he continues, "everywhere and always, economic conditions and resources helped the "force" to win, without which it ceases to be a force, and who would like to reform military affairs, guided by the opposite point of view ... he could get nothing, except for the bumps...

Afterword

"War spreads in all directions, not finding definite boundaries for itself," Clausewitz taught. If such a position was irrefutable for

his era, then it is all the more true for our day. We have repeatedly cited evidence for this on the pages of our work.

Anyone who would like to start writing about modern warfare, supporting his judgments with searches in history, can hardly state it briefly. They say that brevity is the expression of the mind.

The philosopher of war himself, old man Clausewitz, strove to "reach a tolerable whole, in the form of a small volume of eight." "In it," he continued, "I wanted to leave aside everything that is ordinary, well-known and accepted, a hundred times

expressed."

Starting the story about the General Staff, about the "brain of the army", which should cover the war as a whole, we also sincerely wanted to present it to the reader "in the form of a small volume of eight". But we were convinced in advance of the futility of our intentions. Let's not hide the fact that we also dreamed of "leaving aside everything that is commonplace, well-known and accepted, expressed a hundred times", - we tried to do this, but, of course, we did not succeed. The desire to show the reader life as it flowed in the General Staff forced us to turn off the path traced a hundred years ago by a more powerful head than ours.

We confess that the reader of our work passes "everything that is commonplace, well-known and accepted, a hundred times expressed." Maybe we will be reproached for this, or maybe ... someone will read it with interest. In essence, in life we constantly meet "everything ordinary" and "well-known", but this does not prevent humanity from again looking for the truth, when it has long been found. In these types, we believe that our work will also prove useful to the military, who has set himself the goal of not only "shine at the head of a cavalry regiment", but also go to higher positions. The repetition method is not a bad method...

We are expected to be engaged in summarizing the "results" of what was said in our work or "thinking" about what was written.

But, as you know, "results" in modern military literature are not considered a cry of fashion, moreover, we have not brought our story to its final chapter. As for "thinking," in

the introduction we admitted that we had no inclination to "philosophical" verbiage, and throughout our work we shared with the reader our thoughts about this or that fact of life. We introduced him to the building called the "general

headquarters" or in everyday life the "brain of the army", introduced him in general terms to the organization of this institution, visited the office of the chief of staff, introduced some characters from this high institution and undertakings looked at only part of the work of the general headquarters. We still have to get acquainted with most of the functional activities of the "brain of the army" ... We have cited the judgment of our prominent military writers, but

they look at the "ledgers" with distrust. Maybe someone who has leafed through our work will come to the same conclusions - then we will not occupy his attention and try not to meet him on the literary path .. But with someone who decides to sacrifice time and reveal the second

book of our work, we are willing to talk again ...

Clausewitz writes: "I put my ambition in writing a book that would not be forgotten in two or three years, which an interested person could pick up more than once." We are far from such "ambition" and do not

expect that our book will be remembered even in a year. We would be satisfied if the "interested in business" would read it only once, believing that even then it would bring him some benefit. In this conviction, we put down the pen for now ...

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1

Croatians

2

The national minority formed outside the indigenous country from emigrants and migrants is the diaspora. The irredenta is a part of the nation that was forced to find itself outside its homeland, without leaving anywhere. An example is the Germans after the Treaty of Versailles. - Approx. Hoaxer